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 The purpose of this research is to explore unlikely intersections between the 
seemingly divergent streams of spirituality and queer theory in the discourses around 
education. When brought into conversation, the two produce creative tensions 
particularly in regards to constructions of knowledge and subjectivity.         
In an interrogation of “spirituality” as a construct in education, I map a 
genealogy through Enlightenment and Transcendental thought arguing that 
“spirituality” in its popular usage cannot be understood apart from a larger explication 
of Western religious liberalism, and in particular liberal Christianity. I then turn 
towards a consideration of the utility of such a construct in light of the erosion of the 
foundational thought on which it depends. Having both levied my critiques of 
“spirituality” and argued a case for its usefulness, I consider what sort of theological 
framework is functional as an underpinning for a spirituality concerned with critical 
pedagogy. 
My discussion takes shape in relation to three practices more commonly 
spoken of in Christian discourse: hospitality, embodiment, and testimony. I explore 
these three concepts as they support an understanding of queer pedagogy as spiritual 
practice, particularly in regards to my own teaching experience.  Highlighting the 
investment of both queer pedagogy and spiritual practices in drawing attention to the 
limits of knowability, I demonstrate how framing queer pedagogy as spiritual practice 
might enrich both discourses.  
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PART ONE 
 
 
Prologue 
This may be my Nineveh.   
Nineveh was the town to which God told Jonah to go and “cry out against” 
(Jonah 1:2, New Revised Standard Version).  He ran the other way to “flee from the 
presence of the Lord” (1:3), eventually was thrown overboard (at his own request), 
and then spent a few days in the belly of a big fish before being spit up on Nineveh’s 
shore.  It is not a perfect metaphor.  I am not standing in judgment of the wicked ways 
of some depraved city, but nonetheless, I feel as if I am giving in to an assignment I 
have been avoiding.  That is probably a common sentiment as one begins a 
dissertation, but there has been a back and forth around my willingness to engage this 
particular work – the intersection of sexuality, Christianity, and teaching – for most of 
my adult life.  It feels so much like the expected dissertation for someone who has 
lived my life that I have worked fairly hard at resisting it as my work to do.  And yet, 
I know that I have a unique perspective on the intersections of these topics, and I 
continue to find myself drawn into conversations about those intersections – so much 
so that when I have made earnest efforts towards writing in other directions I find 
myself constantly distracted by the questions I ask here.  
            Please do not hear in my referencing Jonah a bold assertion of any particular 
theological claim or serious analysis of agency.  I do not mean to suggest that God 
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told me to write this dissertation. However, what I claim is that as I engaged in an 
active practice of paying attention to what discussions and readings excited me – to 
those moments when I come to the edge of my seat in dialogue with colleagues, 
students and friends – I recognized that the stuff of this project matters deeply to me.  
Despite my varied academic interests and sustained efforts in prioritizing other 
avenues of research, I continue to come back home to these conversations.  
Thus, in large part, I approached the writing of this dissertation as a process of 
vocational discernment.  My understanding of vocation as a concept owes much to 
Buechner’s definition:  
 
It comes from the Latin vocare, to call, and means the work a person is 
called to by God. There are all different kinds of voices calling you to 
all different kinds of work, and the problem is to find out which is the 
voice of God rather than of Society, say, or the Superego, or Self-
Interest. By and large a good rule for finding out is this: The kind of 
work God usually calls you to is the kind of work (a) that you need 
most to do and (b) that the world most needs to have done. If you 
really get a kick out of your work, you've presumably met requirement 
(a), but if your work is writing cigarette ads, the chances are you've 
missed requirement (b). On the other hand, if your work is being a 
doctor in a leper colony, you have probably met requirement (b), but if 
most of the time you're bored and depressed by it, the chances are you 
have not only bypassed (a), but probably aren't helping your patients 
much either. Neither the hair shirt nor the soft berth will do. The place 
God calls you to is the place where your deep gladness and the world's 
deep hunger meet (1993, p. 95). 
 
 
I wrote this as a response to the question posed by poet Mary Oliver, “Tell me, what 
is it you plan to do | with your one wild and precious life?” (1992, p. 94).  At least for 
now, this act of writing is the spiritual practice that shapes my days. 
And yet, the implications of this project extend well beyond my personal 
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practices. Regardless of personal convictions, whether or not one claims identification 
within a confessing community, educators must grapple with the fact that faith and 
spirituality looms large for a significant portion of students.  Inside and outside of the 
classroom, theologies inform epistemologies and vice versa.  Further, I would argue 
that even atheologies, resistances to spiritually infused epistemological claims, are 
shaped by a history of ideas that is so culturally bound to the cosmological claims of 
religious discourses that their rejection still requires their acknowledgment.  In a 
cultural context infused with religiosity and as the inheritors of an intellectual 
tradition historically bound to religious investments, ignoring the influence faith has 
on the institutions of education not only fails to disrupt violence emerging as a result 
of religious privilege, it reinscribes less critical approaches to spirituality and 
theology with the power to control the terms of the conversation by failing to engage 
openly.  
Spirituality matters.  It shapes the matrices through which students and 
scholars, pastors and activists make meaning of their lived experiences.  For those 
readers, situated in the academy who perpetuate constructions of intellectual and 
critical engagement as necessarily oppositional to spiritual and theological 
investments, I invite you to reconsider.  This is no altar call, no attempt to insist 
adherence to some faith tradition, but rather an insistence that the outright rejection of 
the significance of the claims of those who do choose identification within confessing 
communities is both violent and counterproductive.  It is critical that challenges to the 
tendency towards substituting faith claims for critical engagement continue to be 
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challenged, but the work you hold in your hands is also about suggesting that an 
avoidance of critical engagement is not inherent to discourses invested in holding on 
to spirituality and theology as productive means of organizing knowledge. 
At the same time, I recognize there are multiple audiences for this work.  
Some will come to this reading actively engaged in the practices of a religious 
tradition.  Some may have even taken on leadership roles, entering into formal 
covenant with faith communities as clergy or members of religious orders. The fact 
that this work grows out of a course of study within a secular university are indicative 
of the assumption that the lines between secular and sacred are increasingly blurry 
and each may have much to learn from those who privilege other ways of knowing.  
Yet while I maintain that faith and spirituality still matter in public discourses, I also 
challenge adherents to engage the world beyond the churchyard.  The theoretical 
lenses offered by the other intellectual projects have powerful and significant 
implications for those grappling with sacred Mystery. 
I have entered into this work hesitantly, in part because I do not want to be 
perceived as calling for us all to join hands and sing Kumbaya. The agendas that 
shape the multiple communities who might be represented in this project’s readership 
are not one and the same.  And yet, there are points of intersection worth recognizing, 
perhaps more than one might notice at first glance.  There are places in which 
different readers use different language, but similarly meet the limits of what can be 
understood and are left scratching heads and facing the choice to either stand with 
humility or chose denial and the illusions of certitude.  Yes, I am personally 
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implicated in this research project; but no, this is not simply about me working out 
my inner conflicts.  Regardless of what you bring with you into the reading of these 
pages – regardless of which of the discourses referenced feel familiar and which seem 
strange – you are invited to consider the implications of disparate and sometimes 
irreconcilable discourses juxtaposed on one another, to join in imagining new spaces 
opening up in holding them loosely side by side.   
How might these multiple conversations so invested in pushing up against 
what we know and how we know it inform one another?  Is there something to be 
gained in considering queer pedagogy alongside spirituality?  What sort of 
epistemological and theological issues are raised in such a consideration, and how do 
those issues shape and inform pedagogical and spiritual practices?  These are the 
questions that I keep bumping up against, and they are the questions that drive this 
research. 
And so, I walk onto the shores of Nineveh, open to what comes.  
 
Introduction: A Nomadic Documentary 
 
Our entry point into this study is in large part grounded in the stories of recent 
events that led me to stand on this shore, though to call them stories imposes a 
narrative structure that may not quite fit.  Perhaps incidents is a better choice – not 
quite plateaus or fields of intensity, “whose development” in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conception, “avoid any orientation towards a culmination point or external end” 
(1987, p. 22), but working in that direction.  There are four of these incidents 
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reflected in this introduction.  They function less as a history than a nomadaology,1 or 
                                                 
1 Deleuze and Guattari call for a “Nomadology, the opposite of a history” that unlike 
a history, is not written from a “sedentary point of view and in the name of a unitary 
State apparatus” (trans. 1987, p. 23).  The concept of a study of wandering appears in 
the context of their theorizing about the nature of knowledge production in relation to 
written text, and specifically books.  Their primary metaphor, the rhizome, will be 
further explored as we progress, but they also employ the image of a map as opposed 
to a tracing.  Whereas a tracing is simply reproducing the same “overcoding structure 
or supporting axis” (p. 12), a map “constructs the unconscious.  It fosters connections 
between fields, the removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum 
opening of bodies with organs onto a plane of consistency” (p. 12).  A Nomadology, 
then, might function as a meta-analysis, a study of the movement and the movers, of 
the terrain and the path charted through it.   
The very structure of the text you are reading begins to play with this notion 
as it disproportionately locates the building of a theoretical framework in the 
footnotes, mapping a terrain, the concepts and their accompanying symbols, through 
which I as the author am exploring in the production of the written text. In bringing 
her own research into conversation with a wide range of postmodern textual practices, 
some of which intentionally push against the limits of intelligibility, Lather (1991) 
offers a sentiment that resonates with what I am doing in this project: “this text I have 
created feels more traditional than not, no radical departure from the tradition which it 
interrogates. As but one example, it clearly does not break with a profusion of 
references and footnotes in its creation of textual authority” (p. 10), and yet, my intent 
is in some ways to exaggerate the role of the footnote as textual convention so that the 
intentionality of the performance functions as parody.  Consider this textual drag, 
employing a camp aesthetic to the authoritative structure of academic writing.   
Lather goes on to suggest, however, “to write ‘postmodern’ is to write 
paradoxically aware of one’s complicity in that which one critiques…while I in many 
ways inscribe the conventional and provoke conditioned responses, I attempt, via 
making explicit my authorial agendas, to subvert those responses by foregrounding 
how they were induced” (1991, p. 10).  As Lather works within prescribed 
conventions, at least within that particular book, she pushes up against those 
conventions by acknowledging her complicity with them and undercutting the 
assumptions they evoke. So, as I engage similar strategies, in some ways what I am 
about here is a sort of Dolly Parton shtick in which she jokingly acknowledges the 
amplified artifice of her image – but here it is the assumed authority as author that is 
acknowledged as textual performance, and you, the reader, like a Dolly fan, is in on 
the joke.  That is not to suggest that these footnotes are less important than the text 
that hovers above them, if anything it is to suggest that the lines between what is 
primary and what superfluous are arbitrary and permeable.  We all know Dolly is 
wearing a wig, she names it openly, but as she never appears in public without one it 
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map of my wonderings.  The first three document academic/professional 
opportunities that have opened for me since the summer of 2008, with attention paid 
to the ways in which they have pushed my thinking and engagement around questions 
relevant to this project and the work that they have generated.  The fourth draws from 
the previous three experiences – not so much as bases, but more as moments of 
crystallization,2 bulbs or tubers giving way to their offshoots3 – as I articulate a vision 
                                                                                                                                           
is fully incorporated in what we consider the “real” Dolly Parton. The superfluous is 
central.   
In later work, Lather continues to challenge the ways written text functions on 
the page in order to produce or reinscribe assumptions about the linear nature of 
knowledge.  In Troubling the Angels (1997) a book she coauthored with Chris 
Smithies about women living with HIV/AIDS, the authors employ text boxes, split-
pages, and other textual arrangements as they present their research.  Explaining their 
textual strategies, they suggest “While this book is not so much planned confusion as 
it at first may appear, it is, at some level, about what we see as a breakdown of clear 
interpretation and confidence of the ability/warrant to tell such stories in 
uncomplicated, non-messy ways” (p. xvi).  Lather and Smithies make an 
epistemological claim by challenging the assumptions about how a written text 
functions in the production of certain ways of knowing. Though I make only 
occasional use of their specific strategies, elements of that kind of thinking about 
representations of knowledge may appear at other points in this work.   
2 My use of “crystallization” as a metaphor is intended to refer to the process of a 
solid forming from a supersaturated solution, the idea being that a fluid but densely 
constituted body of knowledge gathers into clusters and becomes stable under 
particular conditions. Richardson (2000) uses crystallization in a related manner, 
offering it as a more complex model for thinking about validity in research that 
utilizes a multiple methodologies, perspectives, or data than the more commonly used 
concept of triangulation.  She posits the crystal as “the central imaginary for validity 
for postmodern texts,” because it “combines symmetry and substance with an infinite 
variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and angles of 
approach” (p. 13). Richardson’s concept affirms the same sort of nonsynchronicity 
Villaverde (2008) describes as “a way to rethink time and elements as not occurring 
together yet connected.  The structure for connection is closer to multiple networks or 
rhizomes that still affect each other despite the potential distance between elements or 
events” (p. 145). 
3 Again, this image is drawn from Deleuze and Guattari’s (trans. 1987) metaphor of 
the rhizome.  Unlike the logic imaged by the tree, whose roots are binary and ever 
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for this dissertation.  In essence, the fourth part conceptualizes this dissertation as 
another in the series of academic/professional opportunities, another bulb or tuber, 
like a potato to be chopped up only to produce more vines and other potatoes.   
I resist placing these in a chronological ordering, in part because it would be a 
reductive and linear rendering of what has been a complex and rhizomatic4 process, 
and in part because I am unsure of the dates and sequencing even over these past 
                                                                                                                                           
splitting into smaller parts (much like a tree diagram of a sentence – split into two 
phrases, then ever smaller parts defined in opposition to one another until each term is 
coded), the rhizome “ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, 
organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social 
struggles.  A semiotic chain is like a tuber agglomerating very diverse acts, not only 
linguistic, but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, and cognitive” (p. 7). 
4 Deleuze and Guattari (trans. 1987) describe four characteristics of the rhizome: 
connection, heterogeneity, multiplicity, and asignifying rupture (pp. 7-9).  In 
describing a process as rhizomatic, I mean to suggest that it could be similarly 
characterized.  Specifically in this case, I am making an epistemological claim in 
resisting a narrative structure in which events unfolded in simple cause/effect patterns 
in order to produce a clearly defined knowing. My experience of the incidents 
described in this introduction has been that they functioned as sites of performance in 
which multiple identifications, ways of knowing, and bodies of knowledge were 
assembled for particular purposes.  These assemblages then produced offshoots, both 
new ways of knowing and new knowledge.  
 Building on Deleuze and Guattari, Gannon and Davies (2007) describe the 
rhizome as an “unseen, underground, creeping, multiplying growth that can strangle 
the tree or the root of conventional thought” (p. 87).  While extending in multiple 
directions, rhizomatic plants both form points of crystallization or “knots of 
arborescence” (Deleuze and Guattari, trans. 1987, p. 20) like tubers and bulbs, and 
unpredictable patterns, “moving underground, splitting off, and springing up in anew 
in unexpected places” (Gannon and Davies, p. 87).  Thought described as rhizomatic 
then similarly links unexpected texts and events, making surprising connections and 
disruptions.  Ultimately, such analysis disrupts the concept of a unitary, rational 
subject – a discernable knower to do the knowing.  In using the term to describe 
thinking about my own experiences over the last several months, I play in the tension 
suggested by my own subjectivity.  In other words, I challenge the assumption that I 
could step outside of my experience and reflect back on it.  Rather, I assume that I am 
produced as a subject by the discourses through which the telling of the stories find 
meaning, and I am simultaneously implicated in their production.   
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eighteen months.  I also want to avoid the illusion that these few events documented 
below are discreet and occurred in isolation.  They reflect ongoing dialogical 
processes built on conversation, writing, preaching, and teaching that happened both 
long before and during the half year before this writing.  For example, one of the 
pieces explored in what follows contains work written a year earlier, which in turn 
contains work revised from my Master’s project written five years before that.  
For our purposes, what is particularly helpful in the case of the incidents 
explored here is their production of written documentation – a mapping of my 
reengagement of a larger discourse on sexualities and the church, informed not only 
by my own stories and theological convictions, but also by my academic engagement 
with the theoretical tools of curriculum and cultural studies.  If, as mentioned before, 
they also point towards plateaus,5 significant not in their adherence to a narrative 
structure but rather each functioning as one field of intensity among many, then one 
could read the documents produced out of the first three incidents in any order and 
still find connections.  Part of the frustration of a bookish writing project is the 
imposition of a linear form, one that may be pushed up against, but in the end one 
                                                 
5 Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of a “plateau” is based in Bateson’s use of the 
word in designating “a continuous, self-vibrating region of intensities whose 
development avoids any orientation toward a culminating point or external end” 
(trans. 1987, p. 22).  They use the term to refer to “any multiplicity connected to other 
multiplicities by superficial underground stems in such a way as to form or extend a 
rhizome” (p. 22).  A plateau, they explain, “is always in the middle, not at the 
beginning or the end” (p. 21), so for our purposes, the term refers to points in the 
theorizing or analysis that multiple and disparate strains of thought obtain some 
degree of arborescence.  While not conforming to a narrative structure (with a clear 
point of initiation, gradual building to a climax, and subsequent release) the plateau 
functions as a field of sustained energy, a site in which the multiple offshoots 
entangle and engage.   
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page still precedes another.  In many ways, this particular project functions more like 
a website in which the links are nearly as significant as the text itself – a website in 
which one’s route through the written text could take multiple forms.  As a result 
those three documents, referred to as appendices, are far from peripheral and, in fact, 
make up the core of the work.  They are the driving force behind these early pages. 
While each of the documents that give shape to this introduction offers a 
glimpse into my thinking in response to an external stimulus, the larger mapping 
occurring within these pages is best read as a performance rather than an assertion of 
an alleged “competence”.6  So, I introduce my exploration of queer pedagogies as 
spiritual practice by inviting the reader to explore the terrain I traversed immediately 
preceding my current framing of the primary content of this dissertation.  I know no 
other way to start from where I am than to explore how I came to be here. Yet, I 
know that no matter how rigorous my intent, any path through those fields of 
yesterday’s knowing is drawn somewhat arbitrarily – as is any portrait I draw of 
myself as knower – so please hold this text loosely as you read along.  I suspect it 
may shift in your hands.   
Incident: An Emerging Conversation 
            While I was supposed to be working one of my other academic projects into a 
dissertation proposal, I was invited to write a piece on “the inclusion of homosexuals 
in the church as a justice issue” (that is how it was presented to me in a conversation 
                                                 
6 In their explication of the map/tracing metaphors, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that 
the more rhizomatic map has to do with performance, while the tree-like tracing 
“always involves an alleged ‘competence’” (p. 13), of which they are clearly 
skeptical.    
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over coffee) for an audience of Baptists interested in emerging church movements.7  I 
countered with an offer to write an essay reframing the initial request in a way that 
would allow me to have the conversation I have been longing to have with church 
folk about sexualities for years but have struggled to find a forum that could support 
it.  What I experienced in the process of writing the essay was an unmistakable burst 
of energy that stood in stark contrast to the hours I had spent avoiding my initial 
dissertation proposal.  I recognize three aspects of the invitation to write this essay 
that felt life-giving to me: first, it is a topic I know well and to which I am 
passionately committed; second, I was invited to draw from what I have learned in 
my formal education in order to write for an audience beyond the academy – quite 
different from spending a summer writing comprehensive exams for an audience of 
four professors; and third, the invitation came with a request to ground my thinking in 
                                                 
7 “Emerging church movements” refers to a loose network of collective actions 
ranging from online communities, to neo-monastic intentional communities, to 
congregations worshiping in new ways and new spaces, all primarily concerned with 
reconceptualizing Christianity in a “postmodern” era.  In this regard, proponents of 
the movements tend to transgress modernist theological boundaries between 
liberalism and fundamentalism, orthodoxy and radicalism, in their attempts to 
navigate new ways of embodying Christian principles.  While their influence has 
been significant in mainline denominations, the movements have often been critiqued 
for their failure to challenge a universalizing of middle-class, white, masculine 
experience in articulating their critique of the larger church. The term “Emergent 
church” is also frequently used, but has largely come to be specifically associated 
with the Emergent Village (www.emergentvillage.org), an organization born out of 
the work of Brian McLaren, one of the movements’ most well-known proponents. For 
more information about the emerging/Emergent church, I suggest Tony Jones, The 
New Christians: Dispatches from the Emergent Frontier (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
2008), and Ian Mobsby, Emerging and Fresh Expressions of Church, (London: Moot 
Community Publishing, 2007). 
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my own story.8  
                                                 
8 Pinar and Grumet opened the door to the consideration of curriculum as 
autobiographical text with the publishing of their influential Toward a Poor 
Curriculum (1976).  Using the term Currere, the Latin root curriculum, which 
translates as “the running of the course” (Pinar and Grumet, 1976, p. vii), they posited 
a method by which students of curriculum could sketch “the relations among school 
knowledge, life history, and intellectual development in ways that might function 
self-transformatively” (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman, p. 514).  As he further 
developed the method of Currere as curriculum research, Pinar proposed four 
movements in the process: regressive, progressive, analytical, and synthetical.  In 
exploring the relationships between the knower and the known that structure the 
educational experience, Currere seeks “to understand the contribution academic 
studies makes to one’s understanding of his or her life” (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and 
Taubman, p. 520).  It is not my intent at this point to thoroughly explicate Currere 
and its development over the last three decades.  What matters more is that within the 
field of curriculum studies, autobiography has emerged as a significant theme and 
research method.   
 Yet any autobiographical project, including my own (maybe especially my 
own), raises my suspicions.  In her essay “The Evidence of Experience” (1991), Scott 
raises important questions about the ways in which personal experience is evoked in 
the writing of history.  Her concern is that an appeal to experience buttresses claims 
of uncontestable evidence, “what could be truer, after all, than a subject’s own 
account of what he or she has lived through?” (p. 777).  Her concern is that the 
reliance on experience as foundational in writing “histories of difference,” histories 
that run outside of or in tension with hegemonic historical narratives, weakens the 
critical thrust of the analysis.  Rather than offering interventions into the discourses 
that shape subjectivities in hegemonic terms, histories of difference assumed to be 
written from outside the orthodoxy ultimately reinscribe its discursive structures and 
exclusionary practices. In taking “as self-evident the identities of those whose 
experience is being documented and thus naturalize their difference. They locate 
resistance outside its discursive construction and reify agency as an inherent attribute 
of individuals, thus decontextualizing it” (p. 777).  Lifting up experience as the origin 
of knowledge, she goes on to argue, privileges the subject (the knower – either the 
person who had the experience or the historian recounting it) as foundational to the 
analysis.  The effect is to either ignore or silence questions about “the constructed 
nature of experience, about how about how subjects are constituted as different in the 
first place, about how one's vision is structured-about language (or discourse)” (p. 
777).  Thus, the evidence of experience ultimately serves as the evidence for the fact 
of difference, rather than an analysis of how difference is discursively produced.   
 So what might Scott’s critique, brought into conversation with Pinar’s notion 
of Currere, have to offer this project?  As one whose work includes queering the 
discourses about homosexualities and inclusion in the church, how might I be more 
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Appendix A is a version of that essay, which was written as a chapter for a 
book titled Baptimergent: Baptist Stories from the Emergent Frontier (Roberts, 
2010).9 Writing the essay marked a shift in my focus that ultimately re-opened me to 
the larger work of this project I now engage.  Though less traditionally academic in 
its style, it offers significant insight into how I situate myself within a larger 
conversation about sexualities and the church, and ultimately is a reflection of my 
pedagogical commitments in that regard.   
  A reader familiar with queer theories and curriculum studies can certainly see 
                                                                                                                                           
attentive to the ways in which my drawing from my own experience reifies discourses 
of difference rather than analyzes their function?   
Pinar’s driving concern that the emphasis on the “individual” in educational 
research was reduced to an abstraction led to his working with Grummet to draw 
attention back to the lives of learners, to autobiographies (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery 
and Taubman, 1995).  For curriculum scholars, Currere can then blur the distinctions 
between student, researcher, teacher, and scholar.  Theory and practice are informing 
one another as meaning is made, as knowledge is produced. I am reminded of 
Wilchins’ conversation with her editor about writing Queer Theory, Gender Theory 
(2004).  The editor remarks, “In school I used to know this stuff, but now I hardly use 
it.”  Wilchins responds that is “stuff I use practically every day.”  Wilchins moves in 
an out of storytelling, blending biography, autobiography and theory in attempts to 
educate for social change.  The challenge for me, as scholar and researcher, is to live 
in a similar tension that acknowledges my life experiences as texts for theoretical 
analysis without falling into the trap of fetishizing the autobiographical impulse.  The 
hard work of the this kind of project is to utilize my stories, as I read them from this 
vantage point, as means towards opening spaces for further interrogation rather than 
shutting down possibilities by playing experience as a trump card, self-evident and 
analysis resistant. The problematic temptation towards reducing myself to an easily 
discernable subject, somehow knowable and known, is real – and yet, if I am to 
engage this particular work with integrity, I must acknowledge that my experiences 
loom large and offer rich texts from which to draw.  I hold those texts loosely, 
knowing that any claims towards expertise of my self as a subject are contestable, and 
dependant on the discourses I have access to as I participate in the constituting of my 
self as a subject to begin with.  
9 Roberts’ book went to print, though my chapter was excluded by the publisher’s 
editorial board.  See the Interjection (p.120-125). 
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my attempts to theorize my autobiography and use it as a springboard for a larger 
conversation.  Despite a political choice to avoid the term “queer” (given that the 
initial invitation was to write about the “inclusion of homosexuals”),10 the essay 
reflects a queering11 of my own positionality as well as the larger “inclusion” 
discourse that has shaped it.  Similarly, I made a decision to forego a more in-depth 
and capillary analysis of power, yet still attempted to disrupt the cultural fiction of a 
presumed unitary and autonomous subject that drives a politics of difference propping 
up unidirectional constructs of power analysis.  The initial autobiography also self-
consciously plays on the Foucauldian notion of confession,12 and brings it into 
                                                 
10 The word queer, in this context, is intended to point towards particular ways of 
critiquing and rethinking identity politics or politics among activists and scholars.  
Among the practices and strategies known as queer theories is, like the essay in 
Appendix A, a reconsideration of the “tendency to understand sexual identity on the 
basis of the gender of one’s sexual object choice” (Sullivan, 38).  Queer theories and 
their implications for both critical pedagogies and spiritual practices will be further 
explored throughout the dissertation.  
11 Hall remarks on how queer functions in different contexts as an adjective, noun, or 
verb.  The verb form, employed here (technically as a gerund), refers to processes that 
apply “pressure on simplistic notions of identity” and disturb “the value systems that 
underlie designations of normal and abnormal identity, sexual identity in particular” 
(p. 14).   
12 Foucault claims that the technologies of self-examination and confession are 
aspects of a kind of self-formation he calls a “hermeneutics of desire” (trans. 1978, p. 
50). In the History of Sexuality Volume I, he describes self-examination as “an 
infinite extracting from the depths of oneself” (p. 59), through which one is supposed 
to come to an understanding of the truth of oneself.  As a self-known subject, one is 
then compelled to make pronouncements about oneself, leading Foucault to name 
confession – growing out of the Christian tradition and permeating Western culture 
through legal, pedagogical, medical and other discourses – as being “at the heart of 
the procedures of individualization” (p. 59).   
 Foucault argues that the impulse towards confession has been so normalized 
that we no longer recognize the exercise of power implicit in its structure: that one 
confesses to another (priest, therapist, magistrate, teacher, etc.) who authoritatively 
acts (absolving, interpreting, judging, evaluating, etc.) to make meaning of that being 
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conversation with Pinar and Grummet’s (1976) work on Currere as I seek to 
problematize my sense of self, even as I am participating in its constitution. 
The incident in question here is the process of writing itself, from the 
invitation through the decision to include the essay here.  The essay is useful in as 
much as it points to the incident, which is itself useful (like the other incidents I 
describe) as it becomes a site of performance framing the collision of several bodies 
of knowledge and ways of knowing. 
Incident: A Southern Story 
            Also in the past several months, an opportunity emerged for me to write a 
chapter to submit to an upcoming book entitled South to a Queer Place (Whitlock, 
pending), which again led me back to theorizing my story as an entry point into 
                                                                                                                                           
confessed.  Rather, the act of confession has come to take on a libratory meaning, by 
which the confession of some moment of self-awareness one is assumed to be freeing 
from oppressive social systems functioning to repress a subjectivity assumed to be 
both autonomous and internal (p. 60).  An example of this libratory confessional 
understanding is the notion of “coming out,” or publicly confessing one’s “sexual 
orientation.” Rather than expressing a pre-existing truth found resting deep inside the 
self, Foucault understands such acts as producing knowledge and subjectivity.  
Confession, as a technology, functions within a network of power relations that 
identify, classify, and evaluate individuals according to normative values.  Thus, a 
disjunction between the knowledge of self and the interpretation of that knowledge by 
others is generated (p. 61).   
 As I intentionally evoke the language of confession in the essay in Appendix 
A, I do so with a degree of irony.  Situated as an ordained minister, writing about 
identity and religious experience, I make use of the phrase “I confess” as a refrain 
while entering into an analysis of Christian sexual discourse that disrupts the very 
subjectivity produced in those confessional acts.  The confessions are themselves full 
of contradictions, challenging the interpretive structures through which they might be 
read.  In the end, my intent is to question the libratory assumption of such 
confessional acts, and instead draw attention to the ways in which they function to 
produce particular subjectivities (while remaining accessible to readers less familiar 
with either Foucault or queer, post-structural thought).   
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reconsidering this larger discourse about sexualities and the church.  For that project I 
drew from work I began a year earlier around the production of sexual subjects in 
Christian discourse, both through silence and an essentialism rooted in certain 
creation theologies.  I connected that analysis to a consideration of the church’s role 
in perpetuating systems of violence, particularly towards young people.  
Reconsidering this work in conversation with Whitlock as I prepared the chapter led 
me to a greater attentiveness to the role place plays in my own thinking and the 
shaping of the discourses through which I make meaning of my life as a cultural 
text.13 
                                                 
13 In The Autobiographical Demand of Place: Curriculum Inquiry in the American 
South (2008), Casemore builds off Pinar’s conception of Currere as he considers the 
South. “I want to understand the role of place in my experience,” he begins, “Place 
indicates particular contexts in which I am immersed as well as my subjective 
interaction with these private, social, and aesthetic spaces” (p. 1).  As he draws his 
attention to the American South, Casemore notes that traditionally a “sense of place” 
is “assumed to be a fundamental trait of authentic Southern identity” (p. 2).  It is a 
trope, he contends, that functions to ensure adherence to dominant cultural values and 
silence conflict and dissent from the public sphere.  Taking up “place” as a cultural 
text, destabilizing an assumed inherent centrality in the Southern imaginary, he 
considers the ways in which a romanticized sense of the South plays up the virtue of 
“rootedness” and obscures the conditions of social conflict (p. 3).  Yet, the invocation 
of place in Southern writing even while romanticized, finds its meaning in relation to 
discourses of slavery and segregation, even in their post-1960s reiterations.  For 
Casemore, this dominant fiction of the South provides a sense of proper position, 
even if it is one built on a collective belief in the “the adequacy of the male subject, 
the unity of the Oedipal family and the coherence of the patriarchal world” (p. 5).  
 Ultimately, Casemore suggests that the notion of the South, and the value of a 
“sense of place” to the Southern identity, function to resist analysis and protect 
dominant social orders.  The ways in which these tropes are reiterated in wide ranging 
discourses then continues to create a sense of demand that plays a significant role in 
the constituting of the Southern subject.  I recognize the value of his critique in 
looking back on the essay in Appendix B, as I made these first in-roads into an 
analysis of the ways “the South” functions to shape my own subjectivity and the 
engagements with the particular discourses that I am taking up in this larger research 
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My work around sexualities and the church occurs within the context of 
Southern Protestantism, and as we move through this dissertation the significance of 
that awareness becomes clearer, since so little of the work in queer theological and 
biblical studies is grounded in those particular expressions of Christianity.  Within my 
own practice as an educator and pastor, the choice to remain in the South has not been 
insignificant.  The demands of place have shaped my career trajectory and discourses 
that have constituted my subjectivities.  The essay, found in Appendix B, draws from 
my academic experiences in conversation with other settings that have shaped my 
education.  It contains a blending of voices and writing styles, reflecting my 
navigations of these various institutional identifications. 
  Clearly the content of Appendix B names other significant threads in my 
autobiography that shape both my passion for the larger content of this study and the 
frameworks through which I approach it.14 The work with the Lazarus story began as 
                                                                                                                                           
project.  My participation in reiterating some of the tropes of a romanticized South, 
even as I seek to disrupt them, merits further analysis.  Much like Scott critiques the 
referencing of experience as a way of resisting analysis, Casemore suggests that 
referencing a sense of place in relation to the American South can function to mute 
difficult and contentious conversation. My challenge then is to honor the discursive 
power of the South, the demands it still places on me, as I navigate the sites of both 
adherence to and fissure from its dominant fictions within the ways I am constituted 
and constitute myself.  
14 Again, I am aware of how the confessional element of the essay functions to 
produce a sexual subjectivity that is interpreted through a network of discourses and 
power relations over which I have little control (see Foucault, trans. 1978).  Even in 
suggesting that I include it because the experiences contained within it shape my 
perspective, I acknowledge ways in which my speaking of experiences of sexual 
abuse produces a subjectivity that might be read as “victim” or “survivor,” depending 
on how the reader navigates those networks of discourses and accompanying power 
relations.   
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a portion of my final project for my Master’s in Divinity, a thesis entitled “You’re 
Invited: A Queer Homiletic of Hospitality” (Ammons, 2003), and it reflects some of 
my earliest attempts at queering scriptural texts.15  More importantly for our purposes, 
                                                                                                                                           
 Even further, I acknowledge that understanding a sexual relationship between 
an early-adolescent boy and a middle-aged man as abusive is not inherent, but 
likewise interpreted through webs of discursive productions of knowledge.  Foucault 
(trans. 1978) and Rubin (1993) both raise questions about the regulation of childhood 
sexuality, and would likely critique my interpretation of those events in my life. I 
name this not so much because I agree with them, which as my essay makes clear I do 
not, but rather as a means of continuing to contest my own authority, even in 
interpreting my own experiences.  I acknowledge that a tension could be identified 
between the poststructural logic I evoke in disrupting the hegemony of gender of 
partner choice as the primary means of organizing sexuality, while still adhering to 
what some would argue is an arbitrary construction of adolescence employed to 
regulate sexuality.   
It is a critique I am willing to accept, as the interpretation of those experiences 
I offer in the essay continue to function in a way that coincides with my 
interpretations of later experiences.  In effect, I am naming here my own complicity 
in reinscribing normative sexual values in my reading of these life experiences, while 
actively disrupting normativities in reading other experiences.  In this way, as Pinar 
and Grumet (1976) suggest, autobiography is curriculum, in which the dissonances 
produced in the telling of one’s story invite the learner into deeper engagements with 
the production of knowledge.   
15 As already alluded to in footnote 11, Foucault offers a significant critique of 
problems with liberation inherent in the notion of “coming out.”  He suggests that the 
confessional act is an act of self-formation rather than the proclamation of some 
uncovered self-knowledge it is purported to be (trans. 1978). The tensions around this 
notion of liberation, expanded on by many and central to many theological and 
pedagogical projects, will continue to emerge throughout this work.  Ultimately we 
will consider not so much whether or not liberation can actually occur in any 
meaningful way, but rather how liberation as a concept functions and whether or not 
that functioning is useful.   
 In its initial form, my exploiting the phrase “come out” in my reading of the 
Lazarus story occurred within a sermon with decidedly gay liberationist themes.  The 
broadening of the call to come out of the tomb was intended to draw attention to the 
ways in which “out” queer preachers could open space for others to challenge the 
normativities that regulated their lives.  Reworked into this context in which it also 
functions as a metaphor for healing from childhood trauma, the liberationist elements 
remain central.  Again, I claim an awareness of this so that I might rest into the 
messiness.  I know what is challenging about the idea of liberation – that it often 
19 
 
the chapter reflects a variety of pedagogical engagements in which storytelling, 
autobiography, textual analysis, and homiletics are woven into the educational 
process of destabilizing categorical assumptions.  In other words, it is a reflection of 
my spiritual practice of queer pedagogy, and as such points to themes that are taken 
up in other ways later in the dissertation. 
Incident: A Call to Teach 
            As was mentioned earlier, in the past several years I have often been called on 
to speak to classes and community groups about homosexualties and Christianity.  
My presentation has evolved over the years, incorporating more of the thinking 
reflected in the other two appendices.  Last semester I had the opportunity to offer 
four such presentations at the University of North Carolina – Greensboro.  Though 
they varied slightly depending on the audience, the central content was the same.  I 
mention them because I recognized in those experiences both my own excitement 
about teaching this content, and what seemed to be a hunger on the part of students 
for a thoughtful engagement of these topics.  I began to dream about the possibilities 
of a course, and even spoke with the Director of the Women’s and Gender Studies 
Program about exploring the possibility of such an offering, aware that I would face 
some challenges in shaping it appropriately for a public university in which my 
identification as adjunct faculty would trump my identification as Baptist minister. 
                                                                                                                                           
props up problematic notions of a coherent self, unified identity, and discernable 
community based on politics of difference – and I know that it can still be powerfully 
useful. As we proceed, I will continue to stand in the stream of curriculum theorists 
and theologians who see their work as defined by libratory goals, and at the same 
time I will seek to critique the ways in which those discourses fail to deliver. 
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Near the end of the fall semester in 2008, I was invited to speak to a group of 
students at my alma mater, The Divinity School of Wake Forest University, about 
issues of language and sexual identities.  In the context of that discussion, I gave a 
brief introduction to queer theories and use of “queer” in academic and political 
contexts.  What came in a follow-up conversation with two of my former teachers 
was a much-welcomed (and totally unexpected) invitation to submit a proposal for a 
course that we eventually titled Sexualities and the Church: A Que(e)ry, to be taught 
in the fall semester of 2009, and which played a role in this dissertation (more on that 
later).  Appendix C contains the proposal and syllabus for that course.  
  Initially, I was asked to prepare a proposal for a course on Queer Spirituality, 
though as school officials further assessed their needs the course focus shifted 
slightly. Still, that original concept led me to consider some significant questions.  I 
was unsure as to what exactly “Queer Spirituality” referred, so I began to consider the 
notion of queering spiritualities, shifting the focus from subjects to practices.  At the 
same time, I also recognized the reemergence of a conversation I have moved in and 
out of for several years (and that I have since learned is still ongoing at the Divinity 
School) about what exactly is meant by “spirituality” as a subject in and of itself, 
even without the fabulous complication of the queer.  While the course I taught 
morphed in order to address a variety of disciplines considered traditional to 
theological education, the centrality of spirituality – or of approaching the entirety of 
the course as spiritual practice – remained intact for me.  Which brings us back to this 
dissertation, my Nineveh.   
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Incident: The Dissertation 
The invitation to submit a course proposal to Wake Forest University Divinity 
School nearly perfectly coincided with my decision to change dissertation topics to 
something that would focus my attention back on the discourses around sexualities 
and Christianity.  The reemergence of spirituality as a central theme in that 
conversation drew me back to yet another conversation I have moved in and out of 
for several years around what is meant by “spirituality” as it is taken up in the 
discourses of critical pedagogies and curriculum studies. When I considered those 
questions alongside the pieces I had written in the months preceding my dissertation 
proposal and the preparation for the course at Wake Forest University, I was also 
drawn more deeply into their implications for my pedagogies and my spiritual 
practices.  That I read all of these conversations through a queer critical lens added 
yet another dimension to the complexity.  All of that, and how each part of it 
informed the others, is what writing this dissertation has been about for me. 
While I am not sure that I could go so far as to label my work as a 
rhizoanalysis in the purest since (I am not quite as limber as Deleuze and Guattari), I 
envisioned the remainder of this dissertation as a rhizomatic process of utilizing 
multiple strategies of textual analysis, theological reflection, and prayerful 
ruminations, in navigating the discursive production of knowledges. I expected such 
processes might lead to examinations of the ways text plays on the page, to 
questioning the structure of chapters, to the relationships between texts deemed 
primary and those deemed supplementary (as in this introduction, in which the 
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appendices and footnotes are more central to the argumentation than the primary 
texts, so much so that I considered locating the appendices in the front).  While the 
specific nature of those examinations emerged in the writing process – and, as it 
turned out, led to much deeper considerations of style and tone than structure – what 
was clear from the beginning was that uncritically imposing a linear structure on such 
a multidirectional discourse would not adequately reflect the complexity of the 
research.  So, the reader is invited to approach the text from a variety of angles, in a 
variety of orders, understanding the focus of this work as a series of intersections in 
multiple and pre-existing discourses, lacking clearly demarcated beginnings and ends, 
each extending beyond the scope of the project itself.  Each section informs the other, 
and so while they are presented sequentially as a function of the written word, they 
also assume knowledge of one another as they construct their arguments.   
 While the rhizome and the plateau offer helpful metaphors for the dissertation 
and its components, still other metaphors are needed for the researcher/author.  
Deleuze and Guattari (trans. 1987) play with images of cartographer and nomad, both 
traversing the plateaus and mapping their terrain. Braidotti offers further insights into 
the nomad metaphor, employing it in positing a feminist subjectivity that emphasizes 
“flows of connection” and “becomings,” able to “sustain and generate inter-
connectedness” (2002, p. 8) in which the notion of individualism is challenged. So, 
considering this notion in terms of reflexivity, and bringing it back into conversation 
with Deleuze and Guattari, one might say that the researcher herself or himself 
functions as a rhizome, sustaining the unexpected sprouting up of multiple notions.   
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I am also drawn to considering the nomadic researcher in conversation with 
Anzaldua’s (1999) “mestiza consciousness” and Sandoval’s (1991) “differential 
consciousness”.  Anzaldua’s images mestiza consciousness as born from the 
experience of living in the “borderlands/la frontera” (1999), embodying complex 
tensions and ambiguities produced by intersecting politics of identity and heritage. 
Sandoval (1991) describes a similar concept, offering the stick shift as a metaphor for 
what she calls “differential consciousness,” which allows for fluid movement 
between identities and ideologies, shifting into different gears dependent on their 
usefulness as practices of resistance in a given context.   
Finally, I am drawn to wondering about the nomadic researcher as border-
dwelling trickster, borrowing from Villaverde’s (2008) image in considering feminist 
theories, research analysis, and pedagogies.  Described as a “mythic or folkloric 
figure who uses antagonism and uncertainty in breaking cultural codes,” (p. 12) 
Villaverde’s trickster “often stands, in fact revels, in the between spaces of reality, 
negotiation, intention, desire, and the unknown” (p. 105), a posture she calls on the 
researcher to embody.  All of these images of researcher and researching – whose 
convergence results in something like a nomadic, border-dwelling, trickster, mapping 
a wilderness terrain in a manual transmission jeep – are characterized by an 
“intellectual flexibility” Villaverde describes as “the ability to contend with various, 
sometimes opposing, ideas simultaneously for the sake of increasing agency and 
critical analysis” (2008, p. 124).  As I sit hunched over my keyboard, aware of the 
stiffness in my back and thighs from this morning’s yoga class, I am reminded that 
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maintaining flexibility requires consistent practice, and what opens easily in the body 
one day may be a painful stretch the next.  The texts included as appendices reflect 
my navigation of multiple identifications, ideologies, cultural contexts, and 
audiences. My role as researcher is to find the stretch, hold it, and breathe.    
Plateaus             
In what you have read thus far, I began playing with the metaphor of the 
plateau as a means of thinking about the production of knowledge as my energy and 
attention coalesced around particular professional opportunities and the documents 
produced therein.  The same metaphor for ways of thinking about the production and 
ordering of knowledge shape the structure of the rest of dissertation. As indicated in 
the title, I choose to frame my analysis of multiple of concepts, or “bricks”16 
(Massumi, 1987, p. xii), or “toolboxes”17 (Deleuze and Foucault, 1977, p. 208) as a 
                                                 
16 In the forward to his 1987 English translation of Deleuze and Guattari’s A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Massumi uses the brick as a 
metaphor as he explicates “nomad thought”  
 
A concept is a brick.  In can be used to build the courthouse of 
reason. Or it can be thrown through the window.  What is the 
subject of the brick? The arm that throws it? The body 
connected to the arm? The brain encased in the body? The 
situation that brought brain and body to such a juncture? All 
and none of the above.  What is its object? The window? The 
edifice? The laws the edifice shelters? The class and other 
power relations encrusted by the laws? All and none of the 
above. What interests us are the circumstances. Because the 
concept in its unrestrained usage is a set of circumstances, at a 
volatile juncture (p. xii-xiii). 
   
17 Massumi notes the “toolbox” as the metaphor for concept Deleuze employed in 
discussion with Foucault (1977, p. 208).  Massumi notes: “He calls his kind of 
philosophy ‘pragmatics’ because its goal is the invention of concepts that do not add 
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consideration of queer pedagogies as spiritual practice.  The framing itself begs 
several questions, around which three plateaus making up the body of the work takes 
shape. As already mentioned, a central question for my consideration is “What is 
meant by spirituality?” and then immediately following, “What is a rationale for the 
choice to approach a conversation about spirituality through the frame of spiritual 
practices?”  Necessarily accompanying those questions the title raises, are the similar 
inquiries into the meaning of both queer and pedagogies, and perhaps more 
significantly, “What is meant by their juxtaposition?”  Each of these points of inquiry 
in turn sparks a multiplicity of other inquiries, some intersecting and some not.  
Another implication of my framing of this research is the suggestion of a subject – a 
pedagogue and practitioner – and at least in part that subject can rightfully be 
presumed to be me.   
So, what might one expect from an interrogation of the notion of queer 
pedagogies as spiritual practice?  In my understanding of them, queer theories, 
pedagogies, and spiritualities are similar in their emphasis on practices over 
positionalities – strategies for making meaning are at least as privileged as the 
meaning being made (whose stability is somewhat suspect and mysterious) – and yet, 
none of those three can be reduced to a simple list of procedural guidelines. What I 
mean by practices in these contexts is an ongoing theme in the dissertation,18 but for 
now, we might say that practices are intentional performances of epistemological 
                                                                                                                                           
up to a system of belief or an architecture of propositions that you either enter of you 
don’t, but instead pack a potential in the way a crow bar in a willing hand envelops an 
energy of prying” (1987, p. xv).   
18 The notion of practices is particularly explored in Part III, beginning on page 131.   
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claims repeated in our efforts to navigate encounters with our unknowing.  
 Following the lead of Deleuze and Guattari (trans. 1987), I was hesitant to 
rely on chapters as the primary organizational structure for the dissertation.  As has 
already been demonstrated, the research I am engaging focuses on surprising 
juxtapositions and intersections more befitting a rhizomatic analysis.  Ultimately, this 
is itself an epistemological claim – an attempt, albeit sometimes awkward, to better 
reflect my understandings of knowledge production. As previously indicated, I am 
drawn to “fields of intensity” as a metaphor, one of the ways Deleuze and Guattari 
describe their notion of plateaus (1987).  With that in mind, I originally envisioned 
this dissertation as a navigation of four such fields, though through the writing 
process it became clear that a three-plateau structure better reflected my thinking.19  
The first plateau, this introduction, lays out epistemological claims, methodology, and 
sets up the framework for the rest of the dissertation. The second is an exploration of 
the notion of spirituality, considering both the way it has been taken up in popular 
and academic education discourses, and the challenges in constituting it as a proper 
subject or sub-discipline within theological studies.  My task in this field is to develop 
and defend a workable definition of spirituality (as I have already indicated, my 
understanding privileges practices), and then bring it into conversation with questions 
around the erosion of modernist certainties and dualisms, the relationship to other 
traditional theological disciplines, and philosophical considerations of the 
existence/nature of God.  Ultimately, in an apology of sorts, I argue that 
                                                 
19 The Interjection on pages 120-125, further articulates the rationale for the revision 
in structure.  
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(thoughtfully) leading with spirituality in the framing of an intellectual project still 
matters.  While I work primarily within the Christian frameworks in which I am 
academically trained and which primarily form my theology and practice, I also 
consider more secularized articulations of spirituality and engage scholars from other 
faith traditions.   
 What became clear as my argument developed is that if I argue that 
spirituality can still be a useful construct in pedagogical discourse as long as it is 
transparent about the theological presuppositions on which it depends, I would have 
to engage that work myself.  The result is a second section within that plateau, one in 
which I articulate the theological understandings that underlie my spirituality and thus 
frame my understanding of queer pedagogy as spiritual practice.   
 In my original conception, what is now the Part III was to be two separate 
plateaus: the first focusing on navigating the notion of queer pedagogies, bringing 
queer theories into conversation with curriculum studies; and the second to navigate 
the field of intensity coalescing in the Divinity School course and all that surrounded 
it.  As my research progressed, much of the content of the Divinity School course 
found its way into the second section of the first plateau. Since the preparation for the 
course occurred alongside the writing of the dissertation, the interplay between course 
content and the theorizing occurring in the dissertation research was significant.  
Therefore, my research considered such material as preparatory class notes regarding 
assigned readings, particularly as they have implications for the other fields of 
inquiry.   
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For example, while I as a scholar am not offering extensive interventions into 
the queering of liberation theologies per se, the work done by others (Goss, 2002; 
Althaus-Reid, 2003; etc.) was included in the course content, but also has 
implications for how I regard my own work, considering such themes of liberation as 
presented in the reading of the resurrection of Lazarus in Appendix B.  Even further, a 
critique of liberation projects is a major theme in queer theories, while simultaneously 
liberation remains a significant theme in critical pedagogies.  All of this is to say that 
the interplay between the themes included in the course content and the rest of the 
dissertation were central to my research, both as intellectual constructs and as 
embodied practices in the classroom.  
Part III begins with an Interjection reflecting the mid-stream shifts in my 
thinking and the resulting changes in organizational structure.  The remainder of my 
reflections around the Wake Forest Course were so intertwined with my discussion of 
queer pedagogy that it did not make sense to separate them, rather both are integrated 
and considered in relation to specific spiritual practices.  As a field of inquiry, queer 
pedagogy, is still rather young and contested.  Questions of what makes “queer 
pedagogy” queer is a point of contention (Britzman, 1998; Luhman, 1998; Rodriguez, 
2007). Is it the content? Is it the “identity” or “social location” of the educator? Is it 
the ways in which the educator is read by the learner? Is it the blurring of the 
distinctions between educator and learner?  Is it a set of methods?  Is it primarily a 
deconstructive project, and if so how is different from other pedagogies in that same 
vein?  Is it about positionalities, or (as I argue) performances and practices?  Through 
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both an analysis of literature directly addressing queer pedagogies, and other 
highlighted points of intersection in queer theories and curriculum studies, I propose a 
working understanding of the term and its implications.  Further, in my navigation of 
this field I consider what I carry with me from travels through other fields of 
intensity, sojourns to other plateaus, particularly the intersections between queer 
pedagogical practices and spiritual practices that disrupt seemingly stable groundings.     
 The interspersed reflections from my teaching of the Wake Forest Divinity 
School course reflect an understanding of the course as a context in which I drew 
attention to the multiplicity of questions emerging from the rest of my research.  As it 
relates to this larger project, teaching the course did not function primarily as an 
intervention or training strategy in order to generate a cadre of more sensitive 
ministers (though I hope some of that happened), but more as a cultural text or 
performance in which the ideas explored in the other fields came into play.  
Occurring alongside my writing and as a component of my research, the course 
provided fodder for theorizing my pedagogical practice, which in this case took the 
shape of a teacher in a classroom but has for me at other points been enacted as 
preacher, counselor, spiritual director, and a multitude of other roles.  A rich 
complexity was contained within my teaching the Divinity School course in that all of 
the following were true: I was teaching about practices; I was teaching practices; and 
I was engaging practices as I taught.  While, as we will explore further, queer 
pedagogies may not be dependent on queer course content (whatever that might 
mean), the course at the Wake Forest University Divinity School (whose content 
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could be read as pretty queer) served as a site for reflection in the performance of 
these intersecting discourses.    
I was teaching about practices. The course was about applying queer theories 
to discourses around sexuality and the church.  Much of this work is being done in the 
realms of theology, biblical studies, and Christian sexual ethics.  Some part of my job 
was to teach the cultural texts already queered – to study and evaluate the work of 
those already queering these discourses and the practices (reading strategies) they 
engage in their analyses.   
I was teaching practices. Building on those examples from other scholars, I 
was also teaching the practices themselves. This course assumed that engagement in 
theological reflection, reading scripture, discernment, and having sex are all “spiritual 
practices” in as much as they are practices that draw our attention to our encounters 
with what we might call Sacred Mystery, with that which cannot easily be explained.  
Students were expected to develop a firm enough grasp on the theoretical frameworks 
to consider how they might shape their understanding of their own practices.  So, I 
was teaching how to “queer,” or “read queerly,” and doing so in a context that 
considers reading queerly a spiritual practice. 
I was engaging practices as I teach. As I “read” the class itself as text, or as I 
engage queer pedagogical theorizing into my own teaching, I engaged in queer 
practices.  In maintaining a reflexive posture towards the act of teaching itself and 
drawing my awareness to my encounters with mystery therein, I engaged in spiritual 
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practice.  My consideration ultimately is then about queer pedagogy as queer 
spirituality. 
 
Epilogue 
 
 I am not sure Jonah is really a character to whom I want to compare myself.  
Of the twelve minor prophets whose stories are chronicled in the Hebrew Bible, he is 
the only one not called to speak to the Israelites or Hebrew peoples, and he seems to 
particularly resent being sent by a God, who he believes to have chosen his people, to 
speak to those beyond the realm of what he understands to be his community.  He 
resents further that his warnings of God’s wrath are heralded and the Ninevites 
change their ways. But most of all Jonah resents God mercifully sparing the Ninevites 
their promised destruction, crying out “O LORD! Is not this what I said while I was 
still in my own country? That is why I fled to Tarshish at the beginning; for I knew 
that you are a gracious God and merciful, slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast 
love, and ready to relent from punishing. And now, O LORD, please take my life 
from me, for it is better for me to die than to live.” (4:2b-3). 
 He retreats to the edge of the city to pout, and God “appoints” (4:6) a bush to 
grow up and offer him shade – which seems to make Jonah happier.  However, that 
night God sends a worm to destroy the bush, so the next day Jonah is left to sit in the 
sun once again.  Jonah does not like that very much at all, and demonstrating a 
tendency towards melodrama, he cries out a second time, “It is better for me to die 
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than to live!” (4:8).  God asks, “Is it right for you to be angry about the bush?” and in 
his best Joan Crawford voice he responds, “Yes, angry enough to die!” (4:9).  
God then compares Jonah’s investment in a bush to God’s investment in a city 
of more than one hundred and twenty thousand – and though that is ultimately the 
point of the story, since God is trying to get Jonah to understand more about God and 
God’s choices, it is not what interests me in this moment.  What interests me is 
Jonah’s investment in the bush, the little Deleuzian tree.  Jonah pouts because God 
withers the tree, worms away at the binary root structure, the “us and them” thinking 
through which Jonah orders his world.  Our protagonist takes comfort in a system of 
thought that splits the world into clearly discernable categories, yet he must somehow 
know the limitations of that thought given his assumption that God would show 
mercy on those whom Jonah deemed unworthy.   
God offers the security and shade of the bush, granting Jonah some comfort, 
then demonstrates its lack of sustainability.  The bush withers, leaving Jonah 
despondent.   The worm functions much like a rhizome, shooting up unexpectedly 
from underground and threatening the foundational logic of Jonah’s arboristic 
knowledge.  It is as if God says, “Yeah, that can work for awhile, but don’t count on 
it lasting.” Though it does not represent my best self, I resonate with Jonah’s anger.  I 
concede to having liked the security of a world read through neatly constructed 
categories and simplistic analyses of power.  The order made sense, and I knew where 
to direct my anger – an anger which that order ultimately served to legitimate.  But 
also like Jonah, I trust in a more boundless grace that disrupts my understanding of 
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the other, which in turn disrupts my understanding of who I am, which necessitated 
an other in order to make sense.   
It still is not a perfect metaphor for what I am about here, but Jonah’s journey 
is marked by encounters with a Mystery that transgresses the structure of Jonah’s 
reality.  Jonah sees this coming, he knows from the time he tries to run away that his 
ordered world will give way to the Mystery’s grace.  We do not know how Jonah 
comes out in the end, only his initial anguish when faced with what he feared: God’s 
failure to adhere to his righteous judgment.  If I am to claim a comparison to Jonah – 
and this tree-withering, rhizomatic project is to be my Nineveh – then I am choosing 
to believe that Jonah’s anger dissipated and he began to hold what he knew of 
himself, his others, and God much more lightly.    
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PART TWO 
 
 
Spirituality in Education 
 
I begin with some clarifications about how I approach this conversation, 
where I stand in relation to the material, and what I am not interested in attempting to 
do.  My initial concern here is to consider the usefulness of “spirituality” as a 
construct in contemporary pedagogical discourses.  In so doing, I challenge the ways 
in which spirituality is often evoked as a transhistorical and universal concept, and 
suggest locating it instead within a particular stream of Western thought influenced 
by both philosophy and theology.  Mapping a genealogy through Enlightenment and 
Transcendental thought, I argue that “spirituality” in its popular usage cannot be 
understood apart from a larger explication of Western religious liberalism, and in 
particular liberal Christianity.  Having explored the foundational claims of religious 
liberalism, and thus popular spirituality, I turn towards a consideration of the utility of 
such a construct in light of the erosion of the foundational thought on which it 
depends.  From there I return to our consideration of issues of spirituality in education 
with particular attention to two distinct conversations: first, the broad use of 
spirituality as a construct in popular and academic discourses around school 
leadership and reform; and second, the contested usefulness of spirituality as a sub-
discipline in Christian theological studies.  Having both levied my critiques of 
“spirituality” and argued a case for its usefulness, I revisit the historical linkages 
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between critical pedagogies and Christian Liberation Theology on my way towards 
finally proposing a workable way forward in the conversation.   
As this larger project progresses and evolves, the reader undoubtedly becomes 
clear that ultimately I am grappling not only with my sense of subjectivity as scholar 
and teacher, but also with a sense of my agency.  However, what is at first glance 
understood as a primarily political nature to this work I would argue might be more 
accurately understood as eschatological.  Whereas the dominant political narratives 
of modernity have been exposed as deeply flawed, and a rational claim to hold onto 
them is at best suspect; an eschatological narrative makes no claim of rationality.  It is 
“hope against hope” (Romans 4:18). While I can join in a critique of the myths of 
progress, the limits of liberation, and the politics of identity, I hold out hope beyond 
reason for “another possible world” (Althaus Reid, 2007).  I am deeply invested in 
working towards that possible world’s realization. I claim these commitments as more 
eschatological than political because they are most tenable as leaps of faith.  The 
mythic and the mystical are central to my knowing, and rather than shutting down my 
encounters with the limits of knowledge by dismissing them with trite responses, I 
experience the epistemologies of my faith as beckoning me deeper into a humble 
engagement with Mystery.   
Thus, as I consider spirituality in education, my investment is personal.  
Slattery (2006), Noddings (2005), Pinar, (1995) and others have taken on the 
complicated tasks of considering a theological curriculum in a postmodern context. 
While my task here is overlapping and related, drawing from many of the same 
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resources and traditions, my work is distinct in its final goal. Slattery (2006) moves in 
and out of “understanding the curriculum as theological text” (p. 93) and proposing a 
“theological curriculum that is not theocratic” (112), often with somewhat slippery 
fluidity.  In contrast, I am not so much concerned with positing a theological 
curriculum as I am with articulating a pedagogical spirituality useful in furthering my 
engagement with education discourses, a spirituality unapologetically shaped by the 
particular constellations of influences that constitute my positionality.  
The distinctions in terms are subtle but significant.  Much like the terms 
“spirituality”, “theology”, and “religion”; “curriculum”, “pedagogy”, and “education” 
are often used interchangeably.  Let me elucidate some distinctions, at least in my 
particular usage. “Curriculum,” as a field of study, is described by Pinar, Reynolds, 
Slattery, and Taubman as “the field interested in the relationships among the school 
subjects themselves and with the relationships between the curriculum and the world” 
(p. 6).  The field has undergone a significant reconceptualization in the last half-
century.  No longer are curriculum specialists primarily understood as technicians, 
preoccupied with issues of “curriculum development”; rather the field has shifted its 
focus to the understanding of curriculum.  They argue that a shift has occurred “from 
curriculum as exclusively school materials to curriculum as symbolic representation” 
(p.16).  This shift towards symbolic representation as the definition of curriculum 
“refers to those institutional and discursive practices structures, images, and 
experiences that can be identified and analyzed in various ways, i.e. politically, 
racially, autobiographically, phenomenologically, theologically, internationally, and 
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in terms of gender and deconstruction” (p. 16).  And yet, the continued 
institutionalized function of “curriculum” understood as curriculum development 
persists. While the internal movement within the field is towards an emphasis on 
understanding curriculum the remnants of an older model are often still 
bureaucratically perpetuated.  
Thus, when Slattery takes up similar content (2006), his aim of understanding 
curriculum as a theological text is first to interpret curriculum through a theological 
lens, though in his propositional stance he does not discount the need for curriculum 
development.  By his own admission, he uses “theology”, “spirituality”, and 
“religion” interchangeably, which (though somewhat confusing) is possible for him 
because he is more invested in using the lens to analyze curriculum than analyzing the 
lens itself.  In other words, while we share influences, the construction of our 
conversations differs in that we focus our attention on different texts, Slattery on the 
construct of “curriculum” itself, and I on the construct of “spirituality” in curriculum 
and related discourses.    
“Pedagogy”, in my usage, more specifically refers to the theories and 
practices engaged in the processes of teaching and learning.  That is not to suggest 
that the term is only limited to the formal roles of teacher/student within a classroom 
context (though I am particularly invested in those dynamics), but with the larger 
ways in which knowledges are both produced and transmitted.  Pedagogy, when used 
in this manner, implies both agency and intentionality, though certainly 
poststructuralist thought keeps us humble in facing the limits of either.  Therefore, 
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included in a consideration of pedagogy must be some critical reflection on the nature 
and exercise of power.  A traditional understanding of pedagogy as the art of 
teaching, focused on what the teacher does to/with the student, may be matched with 
a traditional analysis of power as unidirectional and repressive.  While such 
considerations remain important, a more complex and nuanced understanding of both 
concepts is called for and is pursued through this work.  For now, let it be 
acknowledged that my intentions around using the term “pedagogical” are primarily 
in conversation with the understandings championed by the field of critical pedagogy.   
In Empowering Education (1992), Ira Shor defines “critical pedagogy” as 
"Habits of thought, reading, writing, and speaking which go beneath surface meaning, 
first impressions, dominant myths, official pronouncements, traditional clichés, 
received wisdom, and mere opinions, to understand the deep meaning, root causes, 
social context, ideology, and personal consequences of any action, event, object, 
process, organization, experience, text, subject matter, policy, mass media, or 
discourse." (p.129).  Kincheloe (2008) articulates the core principles of critical 
pedagogy saying: 
 
Advocates of critical pedagogy are aware that every minute of every 
hour that teachers teach, they are faced with complex decisions 
concerning justice, democracy, and competing ethical claims. While 
they have to make individual determinations of what to do in these 
particular circumstances, they must concurrently deal with what John 
Goodlad (1994) calls the surrounding institutional morality. A central 
tenet of critical pedagogy maintains that the classroom, curricular, 
school structures teachers enter are not neutral sites waiting to be 
shaped by educational professionals. While such professionals do 
possess agency, this prerogative is not completely free and 
independent of decisions made previously by people operating with 
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different values and shaped by the ideologies and cultural assumptions 
of their historical contexts. These contexts are shaped in the same 
ways language and knowledge are constructed, as historical power 
makes particular practices seem natural—as if they could have been 
constructed in no other way (pp. 1-2). 
 
 
So at the risk of being reductive in my summation, if “curriculum” is interested in 
what is being done, then “pedagogy” is interested in the doing.  Or stated another 
way, “curriculum” is what is being understood, and “pedagogy” is the understanding.  
Lastly, my use of “education” is intended to refer to a broader construct 
including, but not limited to, the overlapping concepts I distinguish as curriculum and 
pedagogy.  Given these working definitions, my analysis of “spirituality in education” 
can be understood as taking its first lead from curriculum studies, in the assertion that 
understanding curriculum requires understanding the language of the field.  Pinar, 
Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman (1996), acknowledge “a field of study is a field of 
study is a field of study, a tradition of language or discourse” (p. 7).  Thus, they 
understand the study of curriculum to be the study of the discourse as text, as “a 
particular discursive practice, or a form of articulation that follows certain rules and 
which constructs the very objects it studies” (p.7). When I engage a study of 
“spirituality in education” I begin with a study of language, in this case the term 
“spirituality”, and how it functions.  While I am interested particularly in the term’s 
functioning in education discourses, I contextualize that usage within an analysis of 
the concept as it functions more widely. Yet this move towards understanding the 
curriculum, while significant in itself, is ultimately the precursor for my primary 
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interest in positing a workable spirituality, mapping a way through the terrain of 
multiple discourses that shape both my identity and practice as an educator.    
At times in this argument I also make the uncomfortable, but conscious, 
choice to privilege Christian spiritualities.  There are two primary reasons, each of 
which becomes clearer later in the chapter.  First, though in its popular usage the term 
“spirituality” generally encompasses a scope much broader than Christianity, it is 
term with a genealogy unmistakably intertwined with Christianity, and particularly 
with Western Protestantisms.  So, while the construct has been read back onto other 
traditions, it is a languaged notion and cannot be divorced from other particular 
liberal discourses which play a role in its production.  Secondly, my own theological 
and spiritual practices are grounded in Christianity, so my convictions (held loosely) 
are also at stake.  I acknowledge both the possibilities they bring with them as well as 
the limitations they bear.   
I walk tentatively here, knowing that I stand within a faith tradition whose 
dominance has had tremendous influence in the discourses of Western cultures, and 
whose often violent conviction of its exclusive rightness has been, and continues to be 
a source of oppression, pain, and conflict the world over. Thus, my claiming 
Christianity carries with it an act of confession in acknowledging my participation in, 
and ongoing receipt of, privilege garnished by the sins of the church.  And yet, I still 
claim it.  For me to speak of encounters with mystery without referencing Christianity 
would be akin to my writing this dissertation in a foreign tongue, denying that the 
vocabularies and rhythms of the English language (particularly as spoken in the 
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Southern United States) infused the very structures of my knowing. Christianity 
offers me rituals, symbols, and stories – all metaphors that point towards meaning in 
the face of the mystery of unknowing.  Though I often push up against them, stretch 
them until they nearly break, and even turn them back on the institutions that handed 
them to me, I still find the structures of Christianity useful.  And besides, I am 
convinced that my grounding and fluency in the dominant faith language of my 
cultural context leaves me well situated to function as an agent of change in that same 
context. 
Understanding “Spirituality” in Education 
What is “spirituality”?  My sense is that “spirituality” is one of those words 
that is often tossed about carelessly with an often unacknowledged silencing effect.  It 
is assumed to be pointing to something significant and obvious, but somehow vague 
and not accessible to all.  I hear it spoken often and defined rarely, and at times have 
sensed it being evoked as some unquestionable notion about which anyone lacking 
clarity must be stupid, insensitive, or heretical.  Even after years of both formal and 
informal study on the topic my experience remains that often when “spirituality” 
comes up in discussion I am unclear as to what is being referenced.  The effect is 
often to shut down conversation rather than invite dialogue.   
 Despite a flourishing body of academic work around spirituality, little 
consensus or clarity in definition seems to have emerged.  Spilka calls it a “fuzzy” 
concept that “embraces obscurity with a passion” (1993).  In a survey of current 
social sciences research, Zinnbauer et al. (1997) observe, “spirituality has been 
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defined by theorists as ‘the human response of God’s gracious call to a relationship 
with himself’ (Brenner 1989: 20), ‘a subjective experience of the sacred’ (Vaughn 
1991: 105), and ‘that vast realm of human potential dealing with ultimate purpose’ 
(Tart 1983: 4).”   Sheldrake (1995) argues that spirituality “seeks to express…the 
conscious human response to God that is both personal and ecclesial” (p.45).  In her 
assertion that women need a feminist spirituality, Martin suggests the term can “be 
described as the way in which we come to experience and express the Divine in our 
relationships with our neighbor, with nature, and with ourselves” (1993).  Carr (1986) 
defines it “as the whole of our deepest religious beliefs, convictions, and patterns of 
thought, emotion, and behavior in respect to what is ultimate” (p. 49).  Bowe (2003) 
suggests, “spirituality is the human response to transcendent reality, regardless of 
how we might name or experience that reality” (p. 11). With differing degrees of 
attachment to a notion of God/Ultimate/Divine; with differing articulations of 
relationship to (or free from) religion; with differing notions of whether it is a matter 
of beliefs or actions; and with sociologists, theologians, and educators weighing in, 
“spirituality” as a construct is at best amorphous and tied to frequently unstated 
presuppositions.    
 Sheldrake’s (2007) etymology of the word “spirituality” roots its origins in the 
Latin spiritualitas, “deriving from the Greek pneuma, spirit, and the adjective 
pneumatikos as they appear in Paul’s letters in the New Testament” (p. 3).  He goes 
on to argue that the Pauline use of “spiritual” (in reference to moral or dwelling in the 
Spirit of God, and in opposition to flesh or everything contrary to the Spirit of God) 
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was the dominant usage through the twelfth century, when Greek influenced 
scholasticism began to use the term to distinguish “intelligent humanity from non-
rational creation” (p. 3).  The two usages co-existed for some time and both appear in 
the influential thirteenth century writings of Thomas Aquinas.  Through the middle 
ages, the noun “spirituality” came to refer to the clergy or clerical state.  It was not 
until seventeenth century in France that the spirituality came to refer to “the spiritual 
life,” and then with some derision towards religious emotionalism.  After virtually 
disappearing from theological discourse until the nineteenth century, “spirituality” 
reemerged again in France as referring to “the spiritual life,” but without the derisive 
tone.  From there it was passed into English translations of French writings 
(Sheldrake, 2007). 
 While Sheldrake’s etymology is helpful in destabilizing an assumption that 
spirituality is a universal concept free from context or history, it does little to help 
clarify the term as it currently functions. American religious historian Leigh Eric 
Schmidt (2005) offers a critical perspective on the “origins of the current boom in 
spirituality” (xiii) as he “probes the ways in which the very development of 
‘spirituality’ in American culture was inextricably tied to the rise and flourishing of 
the liberal progressivism and a religious left.”  While his concern is primarily the 
emergence and dominance of a “seeker” spirituality, which he argues is a particularly 
American phenomenon that predates the typical assertion of baby boom spiritual 
innovation by more than a century, the Transcendentalists he credits with this shift in 
American religious culture (precursors to contemporary “spiritual but not religious” 
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rhetoric) are themselves situated within larger philosophical and theological 
traditions.   
 Any attempt to trace a history of thought is inherently reductive and thus 
problematic.  The question is whether or not a particular rendering might be useful in 
furthering another discussion, so for the sake of this argument, which seeks both to 
clarify the current usages of “spirituality” and to contextualize them in larger cultural 
discourses, it is necessary to at least draw attention to some major themes which 
created productive dissonances, points of crystallization, around which other thought 
flourished.  Here we turn to Murphey (1996), who makes “strong claims for the role 
of philosophy in theological development”  (p. 3). In making her case she argues: 
  
a central task of philosophy is to expose those often invisible 
assumptions, to criticize them, to suggest improvements or 
replacements; these new theories often become the assumptions upon 
which the next era of scholarship is based.  Thus, philosophy helps us 
sum up the most basic characteristics of an era past and foreshadows 
features of the era to come (p. 4). 
  
 
In part, Murphey is concerned with explicating the eroding foundationalism of 
modern Protestant Christianity, characterized by a bifurcating tension between 
liberalism and fundamentalism. She argues that in order to for theologians to makes 
sense in the modern world they worked with the philosophical options available to 
them, and that these limited philosophical options are largely responsible for the 
bifurcation of Protestant Christian thought. Thus, Murphey offers a sketch of 
modernist thought as it informs these two threads, in which her attention to the rise of 
liberalism (given Schmidt’s argument) is particularly helpful for us. 
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 Acknowledging that the marking of periods is notoriously difficult (as there 
are always continuities as well as change, and differing points of change in different 
discourses, regions, etc.), Murphey follows convention in looking to Descartes as the 
first modern philosopher, thus dating the period to the mid-seventeenth century.  “The 
modern period”, she asserts, “in scientific discourse could be dated twenty years 
earlier with Galileo, or in theological discourse 150 years later with Schleiermacher” 
(p. 22).  The point is that somewhere around the seventeenth century, several 
overlapping discourses crystallized in a way that resulted in significant 
epistemological shifts.  In sketching out her framework, Murphey looks to explore the 
“intellectual dependencies” of five Western philosophers of the era: Descartes (1596-
1650), Locke (1632-1704), Hume (1711-1776), Reid (1710-1796), and Kant (1724-
1804).  Her argument is as follows: Locke builds on Descartes’ foundationalist view 
of knowledge and adapts it for religious knowledge.  Hume then questions Locke’s 
positive theories of religious and scientific knowledge.  Kant and Reid subsequently 
both respond to the skepticism of Hume, but in different ways, marking the split that 
characterizes the bifurcation.  Both Kant and Reid provide the basic resources for 
development of theological traditions; Reid for fundamentalists (through his influence 
on Hodge, Warfield, and others), and Kant for liberals (through his influence on 
Schliemacher and other nineteenth century liberal theologians)(p. 5-6).   
 What emerge are two primary theological schools in Protestant Christianity, 
alike in their dependence on irrefutable foundations, but different in which 
theological sources serve as those foundations.  In broad brushstrokes, liberals came 
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to focus on God’s immanence and relational nature, understanding revelation as 
continuous and not in tension with human discovery, and religious experience as 
verifiable and comparable to scientific data.  The Bible, in this school, functions as a 
document of religious experience, and derives its authority thus from the experiences 
that resulted in its production, canonization, and subsequent interpretation.  
Fundamentalists, in contrast, emphasized God’s power to intervene in creation, with 
God’s self-revelation through scripture as the primary example of such intervention.  
As the direct, primary, and unique revelation of God, the Bible, not experience, is 
thus the central source for theology.  For Murphey, the tension between scripture and 
experience centrally defines the binarism in Protestant Christianity (Murphey p. 6-7).  
It is this centrality of experience as the primary source for theological reasoning that 
opens the way for the emergence of “spirituality” as a modern construct.  
 This sort of bifurcated understanding of theological knowledge is indicative of 
the Deleuzian metaphor of the tree, roots splitting as knowledge is categorically 
divided into linearly constructed sets.  Murphey’s depiction of modernist 
Protestantism is itself such a tracing.  Undoubtedly her history is homogenizing and 
attentive to big names as reflections of universalizing thought.  It is ultimately that 
sort of linearity that she comes to critique, but she first invests in understanding the 
influence of modernist reasoning on the theological project.  Stated another way, 
Murphey offers a modernist telling of the story of modernism, one useful in 
understanding the discourses later moderns use to justify their positioning. There is a 
tension then between her rearticulation of modernist historical tropes, and her reading 
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from a postmodern perspective, but it is from this perspective (working backwards in 
looking for difference) that Murphey argues Descartes reflects a shift in theories of 
the justification of knowledge claims.   
For Descartes, authority could not be granted simply on the station of the 
author, but must rather be tied to other knowledge claims available to each individual.  
A belief is justified if it is linked to another established belief, justified by attachment 
to another justified belief, forming a chain that must end somewhere (a circular chain 
is deemed unjustifiable), in a foundation that cannot be called into question.  The 
assumption that any knowledge system must include a class of universal, indubitable, 
unchallengeable beliefs, and the assumption that all reasoning in the system 
proceeded unidirectionally from the foundation and never in reverse, were so 
imbedded in modernist epistemologies that they shaped the very possibilities of the 
discourse (p. 12-13).   
 Murphey argues that Locke maintained Descartes’ foundationalism, but his 
articulation of different types of knowledge allows for an easier coexistence of 
science and religion (p. 13-20).  In establishing a separate structure of knowledge 
founded on scriptural revelation, Locke allowed for multiple and parallel systems of 
knowing, though he ultimately links the reasonableness of theological claims to the 
deductive argument for the existence of God. Thus the structures are independent, but 
not unrelated.  Where Locke struggled, as have others operating out of Biblical 
foundationalism in his time and since, was in shoring up the argument that the written 
texts of the Bible were indeed the direct revelation of God, and thus qualified as an 
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indisputable foundation.  Locke’s reasoning comes to be undermined by several, but 
particularly significant are Hume’s critiques, which Murphey identifies as twofold: 
the undercutting of the necessity of an intelligent designer to the universe as only one 
possibility and based on the presupposition that the universe is construed as a 
machine or mechanism, and the impossibility of gathering enough evidence in order 
to justify a miracle as a violation of the laws of nature.  Both the challenge to the 
nature and existence of God and Locke’s justification for scriptural authority based on 
the accounting of miracles marked a shift towards other means of justifying scriptural 
truth claims (p.21).   
Reid and others then respond to the critiques of Locke returning to the 
existence of God based on the scriptural revelation.  The resultant reasoning leads to 
the need for developing dogmatic assertions of biblical inerrancy in order to claim 
scriptural authority as the indisputable foundation for theological reasoning, helping 
to give rise to Christian fundamentalism (p. 15-19).  In contrast, Schleirmacher put 
forward that the essence of all religions, not just Christianity, was a “certain sort of 
feeling or awareness,” or an “intuition of the infinite” (Murphey, 22).  His work 
centered on establishing a systematic theology that argued all legitimate doctrines 
emanated from this foundational experience. Murphey argues that Schleiermacher 
represents a foundationalist epistemology in that he agues for the universality of this 
human experience of the divine.  While he holds that Christianity is but one system of 
response, he claims human religious self-consciousness as the starting point for all 
theology (p. 22-23).  Murphey traces this school of thought through prominent 
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twentieth century American theologians such as Mathews and Fosdick, who privilege 
experience as a the primary source for theological reasoning, and base scriptural 
authority in its evidence of a transhistorical experience of God (p. 24).  
Spirituality and American Liberal Protestantism 
While Murphey only offers a limited sketch, it is useful as a backdrop.  After 
all, the primary purpose of this work is not a detailed history of “spirituality”, but 
rather an exploration of its function and usefulness in its contemporary form.  These 
historical explorations are thus intended to be contextualizing rather than exhaustive.  
It also seems important here to note again the privileging of Protestant thought in 
establishing the context for our larger conversation.  As we shift to a more explicitly 
American conversation about the construct of spirituality, the dominance of what is 
typically referred to as “mainline” Protestant thought in the historical public 
discourses loom large.  That is not to say that other discourses are not significant or 
influential, but again, my attempt is to be representative more than exhaustive.  
Certainly similar streams of liberalism and fundamentalism can be seen emerging in 
Catholicism (though tradition may overshadow scripture as foundational in that 
particular fundamentalism), and in Judaism (broadly represented in distinctions 
between orthodox and reform movements) in the same eras.  Certainly other religious 
traditions beyond Judeo-Christian play a role in the shaping of this conversation as 
well.  However, for the sake of this research, and with the acknowledged risk of 
participation in reinscribing the dominance of a Protestant discourse, we continue 
with a somewhat limited focus.   
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Murphey’s analysis dovetails with Schmidt’s more complex genealogical 
mapping of American spirituality.  Schmidt characterizes the American popular 
spirituality as a “seeker spirituality” (p. 2), marked by a search for meaning that 
emphasizes personal experience and often transgresses established religious 
demarcations. Beginning with noting that “the act of journeying across the bounds of 
traditions, denominations, and institutions has emerged as a familiar, if still creative, 
course of exploration for many Americans:  “From Jewish-Buddhist contemplatives 
to yoga-performing Methodists, more and more seekers have been finding insight 
through a medley of practices and pieties” (p. 2).  He frames his study by challenging 
the watershed view of baby boomers as the great inventors of a new spiritual trend in 
America, unhinged from the church-going generation of their parents.  Instead, he 
asks, “How over the longer term did the United States become a land of spiritual 
questing?  How was it that so many Americans became so intensely absorbed in 
something amorphously called ‘spirituality’?” (p. 2).   
Schmidt is equally dubious of the assertion that spiritual questing is somehow 
inherent in the founding of America, arguing that contemporary spiritualities could 
not be read as predictable outgrowths of the heavily Protestant religious expressions 
of either British colonialism or a post-revolution America. Despite the chaotic nature 
of Protestant assertions of the individual prerogative to read and interpret scripture, 
scripture was firmly in place as the foundation of theological and social thought; 
“Debates were everywhere, but the authority and sufficiency of biblical revelation 
were not up for grabs in early American Protestantism.  Sure, pilgrims wandered 
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ceaselessly into new interpretations of Christianity – with their Bibles firmly in hand” 
(p.3).   
Schmidt’s argument is that American “spirituality,” as the term is broadly 
configured, “was invented through a gradual disentanglement from…model 
Protestant practices [Sabbath observance, private prayer, sacramental meditation, 
Bible reading, etc.] or, at minimum, through a significant redefinition of them” (p. 3).  
“Spirituality”, he argues, only comes to be distinguished from “religion” in the 
American imaginary through some dissociation with those habits, “only a step 
removed from evangelical Christianity does spirituality begin to refer to ‘direct 
mystical experience’ and ‘an individual’s solitary search’ for ‘the absolute or the 
divine’” (p. 4).  And thus, even in our exploration of spirituality as a broader 
construct, Protestant Christianity remains a central point of reference.  
“I once heard a preacher who sorely tempted me to say, I would go to church 
no more,” (1838), Emerson comments in his infamous address to the Harvard 
Divinity School.  Schmidt argues that the Transcendentalism of public voices such as 
Emerson and Whitman marks the most significant cultural shifts around which a 
contemporary notion of spirituality coalesces.  Certainly the Enlightenment era 
thought of early American leaders was significant in the articulation of religious 
privatism and voluntaristic freedom, but ultimately, Schmidt posits, the deists’ 
assumption of God’s detachment from creation served to minimize any substantial 
attentiveness to things spiritual.  “Only when Enlightenment freedom, happiness, and 
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autonomy were refracted through a romantic prism did the life of the spirit come to 
matter experientially to rational souls” (p. 5).   
For Schmidt, the contemporary boom in seeker spirituality “is an artifact of 
religious liberalism, especially in its more radical stripes.  Included in that company 
of nonconformists were Transcendentalists, romantic Unitarians, Reform Jews, 
progressive Quakers, devout disciples of Emerson and Whitman, Spiritualists, 
questing psychologists, New Thought optimists, Vedantists, and Theosophists, among 
sundry wayfarers” (p. 7).  Many of these spiritual seekers, he notes, traveled more 
than one path simultaneously or many in succession.  Some envisioned themselves as 
architects of a future religion based in a universalized spirituality.  Their commonality 
is their move from the authoritative structures of older religious expressions towards a 
more democratic idealism in “religions of the spirit” (p. 7).  
Our current seeker spirituality, “spiritual but not religious”, cultural trend 
cannot be so easily be divorced from Indian mystic Hazrat Inayat Kahn’s 1925 “One 
Religion for All” lecture tour, or Unitarian minister Martin Kellogg Schermerhorn’s 
“universal worship” services of the same era.  He argues both grow out of a distinct 
liberal religious and political ideology invented in the nineteenth century.  Broadly 
diffused, it was “always as much a religious vision of emancipated souls as a political 
theory of individual rights and civil liberties” (p. 11).  He points to the 1820s as a 
period in which a radical form of Christian Protestantism cohered into an articulation 
of liberalism in the United States.  Over the next few decades the trend gradually 
edged over the bounds of Christianity itself.  With its popular articulations voiced by 
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the likes of Emerson and Whitman, liberalism emerged as powerful cultural force in 
the religious, political and academic thought of nineteenth century America.  
Schmidt looks to Harvard scholar Horatio Dresser, writing in 1900 as a 
primary architect of American progressivism for a description of central 
characteristics of liberalism.  His determination of key points include: 
 
individual aspiration after mystical experience of religious feeling; the 
valuing of silence, solitude, and serene meditation; the immanence of 
the transcendent  -- in each person and in nature; the cosmopolitan 
appreciation of religious variety as well as unity in diversity; ethical 
earnestness in pursuit of justice-producing reforms or ‘social 
salvation’; and emphasis on creative self-expression and 
adventuresome seeking (p. 12). 
   
 
Increasingly disenchanted with the dogmatism of Protestant Christianity, the new 
American pilgrim, traversing increasingly divided terrain, sought a vision of unity 
through a universalized religion of the spirit.   
The Case of Alcoholics Anonymous 
 I choose Alcoholics Anonymous as a case study for illustrating the 
phenomenon of which I am speaking in part because of its cultural influence, but also 
because it is a well documented and somewhat systematized movement. In looking at 
Alcoholics Anonymous, we can see clear evidence of the appeal to this liberal 
religious discourse. In her study of emergence in Christianity, Tickle (2008) notes, 
“When speaking of which sociocultural events in the twentieth century most affected 
North American Christianity and its shifting relationships with spirituality, many 
sociologists of religion will cite the founding of Alcoholics Anonymous as the first in 
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a list of prime movers” (p. 91).  For our purposes, the location of Alcoholics 
Anonymous (AA) as “first” chronologically (which is debatable) is less important 
that its primacy in systematizing an articulation of  “spiritual but not religious” 
thinking in a manner that has been wildly influential both in the growth of AA itself 
and related twelve step movements (Al-Anon, Narcotics Anonymous, Overeaters 
Anonymous, etc), but also as a framework for the larger cultural manifestations of 
popular spiritualities growing out of the religious liberal tradition.   
 AA officially dates its founding in 1935, when Bill Wilson and Dr. Bob Smith 
(referred to in AA literature and discourse as Bill W. and Dr. Bob) began to formalize 
a method of recovery from addiction based on their experience.  AA built on the work 
of previous movements, particularly the early-twentieth century Oxford Group, which 
in contrast to AA was marked by a strong evangelical zeal (Tickle, p. 92).  Part of 
AA’s unique contribution rests in its claiming a place alongside Emerson, Whitman 
and others in rejecting the dogmatism of evangelical Christianity, while still 
embracing the possibility of radical transformation.  “Rarely have we seen a person 
fail who has thoroughly followed our path”  (Anonymous, p. 58) begins the chapter 
entitled “How it Works” from the central text Alcoholics Anonymous which outlines 
the twelve steps and is still read at the beginning of AA meetings across the globe.   
 The steps themselves go on to repeatedly make the case that the suffering 
alcoholic can only find serenity through admission of powerlessness and intervention 
of a loving God.  However, that God is not confined to the constraints of a particular 
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religious articulation, but rather referred to as “God as we understood Him” 
(Anonymous, p.59).  “Choose your own concept of God,” Tickle observes,  
 
was to be one of the early principles that liberated Wilson from his 
own torment, and he would remain true to it throughout his life.  God 
could even be addressed not as God, but as a/the Higher Power.  In 
fact, health itself seemed to depend upon one’s having the power or 
facility to make just such a leap from the doctrinal to the experiential 
[emphasis added], and who could argue with that, especially given the 
increasingly obvious success rate AA was producing? (p. 92).  
 
 
 The “choose your own God” concept was significant, but its real genius was 
in its pairing with a second defining characteristic of AA spirituality: the authority of 
experience.  From the start, AA assumed that other alcoholics were better-equipped 
and more effective carriers of a message of hope than were “non-addicted (non-
confessing) experts and authorities, including most particularly pastors and clerics” 
(Tickle, p.92).  In a move born of the same impulse to relocate authority that 
Descartes articulated three centuries earlier, twelve-step spirituality delivered a, 
perhaps unintentional but nevertheless substantial, blow to the authority of clergy.  In 
its almost sacramental emphasis on one alcoholic sharing the experience of addiction 
and radical transformation upon “having had a spiritual experience as the result of 
these steps” (Anonymous, p. 60), AA stood within the radically democratizing and 
anti-clerical tradition of religious liberalism.  Experience was codified as the central 
justification and source for theology. The whole system was built from a pragmatic 
decision to work from the premise that other alcoholics’ experiences of recovery 
proved the existence and power of God to “restore us to sanity” (Anonymous, p. 59).  
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 The “abc’s” of AA’s twelve steps, the closing of the passage from “How it 
Works” read ritually at the beginning of each meeting, sums up the liberal tenets 
underpinning its core spirituality:  
 
Our description of the alcoholic, the chapter to the agnostic, and our 
personal adventures before and after made clear three pertinent ideas:  
(a) That we were alcoholic and could not manage our own lives. 
(b) That probably no human power could have relieved our  
alcoholism. 
(c)     That God could and would if he were sought (p. 60). 
 
 
The emphasis on both experience and the seeking of God are direct manifestations of 
the liberal tradition Schmidt explicates.  The chapter titled “We Agnostics” in 
Alcoholics Anonymous, immediately preceding “How it Works”, essentially has as 
its primary focus an argument for the shift from the secular modernist reasoning that 
grounds truth in the rationality of science to a liberal religious foundationalism of 
experience which could function alongside scientific discovery.  Schmidt contends, 
“For religious liberals, unlike their secular cousins, a deepened and diversified 
spirituality was part of modernity’s promise.  Materialism and scientism might 
challenge this unfolding religion of the spirit…but to its proponents those perils only 
made the inward dimension of liberalism more important” (p.12). 
Spirituality and Education 
 Thus far we have explored the relationship between the contemporary notion 
of “spirituality” and the liberal religious tradition, particularly as it relates to 
modernist thought and Protestant theologies.  Claiming experience as its foundational 
principle, this amorphous and post-religious notion of spirituality has found its way 
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into the larger discourse around education.  Undoubtedly, several routes to this place 
could be mapped.  The interplay between the religious and educational dimensions of 
public life is complex and multifaceted.  My choosing to highlight this notion of 
“spirituality” through its theological development is a to highlight particular 
knowledge relationships that current discourses tend to obscure.  My intent here is to 
build this connection so that I might consider the implications of critiques of religious 
liberalism for the notion of spirituality in education, ultimately with the desire to 
invite new conversations and consider my own investments in these intersecting 
discourses.   
 Charting a way through the vast terrain of recent research in spirituality in 
education is a daunting task at best.  This is nowhere close to a comprehensive 
survey.  My purpose here is primarily to offer samples of a few scholars’ work in 
order to support my characterizing the larger discourse as related to the seeker 
spirituality that has already been established in relationship to the liberal religious 
tradition. I pay attention here to three voices in this conversation around spirituality in 
education: Miller, Palmer, and Dantley.  I choose these three largely because theirs 
are voices that I have encountered repeatedly in my academic and professional life.  
While there are certainly countless others who could be brought into this 
conversation, these three offer a glimpse into the discursive trends that are the larger 
focus of my analysis.   
 John (Jack) P. Miller, Professor of Education at Ontario Institute for 
Education, has written widely in the field he refers to as “holistic education,” which 
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he describes as providing “a broader vision of education and human development” 
based on three key elements: “balance, inclusion, and connection” (1998, p. 46).  He 
argues that schools are largely set up to focus on learning that happens through 
transmission (a one-way flow of information from teacher to student), or sometimes 
transaction (a more interactive flow of information between teacher and student).  He 
posits a third mode of learning which he dubs transformational, focusing “not just on 
intellectual development, but also on physical, emotional, aesthetic, moral, and 
spiritual growth” (p.46).  While he argues holistic educators should balance all three, 
Miller clearly suggests that the transformational is largely absent and in desperate 
need of further development in schools.  He argues that this broadened educational 
vision “is a return to basics.  It asks us to focus on what is ultimately important in 
life” (p. 47).  This notion of ultimate importance points to Miller’s assumed universal 
experience of the sacred in relation to the self, others, and nature – experiences which 
he argues schooling too often fail to nurture.  “If we are to build a less violent and 
more compassionate world,” he asserts, “we need to nurture this deeper sense of self 
in our children” (p. 48).   
 Miller is in fact quite clear that his educational vision towards the “whole 
child” is grounded in the Emersonian tradition.  He bases his assertion that education 
should “help each person find their own destiny or calling” (p. 194) on Emerson’s 
assertion of the same principle.  He similarly argues for “a curriculum for the inner 
life which nurtures contemplation” based on Emerson’s call for education to nurture 
the soul, which Miller contends grows out of Emerson’s belief that the individual is a 
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reflection of the “universal spirit” (p. 194).    Miller similarly evokes Whitman, 
Thoreau, and Alcott, ultimately concluding that the Transcendentalists made key 
contributions to the education discourse to which we should return, including: 1) that 
within each individual is a soul that needs to be nurtured by the teacher and 
educational environment, 2) the teacher should respect the child, 3) experience is 
central to learning, and 4) the teacher should work from his or her spiritual center.  
This last point he argues, is “essential for contacting the intuitive wisdom of children” 
(p. 201).  Ultimately, Miller’s evocation of these major transcendentalist thinkers is 
an act of justification for his spirituality-infused approach to education he dubs 
“holistic” (not to be confused with a more nuanced use of this term later in this 
dissertation).  Following the same line of reasoning that Schmidt argues, Miller 
defends “Sometimes holistic educators are seen as ‘new age’ with no roots in the past. 
The work of these transcendentalists strongly counters that notion” (p. 202).   
 Similarly committed to education as a “spiritual journey” (1993), Parker 
Palmer’s books To Know as We Are Known (1983), and the Courage to Teach (1997) 
have been wildly popular and are often included in teacher education curriculum.  
Working out of his own his own Quaker spirituality, Palmer has written several books 
about teaching, learning, vocation, and spiritual journey. The Center for Courage and 
Renewal, which he founded, uses the tag line “reconnecting who you are with what 
you do” (2010). “What are we seeking when we seek ‘spirituality’ in education?” 
Palmer asks; “I think, at heart, that we are seeking to find life-giving forces and 
sources in the midst of an enterprise which is too-often death dealing: education” 
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(1999, p.164).  Drawing from Merton’s language of “true self,” Palmer assumes an 
understanding of selfhood that is Platonist and essential, a foundational assumption of 
the created self based in a universal experience of the divine. His is a cosmology in 
which each has place in the larger order, and the task is to discover and live out of 
that place.  He argues for a reclaiming of the “sacred at the heart of knowing, 
teaching, and learning”, a notion he describes as “that which is worthy of respect” (p. 
166).  
Palmer critiques education on the basis that fear drives a curriculum that 
fragments the self and disconnects one person from another.  He posits a counter 
move towards a spirituality of education based on love and compassion, noting that 
such a curriculum carries with it the potential for radical transformation.  Ultimately, 
most of Palmer’s work point towards this notion of “living divided no more,” (p. 172) 
of our passions and our values being brought into conversation towards a sense of 
wholeness that calls us into action for social change.  For Palmer, to educate is to 
invite knowledge of the true self, and in so doing empower the individual to act in 
community towards a more just world.  For him this is a universal journey of the 
spirit: “I suspect that your journey, like mine, is towards trying to come into a deeper 
understanding of what it means to live divided no more.  If we can come to a deeper 
understanding of what this decision might mean for us in the context of education, we 
will have done something worth doing” (p. 172).  
 Finally, Dantley (2003) grounds his work on spirituality in education 
leadership in a notion of “critical spirituality” which he describes as a construct 
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infusing “two radical perspectives, namely critical theory and prophetic, African 
American spirituality” (p. 5).  He argues that blending the critique and deconstruction 
of power systems that undercut democratic relations “with reflection grounded in an 
African American sense of moralism, prophetic resistance, and hope” can make for 
transformative leadership. For Dantley, “spirituality” and “morality” are closely 
linked if not interchangeable.  The centrality of moral change to the traditional 
notions of transformative leadership in education literature is his basis for the 
assertion of his critical spirituality construct.   
 Dantley argues that African American spirituality is an integral part of Black 
life, a “mechanism through which African Americans have shaped their 
consciousness and understanding of themselves as well as who they are in 
relationship to others” (p. 6).  “Spirit,” he argues, “animates human life.  It is that 
intangible dimension of ourselves that connects us with something greater than 
ourselves.  It literally becomes the nexus of inspiration, motivation, and meaning-
making in our lives” (p.6).  Dantley goes on to link African American spirituality to 
the capacity for resilience, forgiveness, and survival. He looks to Cornel West’s 
notion of “prophetic spirituality” as a nuanced construction in which one critically 
perceives one’s “situationality in its unpolished context as the ‘as is,’ while 
transcending one’s political and social realities to project a different and in fact better 
‘not yet’” (p. 8).    
 If we read each of these three scholars alongside Dresser’s century-old 
assessment of religious liberalism, the parallels are clear.  Particularly in Miller and 
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Palmer, there is an emphasis on the individual “mystical experience of religious 
feeling,” though Dantley also grounds his notion of African American spirituality in a 
blended sense of self-understanding and inspiration.  The contemplative traditions of 
silence and meditation are central to Palmer and Miller’s work, while all three are 
deeply invested in “ethical earnestness in pursuit of justice-producing reforms or 
‘social salvation’” (Schmidt, p. 12).  Each also claims a sort of universality of 
experience, as central to Murphey’s characterization of liberalism (p. 24), though 
Dantley presents a variation on this theme as he speaks to a universal African 
American spirituality. While his contextualized spirituality in some ways challenges 
the assumptions of a universal experience of the sacred which is central to the, 
notably white, liberal tradition; the broadness of his characterization of African 
American spirituality and its relationship to a common Black experience functions 
similarly in its assumption of universality, even if it is a limited universalism.   
 Each of these scholars avoids making the kind of specific theological claims 
that may be seen as more “religious” than “spiritual,” yet each holds transformational 
experience as foundational to their construction.  In short, acknowledged or not, the 
“spirituality” or even “spiritualities” evoked here as part of a public discourse are 
much indebted to their nineteenth century precursors.     
Critiques of Liberalism and Foundational Experience  
 Alcoholics Anonymous is helpful for us to the extent that it is illustrative in its 
articulation and communal practice of a pragmatic spirituality beyond religion, but it 
is not unique in its general aesthetic and guiding principles.  The cultural trend 
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towards experiential spiritualities over against organized religious systems continues 
and permeates our broader discourses, as demonstrated by Miller, Palmer, and 
Dantley.  Yet, the foundational logical of religious liberalism on which these 
spiritualities rest has found itself under attack.  If, “spirituality” as it is commonly 
used is located somewhere on the upper floors of this tower of religious liberalism, 
stacked upon assumption after assumption that leads back to the irrefutable claims of 
a universal experience of the divine, then the crumbling of those claims destabilizes 
the entire structure of thought.   
 The most common attacks on “spirituality” as we have been using the term 
and its liberal religious leanings come from religious conservatives growing out of 
more fundamentalist leaning traditions.  Those traditional attacks largely attempt to 
displace an experiential foundation and supplant it with a scriptural one.  In my 
estimation, the more intriguing and potentially disruptive challenges, then, are not 
those concerned with which foundation to build from, but rather those which 
challenge the nature of foundational thought altogether.   
 Murphey (2002), utilizing the metaphor of a building, argues that within the 
liberal tradition experience lies as a foundation on which other “floors” or 
propositions are built, one resting on the other.  Fundamentalists built a neighboring 
tower on the foundation of scripture, a foundation that liberals have challenged 
around historicism, hermeneutics, and the politics of canonization.  Though quick to 
disrupt their neighbors’ stability, liberalism has been slow to reckon with the 
challenges to its own foundation.  Murphey identifies three threats to liberalism that 
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are significant for our discussion.  The first is the problem of God’s existence, which 
if it is to be answered with a claim to personal experience reasonably invites 
skepticism. The second, and related critique, is that liberal theologies extend 
unidirectionally out of a universal, core inner experience of the divine, an experience 
presumably that can be differentiated from other religious experiences, yet there is 
little consensus on what exactly that experience is.  Thus, it becomes self-referential.  
The acceptance of the theory that such an experience exists, and that it is a revelation 
of the divine, informs the assignment of such significance to the experience itself (p. 
93).   
The third challenge is related to this self-referential problem, and while it 
poses a particular problem to Murphey, who writes as a Christian theologian, may 
actually rest comfortably with Schmidt and other proponents of “spirituality” as other 
than religion.  Murphey argues, that the same self-referential nature of the spiritual 
experience is then read through the theological lenses of those who have those 
experiences. “Thus,” she argues,” Catholics have visions of Christ and of Mary; 
Protestants have experiences of repentance and reconciliation; Hindus have 
experiences of Krishna” (p. 94).  What for Murphey functions as a problem because it 
erodes the ability to assert the particularity of Christianity, is ultimately the same 
feature of the liberal religious tradition that predicated a broader embrace of religious 
diversity and multiple articulations of the divine – exactly the move that Emerson and 
friends made.  Still Murphey’s, observation that the interpretation of the supposed 
universal experience through a matrix that assumes the nature and existence of the 
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experience to begin with, and then illuminated by the specific theological 
assumptions of the one having the experience, is compelling.  The result, to use her 
metaphor, is that the foundation turns out to be “hanging from the balcony” (p. 92).  
For those of us who, like the Transcendentalists, are less invested in 
forwarding one particular faith tradition over others than is reflected in Murphey’s 
concern regarding theological relativism, the third aspect of her critique still has 
significant implications.  In fact, it reflects my central concern in the ways 
“spirituality” is evoked in broad brushstrokes, particularly in regards to education. 
Beyond the problematics of assuming the universality of a rather ill-defined 
experience of something grander than oneself, which I am inclined to forgive (or at 
least suspend for the moment) the notion of “spirituality” functions to obscure the 
second tier of assumptions through which the experience is interpreted.  Thus, even if 
we chose to overlook that a universal experience of the sacred presupposes itself 
(which is a big if), the problem remains that such experiences are defined through 
inherited systems of theological assumptions.  
Even in what is often assumed to be a uniquely postmodern accommodation 
of religious pluralism, an assumption which Schmidt compellingly if not intentionally 
debunks, the popular construction of “spirituality” simply decentralizes the narratives 
of particular religious expressions and replaces them with a larger and more 
encompassing metanarrative. Therefore, the problem with the “spiritual but not 
religious” trend which I find most disturbing is that those assumptions, the stuff of 
creeds and dogmas, avoid articulation and thus avoid critical analysis.  My concern is 
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that too often these unarticulated, elusive theological claims allow amorphous 
articulations of spirituality to be played like a trump card having one or both of the 
following effects: an epistemological block on the part of those who play the card in 
order to avoid uncomfortable challenges to what they can stand knowing, or a 
complete dismissal of all articulations of spirituality (including undifferentiated 
constructs of religion and theology) by others in the game because of its claims to 
transcend the rules of regular play, in this case being rigorous critique.  
It is my conviction that if spirituality is to be useful as a construct, then it must 
not be removed from the realm of critical analysis.  In that vein, if for the sake of 
discussion, we continue to hold stable the possibility of a common experience of the 
divine, I observe two primary theological issues in which the examples of 
“spirituality” discourses we have considered thus far fail to own up to their 
assumptions:  “What is the nature of humanity (i.e., subjectivity and the soul)?”, and 
“How does God (or Universal Spirit, or whatever language one uses) interact with the 
world?”   Obviously, a third question could be raised about the existence of God, but 
one’s answer to the second, about the nature of God, implicates one’s assumptions 
about God’s existence.   
Again, Alcoholics Anonymous provides a helpful example in that it is a more 
thoroughly articulated example of the “spiritual but not religious” path than most.  
The AA view of humanity, at least of Alcoholics, is characterized by powerlessness.  
In fact, it is this experience of powerlessness, the gift of desperation that results in a 
humility through which a “higher power” can “restore us to sanity” (Anonymous, 
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p.55).  Yet, the AA literature also asserts that within each person is the spark of God 
consciousness, a seed of divine grace.  While brokenness and powerlessness are 
understood as the universal human condition, experienced in a particularly acute 
manner for alcoholics, there is a tricky dichotomy at work in the transformational 
experience.  The gift of desperation is granted externally from a benevolent higher 
power, a transforming grace that is enough to start one on the spiritual path by an 
admission of powerless and unmanageability.  However, the practices that follow, in 
the form of the other eleven steps, promise a “spiritual awakening” – thus the 
transformative process is initiated by God, but requires the active participation of (in 
this case) the alcoholic.  The alcoholic, trusting in the experiences of other alcoholics 
that have adopted these same practices and holding the principle of “progress not 
perfection” as central, maintains the spiritual condition through the working of the 
steps.   
It is simple enough to see a parallel between the theology of grace laid out in 
these assumptions about humanity and God and John Wesley’s (1872) three tiered 
conception of grace, prevenient (preparing and present from birth), justifying (in the 
form of some conversion experience of repentance and forgiveness), and sanctifying 
(sustaining continued growth and practice through attention to God’s active 
presence).  My point here is not to suggest that Alcoholics Anonymous is secretly a 
Methodist movement, but rather to suggest that there is a systematic theology and 
creed, with its own complex and formative history, underscoring even the claims 
towards the freedom to conceptualize “God as we understood him” (Anonymous, p. 
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59) (not to mention the theistic, anthropomorphic, and gendered assumptions in the 
use of a masculine pronoun in reference to God).  In essence, the functioning of the 
steps is dependent on a conception of God that can and does deliver grace to a 
humanity that is ultimately loved, though spiritually sick and thus disconnected from 
the grace so freely given. There is a specific theology present and working in 
Alcoholics Anonymous, one based on the frameworks through which those who have 
experienced the transformation of recovery have interpreted their experiences, which 
is then offered as an interpretive lens for others. The existence of a higher power is 
evidenced by the recovery experience itself, and having made that justification, the 
experience is further described through (a remarkably Wesleyan) theology of grace 
and redemption.  Though the intent may be towards a spirituality free of religious 
dogma, the effect is really more of a distilling religion (particularly liberal 
Protestantism) down to a few theological assumptions deemed pragmatic and useful 
to describing and facilitating the recovery experience.     
I would argue a similar principle functions in most of the discourse around 
spirituality.  Though in his earlier work Palmer more explicitly grounds his 
theological claims in a Quaker Christianity (1983), the work I explored earlier 
represents his move towards an increasingly obscured religious underpinning in an 
expression of universal spirituality.  He, Miller (1998), and Dantley (2003) all make 
use of some construction of universal or ultimate truth/reality and the soul/spirit of 
the individual in relation to it.  The unexamined claims here, as I briefly alluded to 
earlier, are towards a Platonist cosmology in which there is an ultimate “good” – 
69 
 
Christianized to God by the scholastics (Sheldrake, 2007), and then resecularized here 
back to “good” – and a cosmology in which all of creation has a specific place in the 
grand scheme.  The goal of “holistic” (Miller, 1998) education, or “education as a 
spiritual journey” (Palmer, 1983), or “critical spirituality” (Dantley, 2003), could be 
understood then as a transformative experience towards a more moral order in which 
the value of each person is understood as it fits into a larger order; in Palmer’s words, 
“living divided no more” (p.172).  But do not mistake these aims as purely 
individualistic, like their Liberal Religious precursors, these spiritualities are equally 
concerned with social transformation.  The implication is that the process of 
individuals finding their place, living more fully into their created selves, leads to 
social action of the prophetic nature Dantley speaks of; the examples of Parks, King, 
and Gandhi Palmer points to, and the “less violent and more compassionate world” 
Miller envisions.   
So, for these spiritual educators, there are a few theological assumptions 
functioning: there is a sacred goodness to each individual, something which might be 
called a “soul”; that soul exists as a part of an “ultimate reality” which abusive 
systems of power and oppression stand in the way of being fully realized on both the 
individual and communal level; and finally, that through some series of communal 
practices and collective choices individuals can progress towards realizing their true-
selves and thus transform the world.  While lacking in a clear articulation of God’s 
providence, and flavored with hints of radical transformation as the inner light of each 
is revealed through some blended enactment of external grace and hard work, this 
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hopeful narrative of progress is more akin to Protestant salvation than, say, Buddhist 
enlightenment.  Where teachers are prophets and students are seekers, the journey 
towards a promise land seems the realization of destiny, and thus the divine decree is 
at least implied – even if the details of God’s potential for intervention are a bit fuzzy.  
 If the universal experience of God is problematic both in its very claims to 
universality and in its presumption of God in defining the universal experience on 
which its justification of God depends, then a de-religionized spirituality is equally 
problematic in its assertion of unexamined theological claims, not the least of which 
is the notion of a unified subject – a soul.  I offer two major critiques of this notion (at 
least as it assumedly functions given a lack of expansion or interrogation).   Looking 
to Butler (1990), the essentialist notion of a “true self,” or soul, created for a 
particular place and purpose breaks down in that the categories for understanding the 
self are discursively produced.  “Identity” is thus performative, a repetition of 
gestures which are copies of other performances, which are copies of other 
performances, which lack any immutable foundation.  The result is the appearance of 
a category (like gender) as “natural”.  If the language and categories through which 
we understand and construct a self are produced discursively, then it becomes 
difficult to argue for the kind of Platonist cosmology that we have seen evoked.  If the 
assumed placeholders for selfhood are destabilized, the notion of a true-self waiting 
to be freed is as problematic as the identity politics propping up the gay liberation 
“coming out” narrative.  
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 Further, the libratory claims of self-discovery are themselves suspicious.  To 
be a subject, Foucault claims (1982) has two interpretations: “subject to someone else 
by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-
knowledge.  Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes 
subject to” (p. 216).  Foucault would thus read the notion of the true-self in the 
spirituality discourse, this notion of an inner and inward self, functioning as a means 
of subjugation that leads to constant surveillance of the self in an effort to be 
“normal.”  Thus, the modern construction of the self ultimately closes off 
possibilities. 
 The second critique of this construction of self is more embodied.  Though it 
is not explicitly clear in the examples of Miller, Palmer, and Dentley, the privileging 
of the soul as a the central category for selfhood can fall easily into a Cartesian 
dualism that denies the material body.  This is a critique that can also be levied 
against some queer theorists and other poststructuralists, whose blank canvas 
approach maintains the body functions only as a text to be read and interpreted, rather 
than an integral part of the knowing itself.  Murphey (1996) challenges this kind of 
disembodied notion of the soul with a simple, but compelling example.  She tells the 
story of hearing philosopher of religion Richard Swinburne deliver a paper in which 
he stated “it was conceivable that he should change into a crocodile and still remain 
himself” (p. 92).  Swinburne is a dualist, operating from a theory of the nature of the 
person through which he identifies with his immaterial soul; “thus, he can easily 
imagine waking up one morning and finding that his soul, the seat of his 
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consciousness, personality, emotions, has transmigrated into the body of a crocodile – 
possible, though surely inconvenient” (p.93).  On the other hand, Murphey 
presupposes a “nonreductive physicalism” in her conception of the person, 
“according to which human mental and spiritual capacities arise out of the complex 
ordering of our physical selves in their social environment,” thus in regards to the 
philosopher/crocodile, “no neo-cortex, no capacity for philosophical thought, no 
Swinburne” (p.93).   
Spirituality within Christian Theological Studies 
 Having demonstrated that “spirituality” largely takes its meaning in popular 
discourse in its distinguishing itself from a dogmatic construction of “religion”, and 
then having problematized the use of “spirituality” as a broadly universal construct in 
education discourses, we turn now to those seeking to claim “spirituality” within a 
tradition.  Because “spirituality” emerges as construct in particular relation to 
Christianity, the current debate over the construction of spirituality as a legitimate 
field of study within Christian theological education has much to offer our larger 
project.  Free from the critique that other uses of the term “spirituality” obscure 
theological assumptions, Christian Spirituality, as a field of study attempts to 
explicitly situate itself within an established theological tradition.  Therefore this 
debate can help us further understand “spirituality” as a construct by removing some 
of the problematic variables and instead locating it not in opposition to religion in 
general, or Christianity in particular, but in relationship to other sub-disciplines of 
theological study.  I look here to two established scholars, Roberts and Sheldrake, 
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who write from opposing positions, both responding to the increased demands for 
theological schools to address “spirituality”.  
In his scathing critique of the responses to a rise in student requests and 
institutional pressures for seminaries to offer more in the way of “spirituality” and 
“spiritual formation”, Roberts (2002) characterizes the “fixes” as ranging from 
“incoherent” to “flakey” (p. 44).  He argues that the protestant (particularly 
Presbyterian in his case) adoption of Roman Catholic modes of spiritual practice such 
as spending time in Benedictine monasteries, or training spiritual directors are 
decontextualized from theological and cultural realities that gave them significance.  
Similarly he suggests a “fad” such as labyrinth walking, promoted as a profound 
reclamation of ancient practices, is elevated beyond its significance, as the practice is 
neither particularly ancient nor is there evidence that it was particularly important 
even in its original context (p. 44). 
“Spirituality,” for Roberts, “ is one of those amorphous words that can mean 
anything in general and nothing in particular” (p. 46).  His fear regarding the cries 
from students for more attentiveness to spirituality is that they grow from a desire for 
a “totally integrated, un-conflicted Christian identity” that can make them feel secure 
that they will remain faithful in their future ministries, a surety he suggests is 
untenable and impossible.  Roberts raises questions about the role of the academy in 
supporting the Christian life, which he argues is at its core communal and that 
community rests in the congregation rather than the seminary.  It is this tension, in 
part, which makes this thread about “spirituality” as a field of study in theological 
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schools relevant to our larger conversation.  Two questions strike me in reading 
Roberts’ critique: “Is ‘spirituality’ a legitimate construct or body of knowledge?”, and 
“If it is, is it the role of the school to nurture it?” 
 Sheldrake (2001) offers a counter argument, beginning with a clear definition 
of “spirituality” within a Christian context saying the term “describes how people 
relate their beliefs about God in Jesus Christ to their core values and then express 
these beliefs in spiritual practices and also in how they form social and religious 
communities and relate to social and cultural realities” (p. 53).  Other than his circular 
use of “spiritual” in describing practices, it is a definition I find generally workable.  
It is consistent with Bowe’s (2003) simple assertion about the doing nature of 
spirituality: “Spirituality is theology on two feet” (p. 11).  Sheldrake is a Roman 
Catholic historian and writes predominantly about the precursors to “spirituality,” 
through pre-Vatican II terms such as “ascetical” or “mystical” theology, noting that 
within theological studies the term has only been actively used since the 1960’s.  He 
argues five reasons for the shift in language and the direction of the emerging field of 
study: 1) it counters outmoded distinctions between a supernatural, spiritual life and 
the everyday experience; 2) it recovers a sense of the collective rather than 
individualistic nature of Christian discipleship; 3) it is not limited to interiority, but 
integrated all aspects of human existence; 4) it re-engages with mainstream theology 
and biblical studies; and 5) it serves as an area of reflection that crossed lines of 
denominations and eventually faith traditions (2007, p. 4).  Still, as modernism 
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loosens its grip on theological studies, questions of context, experience, collective 
engagement, and ecumenism are increasingly commonplace in other sub-disciplines.   
Sheldrake positions spirituality as an interdisciplinary field of study, taking up 
other historical theological sub-disciplines in light of their application to lived 
experiences, both contemporary and historic.  In my estimation, Sheldrake’s most 
compelling case for the perpetuation of the field (beyond my pre-existing bent 
towards interdisciplinary approaches) is the claim, “Spirituality of its very nature is a 
‘self-implicating field’.  That is to say that some kind of transformation is implied by 
the search for knowledge” (p. 61).  He goes on to argue that “spirituality” functions to 
hold the larger enterprise of theological education accountable to this self-
implication.  “This does not imply” he purports “a lack of rigor or a dumbing down of 
critical analysis.  It does, however suggest that ‘to do theology’ implies becoming a 
theological person rather than simply using theological tools effectively” (p. 61).  
Thus, the construct of “spirituality” within theological education makes a unique 
contribution in its transformational intent. While he is quick to assert that his courses 
are academic and not a form of personal spiritual formation, he grounds his study and 
teaching in the belief that “all interpretation is inescapably an act of commitment” (p. 
62).  It is in the response to the question “why study this?” that spirituality as a field 
takes its meaning.  Rather than studying texts, traditions, and practices for purely 
literary or historical purposes, spirituality unapologetically suggests a claim that such 
study can be personally and culturally transformative.   
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I find the debate about “spirituality” within Christian theological education 
helpful not simply because it is articulated within a tradition which I claim as 
informing my personal and communal commitments, but because it emphasizes a 
need for that kind of articulation. Until this point, our attention has been focused on 
understanding “spirituality” not as a universal given, but rather as a discursively 
produced construct functioning to produce and support specific, though often 
unstated, worldviews. Yet, in this historic era that is being depicted as demonstrating 
an increase and marked interest all things spiritual (if not religious), these worldviews 
remain overwhelmingly modernist.  In my estimation, while the inventiveness of 
spiritual seekers in blending and questioning religious structures has tremendous 
potential for the emergence of broadening spectrums of engagement, unless they are 
accompanied by rigorous, critical inquiry they are more problematic than useful.  In 
essence, I am arguing that spirituality cannot escape the discourse of religion, even if 
it seeks “liberation” from institutional expressions.  There is no spirituality without 
theology, and so to assert a vision for spirituality in education without reflecting on 
the theological claims it presupposes, without attention to its cosmological and 
epistemological infrastructure, is simply irresponsible.   
Yet, Sheldrake’s compelling defense of “spirituality” as a field of study on the 
basis of its uniquely transformative claim, articulated in relationship to a broader 
theological framework, offers a keystone in the archway towards my own proposals.  
Yes, “spirituality” matters.  It can be a useful concept in our discourses around 
education, because it not only takes seriously the search for meaning in light of 
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experiences with that which we do not fully understand, its self-implicating nature 
uniquely speaks of those experiences as transformative.  The best of what Palmer, 
Miller, and Dantley have to offer us is the same sort of accountability that Sheldrake 
suggests spirituality offers theological sub-disciplines, a call to be about something 
more transformational, more life-giving, than training individuals in the effective use 
of tools.  
Thus, I retain the centrality of spirituality within pedagogy, though with the 
caveat that it take seriously the critiques I have laid out and thus open itself to 
challenge.  Further, I cannot comprehend a useful theological framework for 
spirituality that does not engage the challenges of postmodern thought.  Therefore in 
order for my work to claim any cohesion, the next section Towards a Spirituality for 
Pedagogy must not only take seriously the transformative claims and self-implicating 
nature of spirituality itself, it must be evaluated in light of my own critiques of how 
“spirituality” is frequently utilized in education discourses.   
 
Towards a Spirituality for Pedagogy 
 
Sheldrake’s (2001) emphasis on self-implication as a distinctive characteristic 
of spirituality as a field of study suggests that it may be well positioned as a 
significant aspect of postmodern pedagogical discourse, but only if it emerges from 
nonfoundationalist theological assertions.  Spirituality can offer a mode of discourse 
comfortable with the tension between agency and subjectivity, in which we produce 
and are produced, while avoiding the mires of cynicism.  Yet if we are to speak of 
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spirituality in postmodernity, we must remember that postmodernity is exactly that: 
post-modernity.  Modernity is its reference point, and thus suggesting a sharp break 
from it would be a dubious move.   
It is in this vein that Bauman proposes the term “liquid modernity” (2000), 
arguing that modernity is not over, but rather that we have moved into a phase 
marked by its fluidity and inability to hold shape. But, he argues, “was not modernity 
a process of ‘liquefaction’ from the start?  Was not ‘melting down solids’ its major 
pastime and prime accomplishment all along?” (p. 2).  Modernist epistemologies 
geared towards dethroning the past in narratives of progress and liberation were 
always about the melting process, however until recently they were about “melting 
the solids” – to borrow a Marxist refrain – in order to replace them with new and 
improved solids.  For Bauman, the “melting powers” of modernity have moved from 
the institutional level to the individual, as “it is the patterns of dependency and 
interaction whose turn it is to be liquefied” (p. 8).  He suggests that modernity is not 
over, but it is breaking down; the projects and aims of the era have turned in on 
themselves.  The structures making meaning of other structures are collapsing, and he 
wonders “whether their resurrection, albeit in a new shape or incarnation, is feasible; 
or – if it is not – how to arrange for their decent and effective burial” (p. 8).  Thus, my 
articulation of a postmodern theology that can support a spirituality for pedagogical 
vision must respond to the critiques I have previously levied, but is born out of the 
late modern, liquefaction of those discourses.  The ice has melted, but I still swim in 
these waters. 
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 If, as I have contended, our liberal religious tradition undergirds a 
contemporary construction of “spirituality” in its “spiritual but not religious” context; 
if that “spirituality” has become an accepted (if amorphous) aspect of the educational 
discourse; and if, rather than being free from religious thought, “spirituality” asserts 
both the circular reasoning of experience as the foundational claim for the nature of 
God, and the problematic claim of the existence of a unified self (in the form of a 
“soul”); how can “spirituality” still function as a useful construct in education 
discourses?  While it has been my intent to remove “spirituality” from the rather 
idolatrous category of the unchallengeable, ultimately, I am still invested in keeping it 
alive.  While I have raised critiques of the liberal religious tradition, both in its 
Christian theological and more amorphous “spiritual” forms, it is a tradition that has 
been formative in my own life and one with which I am still associated.  Perhaps 
then, I am something of a postliberal (Lindbeck, 1984), one who claims a 
nonfoundationalist theology, but whose theological antecedents are largely of the 
liberal type.    
 Here then, in positing spirituality for pedagogy that I find workable, I return to 
my Christian heritage.  Since my attempt is to construct an alternative in light of the 
limits of the dominant usage of “spirituality” I just explicated, I must first challenge 
assumptions of universality by claiming the particular theological contexts through 
which I operate, the language that both produces the possibility of my propositions 
and in which my propositions are produced as possible.  The distinctive centrality of 
salvation, whether interpreted individually or communally, marks my tradition and 
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the spirituality that emerges from it.  Not unlike the earlier discussion of Wesleyan 
theology and Alcoholics Anonymous, grace is a central theme and must be worked 
out through theologies of God’s action in the world – issues of imminence and 
intervention.   
So, what is being documented here, at this point in my research, is a reflexive 
move in which I am breaking from the claim of experience as the irrefutable 
justification of God’s existence, while acknowledging the epistemological quandary 
in which I locate myself by still professing Christianity after the foundation of the 
liberal version that informed me has been shown to be hanging out on the balcony.  
This is a pragmatic move.  As I began “mapping this plateau”, I claimed Christianity 
as the tradition shaping the theological framework for a spirituality I find workable.  
It is a deeply contextual claim, specific to my embodied experience of a particular 
cultural milieu. Thus, as in the previous chapter, and as a function of locating myself 
within Christian discourse, I work with the assumption of the existence of God.  
However, I do not use that presupposition as means of dodging a more critical 
conversation about the nature of God, or how God functions as a construct in the 
production of other knowledge.   
Let me also be clear that in articulating a spirituality for pedagogical purposes 
I am in no way advocating a collapse of the distinctions between church and state.  
Much has been written on both the need for a more robust conversation about faith 
and religion in schools and the need to do that in a democratically responsible manner 
(Slattery, 2006).  I work in both secular and religious learning communities, and 
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understand the differences of my role in each; but I also recognize that I carry the 
same history and self-understandings into either setting.  My interest is in an 
articulation of the spiritual life in as much as it informs my understanding of how and 
why I teach, the ways in which my identity as an educator is constructed by a spiritual 
discourse, and how that identity might be utilized in effecting positive cultural 
change.  However, this is not primarily an autobiographical venture.  I am not (at this 
point) leading with a telling of my life story; I am simply making the conscious 
decision to privilege particular discourses that shape the language through which I 
make meaning of my life story.  These are the discourses that have significant 
resonance for me, and so I accept and claim that criteria as a delimiting factor in my 
research. 
Epistemological Metaphors 
 In the introduction to this dissertation I make much use of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1985) challenge to thinking about knowledge as a tree, and their favoring 
a conceptualization of knowledge as a rhizome.  I find their critique of the linear 
representation of knowledge on the written page intriguing, and their parallel 
metaphor of mapping plateaus helpful.  However, in turning to a more constructive or 
propositional phase of this project, the rather unwieldy aspects of Deleuze and 
Guatarri’s radically playful metaphor becomes cumbersome.  Their idealization of a 
schizophrenic construction of reality that pushes beyond a critical suspicion of 
authoritative claims can be, well, maddening.  
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In a move borrowed from Murphey (2002), perhaps a more useful metaphor 
for our purposes at this point is Quine’s (1953) depiction of knowledge as a web or a 
net.  This Quinian holism, like the rhizome, challenges the epistemological claims of 
foundationalism.  However, where it is helpful for our purposes is in its implications 
for justification. For Quine, boundaries of the web are experiential.  That is not to say 
that they are foundational, as in the assumption of a singular universal experience 
grounding modern liberalism; but rather experience, itself, is variable and changing.  
He writes specifically of science, so his interest here is in a web constructed by a 
particular epistemological system. There is room within his construction for multiple 
and competing webs, each with their own, potentially impinging, boundaries.   For 
Quine, “Conflict with experience at the periphery” necessitates readjustments to the 
internal logic of the web, so “re-valuation of some statements entails revaluation of 
others, because of their logical interconnections – the logical laws being in turn 
simply certain further statements of the system” (p. 42).   
Murphey (2002) highlights two dogmas that Quine disrupts.  First, he calls 
into question the notion that a given belief could be traced in a linear and 
unidirectional way to a foundational belief derived directly from experience.  The 
conception of a web of knowledge, in which all beliefs are justified in relation to 
other beliefs, means that an experiential disruption implicates the whole of 
knowledge.  Second, he argues that attempts to maintain a special category of 
indubitable knowledge based on core concepts collapses under our ability (and 
occasional willingness) to adjust the meanings of the terms to maintain the truth of 
83 
 
the claims.  Stated another way, “concepts themselves have a history, and their 
meaning shifts under the pressure of new discoveries and theoretical changes” (p.95).   
Thiemann (1985) is one of several theologians making use of Quine’s 
conception of knowledge in thinking about justification of religious belief.  He argues 
that holist justification requires situating a disputed belief within the web of accepted 
and interrelated beliefs on which it depends.  Using the example of God’s 
prevenience, Theimann argues that the disputed belief is logically tied to both 
practices and beliefs not under dispute among Christians.  He suggests that the very 
nature of the web of Christianity is so tied to those beliefs, that their disruption would 
cause such a radical shift that the web would no longer be Christianity.  Thus, he is 
able to reason backwards towards a justification of the belief held in contention by 
arguing it is presupposed by its relationship to more widely accepted beliefs and 
practices.  It is worthy of note that Theimann includes practices in his construction, 
acknowledging, in Murphey’s (2002) words “the intrinsic relationship between 
human knowing and doing” (p. 97) that I return to later in my argument.   
Because holism offers an epistemology in which threads of logic are mutually 
supportive and running multi-directionally, it resists the traditional function of a 
unified and singular foundation.  Still, as Theimann argues, claims can be justified 
within their multi-relational context to other claims.  The challenge is that those other 
claims have to be presupposed, that the viability of a belief lies within the believing 
community.  Thus, in contrast to attempts to defend Christian truth-claims in relation 
to general principles of rationality, validity for a nonfoundational Christian theology 
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is located within the authority the community exercises on itself as the tradition 
continually seeks to redescribe its internal logic.  In my consideration of Theimann’s 
holistic, nonfoundationalist theology, I would maintain the construction works only if 
we consider multiple Christianities, multiple communities within which the internal 
logic is redescribed in relation not to a common, unifying, and foundational 
experience, but rather in relation to multiple and varied boundary experiences. 
 By employing this epistemological method in the context of working towards 
a spirituality shaped by the Christian discourses that animate my selfhood, I can begin 
with the presupposition of the existence of God (and the significance of God’s 
revelation in the figure Jesus Christ), and the continued relevance of Christian 
scripture (inasmuch as they proclaim that revelation). Rather than these being 
understood as foundational, indubitable beliefs, they are understood as beliefs with 
complex and interrelated histories that are so central to the nature of Christianity that 
they can be held relatively stable in a discourse defined as Christian.  Since the 
experiential boundaries of the epistemological system are defined by the practicing 
community, the parameters and viability of what may be taken for a given within the 
system depends on who is included in the definition of community.  Functionally, 
though, it allows the possibility of moving pragmatically forward in our discussion 
with an acknowledgment of the presuppositions as just that, presuppositions. They 
mark the structure of the conversation. Thus, the measure of the validity of my 
spirituality will be its adherence to an internal logic within the fabric of the tradition it 
rests upon.  Yet, the privileging of shared experience in the ongoing process of a 
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community negotiating the boundaries of a thought system (even with the 
acknowledgement that the same thought system gives articulation to the experience 
itself), allows me to claim some of the best of what I seek to retain from the liberal 
tradition.  This post-liberal positioning rejects the notion of a single universalizing 
experience of God, and yet maintains that interpretations of experiences through a 
God-shaped lens, over time and in dialogue, produce valuable knowledge.    
A second challenge emerges with holistic justification in that, as I alluded to 
already, it fails to address the problem of relativism.  If justification is dependent on 
the community’s redescribing its own logic, and there are multiple communities 
functioning simultaneously, are all of these internally coherent systems equally valid?  
MacIntyre (1989), using a complex analysis of history of the Thomist tradition and its 
significant rivals, counters the assumption that when judged by its own terms every 
tradition will always appear to be justified.  More important for us than the details of 
his analysis, is that he demonstrates that this is not the case.  A tradition fails when it 
cannot, within the construct of its own terms, resolve an epistemological crisis within 
the community of its adherents.  Not that it is an easy task, or even possible in the 
present, but a tradition or paradigm can thusly be judged if it can continue to readjust 
and progress while its competitors fail.   
Methodological Metaphors 
Adopting this articulation of a holistic approach, my proposal may be judged 
on its adherence to the internal claims of traditions within which it stands. But just as 
multiple, yet related, epistemological metaphors are helpful in moving from critique 
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to justification; other metaphors may be useful in describing the methodology of the 
creative process.  Villaverde’s (2008) trickster, the fluidity of consciousness 
suggested by a border-dwelling Anzaldua (1999), and a stick-shift driving Sandoval 
(1991) remain active, and describe my stance as a researcher.  Similarly, Segovia and 
Talbot’s (1995) theological application of Ricoeur’s (1985) “hermeneutic of 
suspicion,” questioning the uses of power in the production of knowledges that serve 
as sources, is still at play in this cartography (Deleuze and Gautarri, trans. 1987) of a 
theological framework I undertake.  However, these feminist and poststructural 
influences suggest techniques of navigation more than generation.  Perhaps my draw 
to them sheds light on why I find this more propositional task I am undertaking here 
to be such a challenge. 
Not unlike Murphey’s articulation of the theologian’s task as “contributing to 
the reweaving of the doctrinal web as it has been handed on to her, whether this 
means minor repairs or a radical reformulation to meet an epistemological crisis in 
her tradition” (p.106), I am working with the discourses I have inherited.  The 
challenge I face is that these discourses are multiple and the communities reconfigure 
as I move in and out of different webs of relationships when engaging different 
aspects of this work.  Her metaphor breaks for me at the point that it assumes 
navigating a singular community, a scholar clear about which Quinian web she is 
tasked with mending.  Murphey assumes an intelligible and stable community 
context, an audience to which she writes who shares her investment in the tropes that 
characterize her web.  She is a Christian theologian, and thus she works within the 
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established discourse of Christian theology, which she assumes offers enough internal 
cohesion and self-definition to provide functional boundaries to the net.  
On the other hand, the production of my scholarly identity situates me in the 
field of Education, perhaps more specifically Critical Pedagogy (Giroux, 1997; 
Kincheloe, 2008) – which is in itself interdisciplinary, and thus renders me suspicious 
in claiming participation in the theological community, at least to those functioning as 
academic border patrol.  Further, having found myself on more than one occasion 
living in tension with the church’s exclusionary practices, I get more than a little bit 
nervous about where the boundaries around the community called “Christian” fall.  
There remain many in the larger Christian discursive community, in the academy and 
well beyond, for whom my membership is questionable despite my profession of 
faith. While I welcome the task of reweaving the web of the Christian theology given 
to me, in as much as it is necessary to continue in this current project, my 
conversation partners – my communities – are multiple, and not necessarily made up 
of other Christian theologians. I can claim some basic tenants as definitive of the 
Christian tradition and thus shaping the parameters of the discourse, but I do so with 
the acknowledgement that I stand at the experiential edges of more than one web, at 
the surprising intersection of disparate discourses, and (because of a thankfully 
flexible department) with only tenuous demands placed on me by institutional 
disciplinarity. That is not to suggest that I stand apart from the discursive traditions 
that shape me, but rather to acknowledge that the cartography is complex. 
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The result is that I function something like a DJ or dubmaster, deconstructing 
sounds, isolating rhythms and looping snippets to produce new compositions.  The 
database of my music collection is organized by genre (or as Murphey would see it, 
by Quinian web or net) so that I may more easily find what I am looking for, but I 
know the boundaries of the genres are tenuous at best.  Like any creative DJ, I may 
pull from classical recordings and African drum circles, from jazz improvisations and 
classic rock, from gospel tracks and spoken word rants.  For the DJ, the art is in 
juxtaposing multiple sources while maintaining a danceable rhythm.  As DJ Spooky, 
aka That Subliminal Kid, aka Paul D. Miller suggests, “After all, it’s all just data.  
Map one metaphor onto the other, remix, and press play.  The sampling machine can 
handle any sound, and any expression.  You just have to find the right edit points in 
the sound envelope” (2008, p. 6).  In theorizing the production of electronic music 
through the sampling of digitized audio files, he continues: 
 
Blurring the lines between forms of thought echoes in the aftereffects 
of their actions and things generated by those thoughts, and well, in 
this day and age, that’s something to give one – pause…Music of 
floating signifiers – software as editing environment, dematerialization 
of the studio at a bit rate that can only accelerate.  This is the end 
result: An incidental drift across definitions takes the place of any 
fixed meaning – like slang, we look at sounds as a vernacular process.  
They’re a syntax of the ‘what-if’ – how will these sounds appear in 
this mix when we place them over another sound, in another file, in 
another program? (p.17). 
 
 
Davis (2008), exploring the roots of the hip hop tradition observes that early 
dubmasters stripped music down to pure drums and bass, then “introduced extended 
counter-rhythms by multiplying chunks of sound (voices, guitars, drums) through 
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echo and reverb, producing stuttered pulses which split off form the main beat and 
generate cross-rhythms as they stray and fade into the virtual void” (p. 65).  He 
argues that in rarely sustaining staggered apart playing for very long, it is not strictly 
polymetric, yet by dropping other sound elements in and out of the mix, the 
dubmaster “teased the rug out from the listener’s habitual rhythmic orientation toward 
the 4/4, creating a subtle virtual analog of the tripping, constantly shifting 
conversations of West African drums” (p. 65).   
 Similarly, as an educator/theologian, I seek to emphasize the rhythms of 
complex discourses by stripping them down and exposing them.  Then, layering other 
elements from both similar and disparate discourses on top of them, I will play with 
multiple drumbeats, sometimes dissonant, sometimes destabilizing, not so much with 
the aim of bringing them into synchronicity as with the hope to find in their layering a 
compelling conversation.    
Theology and Critical Pedagogy in a Melting Modernity 
 As already acknowledged, I am certainly not the first to explore the 
relationships between the fields of Theology and Critical Pedagogy (see Slattery, 
2006; Pinar, 1995; and Kincheloe, 1992). Curriculum theorists have particularly 
drawn from two theological trends emerging in late modernity and sharing similar 
aims with critical pedagogies: Liberation Theology, and to a lesser degree Process 
Theology.  Both of these trends took shape in the twentieth century alongside the 
deteriorating foundations of modernity.  A shared emphasis on contextualizing 
theologies, challenging universalisms across lines of political culture (in the case of 
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Liberation Theology) and time in history (in the case of Process Theology), has made 
both schools well situated for postmodernity, and thus common sources for the 
projects of postmodern theologians.  At the same time, their relative accessibility and 
commitment to social change have made these two theological schools popular 
among those seeking theological grounding for other movements, thus the 
relationship to Critical Pedagogies. 
It makes sense then that the next step in this research should be revisiting the 
work of those who shaped the history of the intersecting discourses of critical 
pedagogies and Christian spirituality.  Having identified the primary genres for the 
sources I draw from, each of which is further explained in context, what follows is a 
theological remix.  Holding the steady rhythms of a Christian base line, I sample and 
juxtapose from these two theological camps and the other critical pedagogues who 
employ them.  In a holistic fashion, I consider the internal critiques of those who seek 
to reweave these theologies and claim participation in their justifying communities, 
particularly the critiques voiced by feminists and womanists.  The remixes I produce 
are not purist representations, but borrow from what I find useful and aesthetically 
pleasing.  I critique them in juxtaposition, and use their conceptual bricks to produce 
new models.   
Spirituality, Pedagogy, and Liberation 
Having joined Sheldrake in asserting the claim that the explicitly self-
implicating and transformational intent of “spirituality” makes a unique contribution 
to theological studies, let me further suggest that a similar claim can be made about 
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its significance in critical pedagogies.  In fact, I would argue that this 
transformational claim lies at the heart of critical pedagogies, and though those 
salvific aims have been articulated through several theological and cultural matrices, 
the field has remarkable overlap with Christian, Latin American Liberation Theology, 
particularly through their common relationship to Paulo Freire.  Though Freire is not 
the only important voice in the emergence of critical pedagogy as a field of study, his 
influence is tremendous.  Peter McLaren (2003) refers to him as the “inaugural 
philosopher of critical pedagogy” (p.1).  Kincheloe (2008) argues that his influence is 
so significant at this point all work in critical pedagogy after him has to refer to his 
work, and suggests that the notion of critical pedagogy as we understand it today 
emerges in Friere’s scholarship and activism.   
Born in Brazil in 1921, Friere’s work with the peasant farmworkers around 
him was seen as a threat by the wealthy landowners and the Brazilian military 
(Kincheloe, 2008).  In 1964, following a military overthrow of Brazilian reform 
government, his work was shut down, he was jailed for seventy days, then deported.  
The World Council of Churches sponsored the continuation of Freire’s work in Chile 
and then throughout the world.  Friere’s emphasis on libratory action, students 
intervening in the dehumanizing processes of schooling which served to validate the 
privilege of the wealthy, necessitated both inward change and action in the world.  
“Freirean liberation,” Kincheloe observes, “is a social dynamic that involves working 
with and engaging other people in a power-conscious process” (p. 71).  
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The Liberation Theology movement that spread throughout Latin American 
and has now influenced Christian theological discourse throughout the world began in 
the 1960s and has been closely associated with, perhaps indebted to, Friere’s work 
(Pinar, et. all, 1996).  Professing a preferential option for the poor, Liberation 
Theology grew in response to massive socioeconomic oppression in the region.  With 
the publication of Gutierrez’s A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and 
Salvation in (1973) and the subsequent condemnation of his and other theologian’s 
work by right-wing governments and elements of the Roman curia, the movement 
drew international attention and further influenced the development of anti-
oppressive theologies globally.   
Liberation Theology is characterized by its understanding of theology as a 
second moment in the life of the Christian person or community.  There is an 
assertion that life comes first; daily life in community “has chronological, logical, and 
pastoral precedence over theological reflection” (Maduro, 1992).  Liberation 
theologies challenge the assumption that there can be any other theological method, 
arguing that all theologies grow out of specific life experiences and time and culture 
bound praxis, whether or not they acknowledge their contextualization.  Therefore, all 
theologies stem from and respond to specific and singular experiences rather than a 
universal experience.  Finally, Liberation Theology emphasizes that even though it is 
prone to claiming otherwise, theology is not  “an individual, intellectual, or 
specialized task,” rather it is “the fruit of life in community, of shared faith, and of 
multiple efforts (often invisible and unrecognized)” (p. 288).  This radical 
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contextualization and disruption of the universal experience is in large part what 
makes Liberation Theology a still viable option.  
Liberation Theology articulates a commitment to addressing the social issues 
of the poor and marginalized within a Christian vision, arguing that the central Gospel 
message is one of justice understood as liberation from political and economic 
oppression.  Growing out of a communal commitment to respond to the economic and 
political oppression of the Latin American poor, as a second movement the central 
concept in Liberation Theology is God’s call to for the liberation of the oppressed, 
rather than a call to the production and reification of a theology of liberation itself.  
The theology functions to describe the experience (as it argues all theologies do) 
rather than the other way around (Maduro, 1992).  Christ thus is envisioned as 
liberator, not in an ethereal metaphysical notion of salvation, but in the radically 
incarnational and embodied experiences of poor.  In its critique of social structures, 
Liberation Theology reconceptualizes sin to emphasize its systemic nature over issues 
of individual holiness.  Particularly in its emphasis on praxis, the reflective blending 
of theory and practice; and the centrality of communautes de base, small groups 
which ground the movement’s hermeneutical authority in the lived experiences of the 
poor and function as active sites of spiritual, epistemological, and political resistance, 
Liberation Theology echoes Friere’s vision of education articulated in Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed (1970).   
While Friere’s work has emerged as central to North American curriculum 
theorists, the continued influence of the theological aspects of his work are largely 
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deemphasized in traditional schools of education.  Despite his close affiliation with 
the World Council of Churches as he articulated his vision internationally (Kincheloe, 
2008), a North American anxiety about the blurring of boundaries between 
theological and educational discourses, distinctions which did not seem to be 
important to Friere himself, have limited interplay between the two.  While the 
theological underpinnings of Liberation Theology are intertwined in contemporary 
articulations of critical pedagogy, they are more often than not obscured in the same 
manner that our broad, popular use of “spirituality” obscures the theologies on which 
it depends for meaning.   
Yet the significance of the interrelationship between the two is not lost on 
theorists such as Kincheloe (1992) and Slattery (1992) who more directly 
acknowledge their shared influences with Liberation Theologians, and actively 
consider the implications of their work for critical pedagogy.  Kincheloe argues that 
Liberation Theology offers a model for disrupting objectivism which has significant 
implications for emancipatory research methodologies in curriculum studies.  He 
suggests: 
 
In its refusal to accept history as a record of what has prevailed, i.e. the 
record of the established and successful – Liberation Theology 
exposes the fact that the conquered and defeated have received the 
short end of the stick, that the unfulfilled dreams of the commoners 
have not found their way into the ‘official story’.  Pedagogically, this 
exclusion contributes to oppression when students from subjected 
groups are taught the science and culture of the dominant society 
without this knowledge passing through a filter constructed by a 
historically grounded self-consciousness (p.1). 
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In a similar move, Slattery (1992) links Pinar’s autobiographical methodologies in 
curriculum study (currere) with Gutierrez’s articulation of Liberation Theology, 
underscoring the common reliance on Freire: 
 
It is interesting that Pinar, like Gutierrez, begins his commentary on 
currere paraphrasing Friere’s (1968) Pedagogy of the Oppressed.  The 
human vocation, Freire, Pinar, and Gutierrez insist, is humanization; 
the vision of pedagogy is a dialogical relationship with students; the 
goal of pedagogy is to cultivate thought and action in praxis… In 
Liberation Theology, human life in its entirety is seen as an encounter 
with God’s salvific grace.  There is a regressive moment in this 
encounter: a baptism in the death of the historical Jesus, where one 
enters into the past, meditates on it, submerges oneself in its waters, 
but does not succumb to its despair.  In the progressive movement, the 
future enters into the historical present revealing the glory of 
resurrection.  The analytical movement is the awareness that religious 
praxis is also my praxis.  Thus, eternity (past, present, and future) 
become embedded in human existence through grace.  Finally, in the 
synthetical moment, the fullness of times is recognized and celebrated.  
Thus, spirituality becomes an autobiographical movement which 
allows the individual to become present to shared experiences of 
humanity (p. 20-21).  
 
 
In a claim that anticipates work like this very project’s critique and reassertion of the 
role of spirituality in pedagogical discourse; Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman 
make the case that Liberation Theology, “can expand the dialogue with those who 
believe that critical pedagogy has appropriated the language of empowerment, hope, 
and eschatology from theology, stripped it of its spiritual, cosmological, and 
autobiographical imperatives, and converted critical theory into an empty political 
ideology” (p. 646).  Thus, when I situate myself as researcher in critical pedagogies 
and take on a holistic approach, Liberation Theology is the web to whose reweaving I 
can contribute as I articulate a spirituality applicable to pedagogical discourse.     
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 Furthering this holistic approach, the critiques of Liberation Theology I 
privilege come from those who claim participation within its community.  Since I am 
not attempting to construct a full systematic theology (but rather sample and remix), I 
continue to pay attention primarily to the two issues that framed my critique of 
spirituality in the first place: the nature of humanity, and the nature of God’s action in 
the world.   In the construction of my spirituality I acknowledge that Liberation 
Theology is not a unified and singular pattern of thought, but rather a fluid movement 
maintaining general themes while situated in multiple contexts; yet the commitment 
to hope and the call to praxis function as common themes.  Though Liberation 
Theology is not the only theological influence I will draw from, its linkages to the 
epistemological net that defines the relevant themes of Christianity for work in 
critical pedagogy loom large.  It is also significant that though it emerged from a 
Latin American movement, Liberation Theology’s influence on contemporary North 
American situated theologies (particularly feminist and queer) has played deeply 
influential roles in both my adult church life and theological education.  A theology 
that can offer meaning to my spirituality, particularly as it informs my pedagogy, 
must therefore take Liberation Theology seriously while also tending to its limitations 
and bringing it into conversation with other webs of knowing I find formative.  
 While I privilege internal critiques in this holist methodology, it would be 
painfully difficult to move forward without mentioning poststructuralist challenges to 
the very notion of “liberation”.   Butler (1990) articulates a cynicism towards 
liberation in keeping with poststructuralist thought as she asserts that liberation is not 
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possible because there is no way out of the discourse through which meaning is 
produced.  Essentially, one just moves from one regulatory discourse into another.  
There is also in her work a significant critique of the tyranny of “community” in the 
regulation of normativities, further challenging the identity politics underlying much 
of the claims of Liberation Theology.  While I take up these concepts with greater 
depth in Part III, I mention them here as an acknowledgement that I carry them with 
me into this next phase of the conversation.  While my proposals may be somewhat 
more hopeful in regards to both liberation and community, I maintain a hermeneutic 
of suspicion not completely at odds with these critiques.  
 Liberation Theology has traditionally concerned itself with analyses of 
repressive power more than discursive or productive power.  However, in more recent 
permutations analysis of the productive power of Liberation Theology itself has 
grown in prevalence, particularly in the work of theologians like Marcella Althaus-
Reid, Ivan Petrella, and Luiz Carlos Susin (2007).  These later theologians offer a 
discursive analysis of the movement that holds multiple understandings of power in 
productive tension while still insisting on a message of radical hope.  If this web of 
Liberation Theology is a genre from which I might sample, the thumping bass line 
driving it is a revolutionary rhythm, though the sounds layered on top of it are 
playfully complex.    
The Subject and The Authentic Self  
 The salvific claims of Liberation Theology, and much of critical pedagogy for 
that matter, like popular uses of “spirituality” presume a self in need of saving.  For 
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Liberation Theologians, the specific emphasis on the poor and marginalized is levied 
as a critique of dualistic and future-oriented notions of salvation that privilege the 
soul while failing to address the immediate needs of the body.  Placing the emphasis 
of salvation in the context of the immediate lived experience addresses the embodied, 
incarnational critique I raised of much of the broader spirituality discourse.  However, 
there remain problems in the conceptualization of poor bodies.  Althaus-Reid (2004, 
2007, 2008), queer/feminist theologian, calls for greater attention in Liberation 
Theology to issues of gender, sex and class.  The “poor” in her analysis, has serious 
limitations in its formal articulation.  Because the privileging of the poor and the 
marginalized in the Liberationist construct, based in the assertion that “in Jesus 
himself is the historical option of a God who became human by becoming a marginal, 
vulnerable Jew in a country under an economic, cultural and religious foreign 
occupation” (2007, p. 26), requires the powerful to vacate positions of authority, 
inclusivity is not an immediate aim but rather a subsequent intent of Liberation 
Theology.  For Althaus-Reid, the key for appraisal of the Liberation Theology 
discourse is to consider liberation praxis as related not to inclusion, but rather to 
power struggle.   
 Althaus-Reid, in reflecting on her participation in churches informed by 
Liberation Theology in the 1970’s and 1980’s, argues that inclusivity within 
Liberation Theology can only be talked about after first acknowledging that  
 
the militant churches have never been neutral, but took options (even 
unconsciously) supporting colonial, theoretical constructions in Latin 
America such as the ideologies of gender, race, and sexuality.  
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Therefore, liberation theology did not set out chairs for poor women, 
or poor gays – at least it never did so willingly.  The inclusive project 
affirmed itself by exclusion policies which determined the identity of 
the poor.  The poor who were included were conceived of as male, 
generally peasant, vaguely indigenous, Christian and heterosexual.  In 
fact, militant churches would not have needed many chairs around the 
table of the Lord if these criteria had been applied.  It describes the 
identity of only a minority of the poor.  The poor in Latin America 
cannot be stereotyped so easily and they include poor urban women, 
transvestites in poor street neighborhoods, and gays everywhere (p. 
27). 
 
 
Thus, while Liberation theologies reject a dualistic salvation in which the promise of 
life after death can breed a more immediate complacency, the embodied and 
incarnational evocation of Jesus as the model of the poor has at times been too 
literalized, thus failing to grapple with intersecting systems of sin and oppression.  
The privileging of some subjects over others, while intended to be a radical reversal 
based in a hermeneutical claim of the Gospel witness privileging the poor, fails to 
disrupt other systems of power in its narrowly romanticized notion of poor subject.   
 Still, like Althaus-Reid, who identifies herself as a Liberation Theologian, I 
see the project as more in need of revision than abandonment.  While I can hear 
Foucault’s questioning of the possibility of liberation, I am willing for this to be one 
of those points of shifting consciousness that Sandoval (1991) points towards.  I 
subscribe to a call for an analysis of systemic sin and action towards dismantling it, so 
while discourses of liberation may be problematic, poverty still needs to be addressed. 
Part of the genius of Althaus-Reid is her ability to move with fluidity between the 
most useful elements of the analysis that Liberation Theology offers of repressive 
power, while simultaneously critiquing its discursive power in the construction of 
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proper theological subjects, particularly disrupting the category of “the poor” by 
privileging the irruption of the sexual subject (Althaus-Reid, 2008). While identities 
may be social constructions, they are social constructions that function with choices.  
Here I look towards Rorty for a way towards constructing an understanding of the self 
more complex and nuanced than the identity politics on which that much of 
Liberation Theology historically relies, but not incompatible with its bent towards 
justice.   
How might we address this challenge of the destabilized subject in a 
theological project, when after all, as Althaus-Reid suggests, “The problem is that 
theology is not used to having an unstable subject: instead, it behaves as a 
constitutional, judicial system where exceptions are not viable, unless they become 
recognized exceptions” (2008, p. 90)?  The need for a working model of subjectivity 
then emerges in order to compose a danceable theological remix, so here we consider 
some options.  In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty (1989) argues that 
complex intersections of historical events, each of which could have unfolded 
differently, function to produce the language we speak, the communities we claim, 
and our sense of self.  The very possibilities of our choices are products of previously 
chosen metaphors, shifts in the use of words, or other linguistic patterns and 
occurrences.  In a move more optimistic than Foucault’s analysis of the double 
meaning of subjectivity, Rorty suggests that upon recognizing that our identities are 
constituted from the pool of possibilities set out by history, and that these identities 
are contingent and non-binding, we can exercise the agency to construct and 
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reconstruct our “self” from the options available to us.  He further suggests that 
acknowledging the arbitrary construction of all self-evaluation and self-description, 
lacking foundation beyond what has emerged through historical repetition, also leads 
to the ironic awareness that even one’s own most basic commitments and defining 
ideals are negotiable, or as Guignon (2004) describes his argument, “temporary 
resting places on a road of self-creation” (p. 116).  Within Rorty’s understanding, the 
self is constrained only by the limits of what culture offers and one’s own 
imagination.   
While Rorty’s conception may seem rather privileged and idealistic in its 
assumption of one’s ability to exercise enough power to manipulate those 
discursively produced options (particularly when read against Althaus-Reid’s 
Liberation Theologies), the pragmatic blending of social construction and agency is 
appealing.  The narrativist approaches proposed by MacIntyre (2007) and Taylor 
(1989) expand on what works best about these previous two.  MacIntyre’s position 
articulated in After Virtue (2007) makes the case for thinking of “human action in 
general as enacted narratives” (p. 211).  Locating the possibilities available within a 
narrative context, acknowledging the storied structure of our lives, offers a matrix 
through which actions become intelligible.  Actions find meaning only in a larger 
narrative or set of narratives about the agents involved in which the actions can find 
context.  MacIntyre makes two important claims in his narrativist account.  First, we 
all live out narratives, so rather than stories simply being something we created after 
the fact in the telling of an event, they are enacted as we undertake various actions.  
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Second, he argues that stories are imbedded in any individual life and only find 
meaning in a set of interlocking narratives unfolding in the context of a wider culture.  
Thus, any given “self” can only be understood as their story dovetails with the stories 
of others, and how those stories are contextualized in social settings that give various 
actions their meaning.   
Taylor’s (1989) contribution is a notion of selfhood that is dependent on 
experiencing one’s life as an unfolding story in which the subject both can understand 
how it came to be at a given point in the narrative and can have a sense of where it is 
going.  Taylor emphasizes that selfhood depends on the embedded nature of life 
stories and is defined by commitments and identifications that orient the subject 
within the stories’ contexts.  The commitments of an individual self are only 
intelligible within the context of a community dialogue.  Thus the story-shaped self is 
accountable to the community in two ways: it can give a response to where it stands 
in relation to issues of importance for the community that shapes the context in which 
the story has meaning; and it can be counted on to act in addressing those issues.  For 
Taylor, where there is a lack of ability to do either of those things, there is only a 
mutilated or partial self, unable to effectively function as an agent in the world.   
Thus, Rorty offers us a way to address the challenges encountered by the 
decentering of the subject in postmodernity, while still retaining a sense of agency – 
an issue with which Foucault is not particularly concerned.  However, his optimistic 
view of choosing from possibilities functions best in conversation with MacIntyre and 
Taylor, who situate the available possibilities within the narrative construct which 
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gives them meaning.  Both locate that structure within a communal context, with 
MacIntyre emphasizing the role of tradition and Taylor the roles of commitment and 
accountability,  which brings us back to Althaus-Reid and the Liberation 
Theologians, for whom the salvation of the soul is not a transcendent, theoretical act, 
but rather an incarnational act embedded in a specific cultural context.   
So give me two turntables and a microphone, and I will begin mixing a 
theological jam so that spirituality and pedagogy can take to the dance floor. On top 
of the Frierean beat I assert a story-shaped self, which only exists in the context of a 
body located within a culture and in conversation with other stories.  The becoming 
of that storied body-self occurs in the navigating of choices and possibilities 
presented in contexts shaped by communities, and the making of those choices is 
driven by commitments whose meaning is produced in by the language and traditions 
of the culture.   
God and God’s Action in the World 
 I have held that by locating myself within Christianity, the holistic web I 
claim presumes the existence of God.  Yet, the nature of God remains a point of 
speculation even within that web, as multiple models of God exist within Christian 
tradition and scripture.  Feminist theologians have particularly asserted this point, 
noting the impropriety of models that never change.  Johnson’s critique of masculine 
pronouns and male images of God in She Who Is (1992) makes the case that when 
analogies like “father” become literalized, they cease to function descriptively and 
take on the idolatrous role of absolute identities.  In her classic Models of God: 
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Theology for an Ecological Nuclear Age (1987), McFague suggests, “Theological 
constructions are ‘houses’ to live in for a while, with windows partly open and doors 
ajar” (p. 27).  In my own devotional practices, for precisely these reasons, I am drawn 
to models that emphasize God as Mystery, and challenge me to humbly embrace the 
limits of my knowledge, language, and experience in the process of their 
construction. 
And yet, more fully articulated models are useful in that they illuminate our 
theological presumptions.  To stop with Mystery fails to acknowledge that like those 
who profess to be “spiritual but not religious,” there are deeper theological claims that 
shape the choices I make and the web through which I interpret my very selfhood, the 
rhythms that animate my dance.  Liberation Theology’s conversations about God tend 
to be focused on Christological concerns, focusing on the centrality of Jesus.  In his 
work on a spirituality of Liberation Theologies, We Drink from Our Own Wells, 
Gutierrez (1984) says: 
  
In this following of Jesus the central drama is played out in the 
dialectic of death followed by life.  In this dialectic and in the victory 
of the risen Jesus, the God of our hope is revealed…The following of 
Jesus feeds upon the witness given by the resurrection, which means 
the death of death, and upon the liberating efforts of the poor to assert 
their unquestionable right to life.  The relationship between an 
oppressive system and the God who liberates, between death that 
seems to have the upper hand and the God of life, adumbrates a way of 
following Jesus and being his disciples under the conditions now 
prevailing in Latin America (p. 30).  
 
 
For Gutierrez, the issue is not so much a new model of God, but the application of the 
model to a particular socio-political context that characterizes his reconceptualization.  
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Althaus-Reid in The Queer God (2003) continues Liberationist tradition of playing 
with traditional models but locating them in radical contexts.  She conceptualizes the 
trinity as an orgy, reaching even beyond polyfidelity in the triune relationship asking 
if there “are more than three in this triad because as in real life and relationships many 
other friends and lovers may be hidden in the closets of each person of the Trinity” 
(p. 58).  Althaus-Reid’s intent in her larger queering project is to liberate God from 
heteronormative assumptions.  She works with the divine models of her Roman 
Catholic tradition, particularly the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Virgin Mary, and saints, 
relocating them in contexts that not only privilege the poor (like other Liberation 
Theologies), but also confront heteronormativity as a function of the same systemic 
sin.    
 Generally, Liberation Theology tends to favor what Murphey (2003) describes 
as the liberal tradition’s preference for God’s immanence.  In contrast to the Deist 
view of God’s absence in the created world, and the interventionist view of 
conservative theologians that God performs special miraculous acts; immanentism 
emphasizes God’s universal presence in the world and “God’s continual, creative, and 
purposive activity in and through all the processes of natural history” (p. 71).  This 
view of immanence makes possible an understanding of God’s purpose functioning in 
the claims of both evolutionary science and social progress.  The great problem is 
then is that such assumptions about the driving force of God’s intent make every 
event equally intentional, “devastating earthquakes and the Holocaust as well as the 
growth of crops and the birth of Jesus” (p. 81).  The call to action inherent in 
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Liberation Theologies claims a slightly different sort of role for humanity in the 
realization of God’s intent, claiming greater responsibility for confronting systemic 
sin and thus taking a more active role in the in-breaking of the Kingdom.   
Here we turn to Process Theology to offer us another set of theological tools 
helpful in the face of modernity’s liquefaction, a theological beat to mix alongside 
Liberation Theology.  The nature of God and subsequent role of humanity in 
relationship to God’s action in the world are central themes in Process Theology, 
which are particularly indebted to the work of early twentieth century philosopher 
Alfred North Whitehead (1929). The unique challenge Process Theology offers to 
traditional Christian theologies is its insistence on disrupting the concept of God as 
immutable and unchanging. Theologians look to the biblical narratives of God’s 
changing God’s mind in conversation with humans (such as the Genesis and Exodus 
stories around Abraham, Noah, and Moses) as evidence that this assertion of 
Whitehead’s can be woven into the Judeao-Christian tradition. Whitehead offers a 
dipolar conception of God, in which God contains both a primordial and consequent 
nature.  The primordial nature of God functions as the principle of “concretation”, in 
which God is the basis of order in the world.  God holds all the possibilities of the 
world in this primordial nature.  The parallel consequent nature of God, is 
characterized by God’s temporality and responsiveness.  God is concretized, or made 
real so to speak, in the actual world.  All events in the world come into being and then 
become objectified as they are incorporated into God’s being, and in this way God 
receives the world.  So God is both the actualizing of the present moment, the range 
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of possibilities for the future, and the keeper of the past.  Thus, God is intimately 
connected with all that happens in the world, experiencing both joy and suffering with 
creation (Griffin, 1994).   
This doctrine of God’s consequent nature allows for a particularly helpful 
conceptualization of suffering and evil, one standing in direct contrast to 
interventionism.  In Process Theology, evil exists because all creatures have the 
capacity (to some degree) to determine themselves and affect others, which God can 
influence but not control.  God’s dipolar nature, simultaneously primordial and 
consequent, could have created no other world.  The agency of humans, in their high 
level of self-consciousness, necessarily indicates the freedom to act in contradiction 
to God’s desire.  Griffin (1994) explains, “Contingency in the world in general, and 
freedom in humans in particular, are therefore not due to a divine self-limitation that 
could in principle be revoked now and then to prevent especially horrible evils,” a 
position he argues makes Process Theologians better able to assert God’s perfect 
goodness than any system in which God either controls evil or could act against it but 
chooses not to.  Young (1989) further suggests that Process Theology deals with the 
problem of suffering, “by God’s perceiving of the creative advance in a manner that 
retains mutual immediacy. This mutual immediacy consists of God’s eternal presence 
which forever participates in the world of perpetual flux. It is what Whitehead means 
by ‘everlasting.’ Through this mutual immediacy God prehends or feels every 
experience in the world, including the sufferings, sorrows, failures, triumphs, and 
brings them into a universal harmony of experience” (p. 262). 
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  Process metaphysics holds that God initiates the aim for every finite 
occasion, that is to say, that the possibilities towards self-actualization in the 
concretization of a given moment are at God’s initiative.  However, in Whitehead’s 
articulation, it is not in God’s nature to coerce or impose.  God does not force God’s 
hope for what becomes real into being, but rather beckons.  God’s nature is described 
as a persuasive agency functioning through rationality, allowing for self-
determination in each emerging creature in the world.  Thus, humanity functions as 
co-creators with God, not in acting out a divine plan but in navigating an eternal 
network of possibilities in which each occasion precipitates another set of 
possibilities.  God’s beckoning, God’s hope, is contingent on the action of creation in 
the actualizing of any given possibility. So to return to the problem of suffering, 
Whitehead argues that suffering is overcome in the realm of possibilities: “God’s role 
is not the combat of productive force with productive force; of destructive force with 
destructive force, it lies in the patient operation of the overpowering rationality of his 
conceptual harmonization” (1929, pp. 525-6). 
 Whitehead’s metaphysics are not without problems for the theologians who 
claim it.  They assume a coherent and rational reality, the “ultimately real”, exists 
beyond its interpretation through language, which can be understood as either a 
resolution to an anti-materialist tendency in post-structuralism or a reassertion of 
Platonist ontology.  In its Platonist grounding, it also assumes the power of rationality 
to turn humanity toward a transcendent good, not to mention a “rationality” that 
similarly transcends context and culture. Young (1989), in his considering the limits 
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of rationality in what Process Theology can contribute to a Black theology of 
liberation asks: 
 
Isn’t it necessary to integrate within process metaphysics the notion 
that the transforming power of God which comes as the result of 
salvation, regeneration, and sanctification is essential for humanity to 
deal effectively with the problems of suffering? If we use the 
overpowering rationality of God alone as the clue to resolving the 
problem of suffering in the world, then, we miss a fundamental 
element which has always been basic to Christian theology, namely, 
the recognition that both reason and faith are essential for salvation 
and liberation (p. 265). 
 
 
While our concerns are not exactly the same, I share Young’s critique of Whitehead’s 
optimistic devotion to reason. However, the notion of God as holding hopefully the 
reservoir of all possible outcomes, ever evolving and in flux in conversation with our 
collective and individual choices is compelling. 
 A common, and helpful, thread in the constructions of God as articulated by 
Liberation and Process Theologies is their emphasis on the co-creative role of 
humanity.  Neither looks to God as a means of escaping the painful experiences of 
human existence, but rather both take responsibility for humanity’s role in structures 
that function in suffering’s production.  I am reminded here of the comments of North 
American Buddhist nun, Pema Chodron (1997): 
 
The difference between theism and nontheism is not whether one does 
or does not believe in God.  It is an issue that applies to 
everyone…Theism is a deep-seated conviction that there’s some hand 
to hold: if we just do the right things, someone will appreciate and take 
care of us…We all are inclined to abdicate our responsibilities and 
delegate our authority to something outside ourselves.  Nontheism is 
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relaxing with the ambiguity and uncertainty of the present moment 
without reaching for anything to protect ourselves (p. 39).   
  
 
In the co-creative emphases of Liberation and Process Theologies, in which salvation 
is brought about or hindered through the choices and actions made by people, we see 
a move away from abdication of responsibility Chodron warns against.  While 
salvation and enlightenment are not one in the same, her Buddhist insights have 
resonance for the articulation of spirituality I am proposing.   
God as Story  
While both Liberation and Process Theologies offer challenges to modernist 
constructions of God in that they contextualize knowledge of the Divine and locate 
constructions within a historical narrative, they still have significant limitations.  
Though my proposal reaches beyond her initial conception, I find Broadhurst’s 
(2003) model of God as Story to have great potential in moving towards a workable 
construct.  It is important to note that I am not proposing God as a story in an isolated 
manner transcendent of discursive production, or the story in a universalizing, 
metanarrative sense, but rather I am drawing from Broadhurst’s notion of God as 
Story itself.  Stories then, our stories, in Broadhurst’s estimation, 
 
are a part of Story, and Story is revealed through them – if only 
partially.  In fact, it is the hiddenness of God that keeps our stories 
rolling.  ‘I Am’ [God’s self description to Moses at the burning bush, 
Exodus 3:14] does not provide us with a direct object.  ‘I Am’ does not 
require a subordinate clause.  ‘I Am’ is a complete sentence, revelatory 
of being yet without conclusion – ready for us to frolic in the 
possibilities.  It is, then, the multiplicity of stories flowing from any 
introduction to God that is part of the generativity of Story (p. 7). 
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Story then contains and functions through stories, both individual and communal.  
God therefore is not simply in the narrative, but is the narrative itself; exists not 
simply as the reservoir of all possibilities, but in the very possibilities themselves.   
 To consider God as Story is to move towards compatibility with discursive 
theories of knowledge production.  It is to suggest that if all we are and all we know 
is a function of the discourses through which we can make meaning, then that 
generative shaping, the production of knowledge itself, is God.  Just as we participate 
in the production and propulsion of discourses, we participate as co-creators in the 
stories that make up Story.  Just as we cannot step outside of discourse, we cannot 
escape Story.  Story is the matrices of meaning-making available, based on the 
inherited traditions and practices that structure the possibilities we see in making any 
choice along any narrative arc.  Even the DJ’s remix, pulling from genres of music, 
from sound-stories, is only possible within the larger context of Story structuring the 
meaning and aesthetic value through which the composition exists. 
However, where a conception of God as Story stands in tension with 
poststructural theories of discourse is in that it maintains a hope for directionality in 
the narrative.  Here, my model of God as Story takes on the Process Theology 
concept of a hopeful God (in God’s primordial nature) beckoning us towards a future, 
not planned, but preferred. In the language of Suchoki (1989), Story’s narrative arch 
might be understood as God’s aim realized as each occasion unfolds to another 
occasion.  Said another way, in conversation with notion of the story-shaped (now 
Story-shaped) body-self, Story includes tradition, commitment, and accountability.  
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Story is produced and producing, intimately tied to a co-creating creation, as stories 
form in conversation with other stories against the backdrops of the previous stories 
which make them possible. Thus, Story contains Christianity, a produced and 
producing construct through which Story might be revealed and understood, but Story 
is larger than Christianity.   
The challenge to all models of God, much like the challenge Young (1989) 
raises in regard to Process Theology, is in regards to their ability to deal with 
suffering.  Whereas Whitehead assumes God persuades through rationality, and thus 
suffering can somehow be rationally understood, I suggest that Story beckons through 
tradition, commitment, accountability, and beauty.  Suffering ultimately transcends 
rationality, and thus can only evoke an aesthetic response. However, that still does not 
adequately address the problem of relativism – the possibility of asserting that within 
Story, as a narrative matrix through which meaning is produced, all stories, or 
navigations through that matrix, are equal.  Certainly multiple stories exist – my 
model does not rest on a metanarrative – however, in Broadhurst’s words, stories 
“which intentionally seek to erase, suppress, exclude, destroy or make mute are 
intentional distortions of the Divine” (p. 9). 
Storied body-selves, as co-creators of and with Story, can exercise agency 
within Story’s narrative structure, and thus have the power to inflict suffering.  As we 
are not able to step outside of Story, and thus can only evaluate choices from within 
what is revealed in the interactions with other stories, often that which our traditions 
and commitments lead us to do has harmful implications we do not see.  Our stories 
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produce what Liberation Theologians might call structures of sin, themes that limit 
the access of other storied body-selves to the range of possibilities that is Story, that is 
God.  Broadhurst suggests, “In this case, the argument would be much like 
Augustine’s – there is no evil story, there is only the perversion of the good” (p. 9).  
However, I would argue this only works if “the good” is understood as a co-created 
construction produced within the context of Story itself; “the good” cannot be as 
Aristotle assumed an external, universal concept, but rather points to those beliefs 
held stable in a given holistic web of knowing while other beliefs are considered in 
relation to it.  Thus, while distortions of the divine or perversions of the good find 
meaning in the narrative structure of Story, Story itself does not demand them but 
rather offers a means (fluid and contextual as it may be) through which a “good” is 
produced, and by which it can be understood as distortions or perversions to begin 
with.   
Still, if Story is assumed to have some goodness or virtue, the single 
characteristic within my model that distinguishes it from discourse (which I 
understand a morally neutral concept), the reconciliation of evil stories within Story 
remains a challenge. One could argue that evil stories are ripe with possibilities for 
grace to break in, in the form of possibilities for Story to structure stories of suffering 
into the tradition, and thus shape the range or allure of future possibilities as stories 
retold either preclude or open way for available options.  This seems optimistic at 
best and difficult to reconcile with a reflection on the collapse of the narratives of 
progress in light of the atrocities of the last century.  And yet, my commitment to a 
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tradition that asserts the possibility of goodness through the inexplicable 
transformation of storied body-selves will not let me abandon it completely.  I return 
to eschatological claims, based in faith, tied to a web of Christian tradition and aware 
of the tyranny exercised in the name of community, and yet humbly shaped by the 
awe of Story and the outrageous hope for the liberationist trust in “a way out of no 
way” (Young, 1996).  Story produces the subject within a context; the subject co-
creates in the further production of Story; Story continues producing the subject and 
its context; and sometimes, Story and subject come together in a (mysterious and 
grace-filled) manner in which the subject and/or its context is radically transformed.   
Christ as Embodied/Incarnate Story 
If I claim this web of Christianity as my own, I must deal with the centrality 
of Christ and the Gospel texts to any theological framework.  If Christ is a particular 
and unique revelation of God through radical incarnation, then Christ as a storied-self 
can be understood as a clarification of the aims of Story itself.  In other words, if I am 
to distinguish Story from discourse based on an assertion (chosen freely and in spite 
of its limitations, as an act of faith) that there is some positive directionality we are 
beckoned towards, then the Jesus stories are Christian’s primary indication of the 
values driving those aims.  Certainly, this task is complicated by the multiple and 
competing interpretations of the Jesus stories, which is why I speak of them in plural 
rather than suggesting that even within the Biblical record a cohesive and unified 
portrait of Christ exists.  The Jesus stories provide reference points for conversation, a 
115 
 
means by which those claiming the Christian tradition can engage one another in the 
articulation of a theology and accompanying spiritual practices.  
I have already made mention of the Liberation Theology understanding of 
Jesus as liberator (Sobrino, 1994), advocate for the poor and suffering.  The image is 
easy enough to understand, Jesus is read as a radical in an impoverished, occupied 
territory. What Sobrino offers to Liberation Christologies is an emphasis on the 
crucifixion as revelatory of God’s common suffering with humanity (1976). Whereas 
the resurrection has been central to much of Christian theology, he argues the 
significance of the crucifixion has been often avoided. For Sobrino, oppressed “or 
crucified” people can find in the crucifixion an image of deep intimacy with the 
suffering Jesus.   Only in the death of the divine, God incarnate in Christ, is 
resurrection possible.  “The present situation,” he argues in reference to his home 
country, El Salvador, “rules out any merely romantic conception of Jesus’ 
resurrection. It forces us to reflect theologically on the death of Jesus, and ultimately 
on the crucified God. Without the cross the resurrection is idealistic. The utopia of 
Christian resurrection becomes real only in terms of the cross” (Sobrino, 1976, 
p.180).  For Sobrino, God is found in the suffering, and the call of the way of Jesus is 
to suffer with the oppressed, to take radical action in opposition to the abuses of 
power is the path to the cross.  He argues, “The path to the cross is nothing else but a 
questioning search for the true God and for the true essence of power. Is power meant 
to oppress people or to liberate them?” (p.180). 
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 While I favor the notions of a suffering God revealed in stories of Jesus’ 
experience – of a Story structure in which meaning is made through relationality, of a 
queerly influenced, narrativist remixing of Liberation and Process Theologies – I am 
acutely aware of the ambiguities in all I put forward.  Born from a claim that 
spirituality matters as a concept within pedagogical discourse, and having argued that 
spirituality without an articulated theology is problematic, I find myself now with this 
Story/storied concept that defies certainty and functions more as art than science.  
Monro speaks to this process as “erotic transgression” (2006), and claims it as 
theological method.  She moves fluidly back and forth between deconstruction and 
reconstruction, death and resurrection, with particular attention paid to the moment 
between the two elements; the moment in which “loss of meaning is confronted fully, 
and the unfulfilled possibility of reconstructing genuinely alternative meanings 
emerges briefly. That space is the moment of jouissance” (p.178).  For Monro, and 
for me, Christ is ambiguous, but in that ambiguity is an invitation for engagement, for 
encountering one another in the possibilities.  In the ambiguity and complexity of the 
Jesus stories is the troubling of metanarratives of power and domination, stories to be 
revisited and troubled over with others who claim them as significant.    
An Eschatology for Story and Storied People 
  
we are the manifestation of our thinking patterns. and we think 
in terms of terms.  words. sooner or later we must realize that 
we are liable for what and how we think and say and thus must 
alter (altar) our use of language.  sentence structures predate 
pyramids and are as complex.  realize, even in asking me to 
describe the future of language, i am simply playing my part in 
determining it by helping those who read this to become more 
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aware of the importance of what they say.  and that (this) is 
how the future comes about.  
 
word. (Saul Williams, 2008, p. 24). 
 
Did you think I had forgotten Deleuze and Guatarri?  Has it been too long 
since they were looped into this remix?  Does a theological model that understands 
subjectivity as the stories we tell of ourselves and then posits God as Story itself 
necessitate the very sort of linearity in knowledge production that I looked to Deleuze 
and Guatarri to disrupt in the introduction?  While a linear structure may be implied 
in invoking story as a metaphor, it is not required.  The notion of subjectivity as the 
loosely stabilized intersection of stories is not a far cry from a rhizomatic point of 
crystallization, a tuber, in which multiple thought comes together.  The narrative 
structure of story – the implication of a beginning, middle and end; of characters, 
plot, theme, and setting; conflict, resolution, and dénouement – have been challenged 
and disrupted in postmodern film and literature.  Terrentino’s Pulp Fiction (1994) 
comes to mind as a widely accessible example.  The opening and closing scenes of 
the film depict the same moment, which connects multiple narrative arcs, though not 
playing the same role in each arc.  It is simultaneously a beginning and an ending, as 
story functions to produce meaning through the interwoven events in the lives of a 
network of characters.  The effect for the viewer is that the past, present, and future 
collide in a single moment, and in that moment the larger story finds meaning and 
cohesion, even if only momentarily.  Though the characters experience their own 
narratives in a linear fashion, the story itself is more complex.  
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 I admit it is difficult to hold steady this notion of God as Story without falling 
into a proclamation of a metanarrative.  Though problematic, it is tempting in an 
explication of suffering to offer a unified story in which all will be reconciled.  If God 
is Story – a narrative structure through which meaning is made, one transcending 
individual experiences and yet dependent on them as they form the collective 
traditions that dictate the ways in which future can unfold – then God contains the 
elements of Story, but synergistically is greater than the sum of those elements. God 
as Story presumes a sense of eschatological redemption in which the possibilities 
break open, but the location of that redemption within Story’s structure is not a given.   
Slattery (2006) is helpful here in his characterization of three primary forms of 
Christian eschatology: realized, futuristic, and proleptic.   A realized eschatology 
recognizes hope fully come into being in the present.  Slattery critiques the notion on 
the grounds that it leads to pursuing self-absorbed instant gratification.  If a theology 
of hope for the future is reduced simply to a concern for the present than it leaves no 
room for critiques of violence, greed, lust, and consumption.  On the other hand, a 
futuristic eschatology that delays hope until after death, leads to a living “in fear, 
resignation, or the paralysis of delayed expectations and constant anticipation” (p. 
81).  Slattery argues that in subscribing to futuristic theologies, “we are more likely to 
become intolerant and vengeful and less likely to take action for justice and peace” 
(p.81).  Thus a third option in which future and present both play a role is needed.  
In keeping with our models of storied subjects and God as Story, it is fitting 
that we adopt an eschatology tied to a literary construct.  While “proleptic” may be 
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unfamiliar to some, Slattery notes, “Literary scholars and English teachers will 
recognize this word as describing the moment in a short story or novel when the 
reader becomes fully cognizant of past, present, and future events all in one instant.  It 
is the moment when all the events of the narrative coalesce” (p. 84).  In Pulp Fiction 
(1994), it is the final scene, a continuation of the first, in which all storylines intersect 
in the stick up of a diner.  Within Christian theology, “proleptic” has been adopted as 
a way of speaking of the fullness of time uniquely embodied in the person of Jesus 
Christ.  The proleptic is that which transcends the fragmentary, episodic nature of 
linear time and “nurtures holistic understanding” (Slattery, p. 84).  It describes a 
moment, a crystallization if you would, in which one experiences clarity regarding 
what has been, what is, and what is unfolding.  It is a mystical experience, a moment 
of deep intimacy with Story which Christians might refer to as grace.  In the words of 
folk singer Utah Phillips, it is in part recognizing that “The past didn’t go anywhere, 
did it?” (1996).  It is simultaneously recognizing that our future is equally active in 
our present, as in the last scene of the original Planet of the Apes (1968) in which the 
protagonist wanders into the wilderness of what he thinks is another planet, only to 
discover the ruins of the Statue of Liberty in the sand.  In a proleptic experience, his 
entire construction of reality transforms in the awareness that his present is his future.   
Whitehead (and subsequently the Process Theology from which my 
conception of Story derives) posits that the present holds the sum of existence, all that 
is past and all that is yet to be.  Thus, all of eternity is experienced in each moment as 
each moment is the realization of some past possibility and dictates the possibilities 
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from which the future takes shape.  Moltmann (2007), noted Lutheran theologian, 
similarly argues that a proleptic eschatology means that all of eternity is imminent in 
time.  Thus, the goal of the believer is to be fully present to the moment, a notion not 
unrelated to Chodron’s notion of non-theism mentioned earlier.  Living into an 
affirmation of a proleptic eschatology might look like what Guignon refers to as 
“releasement” (2004, p. 166), a letting go of self-aggrandizement and the need for 
singular control in a move towards, “participating” (I would say co-creating) “in a 
shared event that is greater than ourselves” (p.166).  It is an orientation away from 
what is to be gained from life and towards what can be contributed.  For Guignon, 
“The idea of releasement proposes not passive quietism in which one does nothing, 
but an activism that operates with a heightened sensitivity to what is called for by the 
entire situation” (p.167).  In the proleptic is a calling forth, a beckoning towards what 
is becoming.  
In considering the implications of spirituality on pedagogy, the notion of 
proleptic experience – what I would call the transformative, grace-filled, in-breaking 
of Story into our stories – is central.  It speaks to a primary purpose of education, 
which Slattery names as “to fold within each present moment the past, the present, 
and the future so that our lives will be illuminated with deep understanding” (2006, p. 
87). It points to the same self-implicating nature of spirituality that Sheldrake (2001) 
makes use of in justifying Christian Spirituality as a field of study.  While I remain 
somewhat dubious of claiming an essential nature to this proleptic experience outside 
of the language we use to describe it, or better stated, while I do not dispute the 
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proleptic experience’s discursive production, I still find it a useful concept.  My 
decision to hold on to the proleptic experience only makes sense if it is articulated 
within a theology that is not dependent on it as its foundation.  A co-creative process 
in which we as individuals are shaping our own stories and the stories of each other – 
within the structure and context of Story, which precedes us and extends beyond us – 
is the theological grounding for my spirituality. It is not inherently exclusive to 
traditions other than Christianity, but it is shaped by Christian thought, the holistic net 
into which it is woven.  When I speak of my spirituality it is Christ-tinted, as Christ 
bears witness to the embodiment of Story’s proleptic hope, manifest in creation, 
which beckons me on beyond the collapse of reason.  
Imagining the Impossible 
Clearly, I am invested in the notion of prolepsis as a description of encounters 
with mystery.  Yet, I recognize that the question of future invading the present opens 
possibilities for a Platonist cosmology, in that it could be understood as assuming too 
much about a universal order.  While Slattery’s critique of futuristic eschatologies is 
compelling, it ultimately falls short in grappling with the problem of the role future 
plays in proleptic models.  I have spoken of “proleptic hope” as a way to point 
towards uncertainty in a future characterized by infinite possibilities.  The proleptic 
experience, at least in my estimation, is an in-breaking of a possible future into the 
present.  Its radically transformative power lies in its potential for opening the 
consciousness to possibilities unimagined.  Thus, the imagination is central to its 
eschatological power.  
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Caputo offers us a way into this notion of eschatological imagination, a move 
beyond possibility, in his essay “The Poetics of the Impossible and the Kingdom of 
God” (2005).  In Caputo’s claiming the Kingdom of God not as simply impossible, 
but rather the impossible, he proposes a poetics that offers cohesion to my 
storied/Story/proleptic model.  “By a poetics,” he explains, “I mean a constellation of 
strategies, arguments, tropes, paradigms, and metaphors, a style and a tone, as well as 
a grammar and a vocabulary, all of which, collectively, like a great army on the 
move, is aimed at making a point.  We might say that poetics is logic with a 
heart…logic with pathos” (p. 470).  A poetics of the impossible, then: 
 
describes the movements of a desire beyond desire, a desire beyond 
reason and what is reasonably possible, a desire to know what we 
cannot know or to love what we dare not love, like a beggar in love 
with a princess, whose desire is not extinguished but fired by the 
impossibility of his plight.  For our hearts are burning with a desire to 
go where we cannot go, praying and weeping for what no eye has seen 
nor ear heard, hoping against hope (Rom. 4:18).  To desire what is 
merely possible, to curb our passion so that it remains confined by the 
parameters of a carefully calculated probability – what would that 
amount to if not a lover without passion? (p. 471). 
 
 
In Caputo, we find room for the impossibility of liberation, an acknowledgement of 
the post-structural critique without a collapse of agency, a pragmatic ridiculousness 
that defies logic and history, but functions still.  It is an honest admission that the 
Kingdom of God is not possible, and yet it is a passionate embrace of committing to 
the impossible.   
 In his analysis of the discourse of the kingdom of God, Caputo is quick to 
point out that this poetics of the impossible does not emerge from authors who 
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disregard logic and rationality.  It cannot be dismissed as impish and playful, but on 
the contrary, “it is a discourse with a deadly serious concern, a prophetic concern to 
contradict the ‘world,’ to confound its calculations, and to interdict its hardness of 
heart, its cold-blooded logic, and heartless economics” (p. 471).  Thus, Paul and the 
authors of the gospels present an image of the kingdom of God in which the very 
structures and possibilities of the world are contradicted.  “The poetics of the 
kingdom,” he argues, “moves about in the distance between logic and passion, truth 
and justice, concepts and desire, strategizing and praying, astute points and mad 
stories, for it can never be merely the one or the other, can never occupy a spot that is 
simply exterior to one or the other” (p.472).   
Kingdom rhetoric tends to disrupt predictable order, the last becomes first, 
sinners are deemed righteous, the lines between neighbor and stranger are blurred.  
The kingdom is described by the gospel depictions of Jesus in metaphors and similes.  
Matthew 13 alone offers five such devices, good soil (13:3-9), a mustard seed (13:31-
32), a wheat crop (13:37-43), a hidden treasure (13:44-46), and a net full of good fish 
(13:47-50).  It is a storied construction, poetic, and beyond conceivable possibility.  A 
poetics of the impossible flies in the face of the rational possibility of Process 
Theology, and yet has much in common with it. Process Theology is driven by logic, 
grounded in the assertion that philosophical constructs shape and reshape how God 
can be understood.  Where God is understood as unfolding in the possibilities – and 
those possibilities are dictated by God’s nature, which is constructed in conversation 
with what can be experienced and understood – we are held captive by the limits of 
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our imaginations.  This is not to suggest a wild abandon of reason, but rather a radical 
leap of faith.  Where reason ends, I engage in what Sandoval (1991) might call a 
shifting of gears, to recognize that the kingdom is not just realized in the impossible, 
it is the impossible.  Thus, a kingdom poetics of the impossible, in which a way opens 
where no way exists, imagines the infinite.   
Story’s conclusion is no conclusion at all, it is the impossibility of 
intelligibility, the erosion of what can be comprehended; in Caputo’s words, it is 
“raising holy hell” (p. 477). In the dubmaster analogy, it is the collapse of genre, the 
erosion of the cohesion of concepts like musician, instrument, and even song.  Caputo 
argues that the kingdom confounds philosophers, accustomed to arranging things 
according to the principles of “being, reason, order, possibility, presence, sense, and 
meaning” (p. 477).  The coming of the anarchic kingdom, in which all authority is 
disrupted and assumed meaning called into question, counters the possible with its 
very impossibility.  Caputo carries us back to Derrida, suggesting the in-breaking of 
the kingdom is an event, l’invention de l’autre, the incoming of something wholly 
other, shattering the horizon of our expectations.   Or returning to Deleuze, he 
suggests that the kingdom has much in common with Alice in Wonderland, “packed 
with stories of most astonishing transformations and transfigurations, of paradoxes 
and aporias, of wedding feasts as mad as any hatter’s party, of eventualities that 
confound the time of the philosophers, who do not have nearly as good a time” (p. 
477).  Like what Deleuze (1990) says of Alice, to understand the kingdom requires “a 
category of very special things: event, pure events” (p. 1). 
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Continuing with Deleuze and Guattari, Caputo’s “holy hell” as a description 
of the futuristic in-breaking of the kingdom, could be read alongside a politics of 
schizophrenia, they propose in Anti-Oedipus (1983).  As word and thing collapse for 
the schizophrenic, no separation exists between the personal and social experience, 
saying is doing in an immediate and direct manner.  For Deleuze and Gauttari, 
schizophrenia is a privileging experience in that it frees the subject from the Oedipal 
prison.  Without the distorting and flattening structures, the schizophrenic’s proximity 
to the imaginary, flux and fluidity offers more “truth” in its perception of society.  
Rejecting the Lacanian notion of the real as the impossible, Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest instead that in reality everything becomes possible, because “reality” is what 
one’s desire fabricates.  This productive desire allows the schizophrenic to: 
 
produce himself as a free man, irresponsible, solitary, and 
joyous, finally able to say and do something simply in his own 
name, without asking permission; a desire lacking nothing, a 
flux that overcomes barriers and codes, a name that no longer 
designates any ego whatever.  He has simply ceased being 
afraid of becoming mad (p. 133).  
 
 
The reign of the imaginary, of unfiltered desire, represented by Deleuze and 
Gautarri’s rather idealized schizophrenic is valued as libratory.  It is a complete 
abandoning to throes of Story, a wild embrace of imagining the impossible.   
While not a direct parallel to Caputo’s depiction of the kingdom of God, 
particularly in that Deleuze and Guattari wholly reject community as an oppressive 
force, the schizophrenic politic suggests imagination as the vehicle through which the 
impossible becomes possible, through which reality is produced via desire.  The 
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kingdom, for Caputo, like the Hatter’s feast, ought to be wildly hospitable where the 
distinction between who is in and who is out is all a bit mad.  “Are there rigorous 
walls around the kingdom?  Do they have border patrols there? Do they have a 
problem with illegal immigrants?” Caputo wonders, “the story is that insiders are out, 
and the outsiders are in.  That, I readily agree, is perfectly mad – it makes perfect 
sense, or non-sense” (p. 480) in compliance with a poetics of impossibility.   
The “sacred anarchy” of Caputo’s notion of the kingdom is a productive 
disruption of community which functions as an imaginary vision of what could be, a 
vision which can transform and sustain the navigations of our daily lives as it breaks 
in, never fully realized, but in moments of proleptic chaos in which desire is manifest 
in an imagined future come to visit in the present and experienced as momentarily 
real. It is out of a similar impulse that theologian Monica Coleman (2006), proposes 
black women’s science fiction as a significant source for theological reflection.  
Unlike other womanist fiction, science fiction “is not limited to serving as a source 
for describing the past experiences of black women” (p. 174).  The imaginary 
structure of the futuristic dreams of science fiction, in conversation with complex and 
nuanced understandings of scientific discourse, bridge the gap between experience 
and fantasy, between the possible and impossible, in Coleman’s estimation, “gives 
teeth to the eschatological vision” (p. 174).  As the future invades the present in 
Story, the impossible is experienced as real.  It is the transforming power of radical 
encounters with Mystery such as these to which spirituality speaks.  This collective 
dreaming of “another possible world” (Althaus Reid, 2007), even in its impossibility 
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– not as an escapist exercise, but rather as a commitment to transformative action – is 
at the heart of why I teach.  
Sacred Ambiguity 
 The invitation to consider theology as a poetic act privileges the aesthetic over 
the rational, yet it does not reject the role of reason and the reach towards cohesion.  
Where Whitehead comes to God via a rational extension of his cosmological vision, I 
come to God as an assertion of humility – a hopeful belief in beauty’s power to 
disrupt the banality of existence.  Theologians work in metaphors, and any model is 
limited.  I return to Monro’s (2006) consideration the theological task as one of 
death/resurrection, or deconstruction/reconstruction.  This two-fold movement, in her 
estimation, stresses a moment between the two poles producing in which we are faced 
with the loss of meaning, and possibility emerges. 
 In that regard, it is not so much my positing God as story and people as storied 
body-selves that matters.  That is simply a reconstruction to be deconstructed again, a 
resurrection to be followed by another death.  It is in the dissonance generated by the 
limitations of any theological model that sacred ambiguity reasserts itself, that 
mystery is acknowledged.  Story makes meaning possible, but as we co-create within 
Story to author stories, we work with figurative language, with metaphors seeking 
meaning.  It is a process marked by unknowing.  If spirituality is an enactment of 
theology characterized by self-implicating, transformative claims, then it functions 
both in the devotional making of stories and the critical process of breaking them 
down.   
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PART THREE 
 
 
Interjection 
 
A year has passed since I began hammering out the proposal that would 
become the Part I of this dissertation.  It reflected how I spent January of 2009, 
gaining clarity about the shifts in my attention and discerning a sense of what my life 
and work were to be about in that moment.  I fell into a way of thinking about 
knowledge that was less dependent on linear constructions, embraced the seemingly 
chaotic intersections of the multiple conversations I was having, and abandoned 
myself to playing them out to see what might unfold.   
I have made the conscious, if awkward, choice to leave the tensions between 
what I intended to write and what has actually been written in place.  There was no 
prediction of this reflection inserted after the previous “plateau”.  Much of this work 
has ended up being about epistemology, explorations of knowledge and knowing and 
what either of those mean, so I embrace the messiness of the process reflected in its 
documentation because it serves to underscore the tenuous nature of writing, the false 
stability we read onto the written word rather than acknowledging that at best we get 
snapshots of the author’s thinking in a given moment – at the point of the last edit.  
We clean up texts to offer more unity and cohesion, hiding the author’s conversation 
with the author as a subject she or he participated in creating in the previous writing 
session.  That is not to suggest that I have not edited this work – quite the contrary, it 
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has undergone significant revision – I simply mean that I have avoided the 
temptations to reconcile the tensions that erupted in the writing process.  
Since last winter, publication of the two chapters that I was so excited about 
fell through [or so I thought].  The editor of South to a Queer Place went from eager 
and excited to not returning e-mails or phone calls in a matter of weeks.  I have not 
heard from her in over a year now.  [Note: Since I originally composed this section 
she has reappeared, and it looks as if the book might be back on.  She has still not 
offered a definite word on the inclusion of my chapter].  Then a couple of weeks ago I 
was contacted by the editor of Baptimergent: Baptist Stories from the Emergent 
Frontier (Roberts, 2010) informing me that despite his efforts and the efforts of the 
publishing house staff, the editorial board pulled my chapter from the book.   It was 
(somewhat ironically) deemed “too gay.”  
I know these are not unique experiences for emerging authors, but they still 
sting.  Particularly the second incident – mostly because I am frustrated with myself 
for even believing a mainline denominational publisher would print that essay.  The 
work is far from perfect, and as I anticipated in its text, there are things I would 
change looking back on it a year later.  However, both of those essays represent 
moments of clarity for me – shifts in my attention that felt generative and somehow 
more fully alive.  Perhaps more than anything else I have written, they articulate a 
positionality I have struggled to name and hold onto, even if I am holding on loosely.  
These essays speak something of my border-dwelling hybridity: the pastor, scholar, 
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activist, seeker, storyteller who finds himself so often accidentally disruptive just by 
showing up.  
I did get to teach the course at the Divinity School at Wake Forest University, 
and while it was reduced to a one credit hour seminar, it was still pretty incredible.  
The faculty review of my syllabus (a practice for all adjuncts, I am told) was 
interesting.  I was asked to identify the authors we would read in order to demonstrate 
ethnic and denominational diversity.  It was an uncomfortable process and I was 
unsure how to proceed. Should I place monikers like “Black Presbyterian Woman” in 
parentheses by their names?  I ended up writing brief biographies of each and letting 
the titles of the authors’ works serve as the text to be categorized and codified. It did 
not feel very queer. While the faculty frustratingly employed an old identity politic in 
seeking to establish my credibility and ability to consider “diversity”, several 
ultimately expressed appreciation of what I brought to the school, noting that 
conversations in my classroom were spilling over into other courses and enriching the 
larger discourse.  The students themselves, ten Master’s of Divinity and four auditors 
(all local ministers), were excited and receptive to the destabilizing experience of 
queer material queerly presented.   
I learned in conversation from a member of the Curriculum Committee later in 
the semester that at least in part I was blocked from teaching a three-hour section on 
queer studies and spirituality because the original proposal did not include familiar 
theologians and my doctoral studies were not considered an appropriate background 
(despite “spirituality” appearing in the title of more than a third of my course hours, 
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and being the topic of my research).  Again, I found myself navigating institutional 
assumptions that equate legitimacy with legibility.  
In terms of my research, the course was to be a site of performance in which I 
could play out my ideas about queer pedagogy as spiritual practice.  It was to serve as 
a source for reflection, and it certainly was that.  I am clear that what I have written 
during and after that teaching experience was shaped by what I learned there, as it has 
been shaped by what I have learned in each class I have taught and in each time I 
have played the teacher in some space outside the classroom.  While the inclusion of 
class preparation notes has proved to be not especially useful, particularly given the 
previously unanticipated need for an entire section of this dissertation to focus on 
articulating a theological grounding for my spirituality (which, not surprisingly, drew 
from many of the same sources we used in class).  Still, the intentionality around my 
journaling and reflexive discussions with colleagues through this particular course are 
evident in the last phases of this writing project.  Brief excerpts from my reflection 
journals are interspersed throughout the text.   
While I continue to struggle with the impulse towards self-disclosure and the 
sort of authority implicit in relaying experience, I cannot help but also note that the 
events of the year in my life beyond school equally shape and inform my current 
research.  As I began to explore in the initial proposal and accompanying essays 
(Appendices A and B), my work cannot be easily separated from the rest of my 
experiences, and thus to some degree all of my research is a hermeneutical process of 
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interpreting the knowledge produced in my just trying to figure out how to get 
through the day.   
In the midst of a year in which many of my most primary relationships have 
radically shifted once again, my research has peeked through in spurts.  I have 
engaged a significant analysis of “spirituality” in education discourses, and have 
pushed myself to articulate a theology that I could claim as I consider my own 
spiritual practice of engaging queer pedagogy.  I have also had new writing 
opportunities emerge, an upcoming chapter for a book on queer pedagogies, and an 
editor interested in another article for a new journal of writings about body/spirit play.  
In June of last year I went on a pilgrimage to the island of Iona off the west coast of 
Scotland, an ancient sacred site in Celtic Christianity.  In no small part, the 
pilgrimage served as a reminder that in the wave of family upheaval that was 
disrupting so much of my life and work, I still had my own journey to tend to.  I 
needed to move, to find metaphors for meaning making, and practices to embody 
release and abandonment.  
Why include this “interjection” in my dissertation?  I am not intending to do a 
close reading or deep critical analysis of my familial struggle and the accompanying 
losses, nor am I intending to extensively theorize the grief I have felt in the series of 
significant deaths I have encountered this year.  Yet, when I consider my experiences 
of the last year read alongside earlier writing about childhood and family, the grief is 
potent.  The emerging inconsistencies and tensions are uncomfortable.  The subject is 
destabilized.   
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 I include this interjection into the reporting of my research as a representation 
of how my own destabilization has functioned to disrupt the research process itself.  
My thinking, my writing, my living, have been affected by the unsettling 
circumstances of this year.  The illusion that having come through one storm there 
should be peace on the other side has fallen away.  The implications of the sacred 
shattering of the illusory self, over and over again, inform anything I can say at this 
moment.  I do not suggest or feel that I owe some explanation of the shifts in how my 
work has developed, or that getting naked somehow reveals an ultimate truth about 
myself as an author.  This dissertation could certainly be edited to stand as if nothing 
else was going on during its writing, but that sort of decontextualization runs counter 
to the ways of thinking about knowledge I claim to embrace.  I include this 
interjection so as to invite further connection-making, both for the reader and for 
myself, so that an engaged and integrated pedagogy may reflect knowledges and 
subjectivities produced in multiple contexts and resist the neatly cording off of one 
from the other.    
So, as we proceed, I acknowledge the shifts from the plan as it was originally 
proposed. Rather than two plateaus in which I consider queer pedagogy and the Wake 
Forest University Divinity School course as two discussions, I have integrated them 
into a larger discussion of spiritual practices – repeatable gestures that serve to 
illuminate my engagement of queer pedagogy as spiritual practice.   
And so we continue.  
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Queer, Pedagogy, and Practice 
Queer Pedagogies 
 We begin with definitions.  What do I mean 
when I speak of “queer pedagogy”?  Defining the 
term is a tricky subject indeed.  While it draws from 
previous discourses in curriculum studies and gender 
theories, the term first appeared in the academic 
literature with a 1993 article by Mary Bryson and 
Suzanne de Castell titled “Queer Pedagogy: Practice 
Makes Im/Perfect”.  The two reflect on their 
attempts to grapple with post-structuralist theories of 
subjectivity and essentialist constructions of identity 
in the context of a lesbian studies course they co-
taught.   The authors seek to “describe the goals, 
organizing principles, content, and outcomes of this 
engagement in the production of ‘queer pedagogy’—
a radical form of educative praxis implemented deliberately to interfere with, to 
intervene in, the production of ‘normalcy’ in schooled subjects” (p. 285).  Ultimately, 
they conclude that despite their best efforts, all of their discourses were permeated 
with backdrop of white heterosexual dominance and “lesbian identity” remained fixed 
and stable within their institutional context despite the course’s explicit attempts to 
disrupt monolithic constructions of the concept.  What the article successfully 
Journal Excerpt: 
How am I ever going to write 
about this course as a site of 
performance for queer 
pedagogies as spiritual 
practice without reducing 
pedagogy to a how-to list?  
And can I trust that original 
framing of the theme: Queer 
Pedagogy as Spiritual 
Practice? Why not Queer 
Pedagogy in Spiritual 
Practices…or Queer 
Pedagogy and Spiritual 
Practice?  Neither of the 
latter is quite as bold, but they 
may offer more freedom and 
open up some fluidity in my 
organizing my thoughts.  But, 
neither is really what I’m 
thinking about as I’m teaching 
this course.  My reflecting is 
all about me as a 
teacher…about thinking about 
this queer pedagogy I’m 
trying to enact (or maybe 
draw attention to as it is 
d) f li i
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provides is both a working construct of what “queer pedagogy” might be: 
 
a teaching against-the-grain, or, in this particular case, an amalgam of 
‘performative acts’ (Butler, 1990) enfleshing a radical form of what 
we envisioned to be potentially libratory enactments of ‘gender 
treachery’ (Bryson, de Castell, & Haig-Brown, 1993) with/in the 
always already (Derrida, 1978) heterosexually coded spaces of 
academic women’s studies programs (p. 288), 
 
 
and an analysis of the tremendous difficulty in realizing its goals.   
 Deborah Britzman’s 1995 article “Is There a Queer Pedagogy? – Or, Stop 
Reading Straight” furthered the discourse as she considered the role of reading 
practices and psychoanalytic theory in encountering resistance to knowledge, or 
thinking the unthinkable. She argues queer theory when brought into conversation 
with pedagogy: 
 
insists, using psychoanalytic method, that the relationship between 
knowledge and ignorance is neither oppositional nor binary. Rather 
they mutually implicate each other, structuring and enforcing 
particular forms of knowledge and forms of ignorance. In this way 
ignorance is analyzed as an effect of knowledge, indeed, as its limit, 
and not as an originary or innocent state (p. 154). 
 
 
Britzman’s is concerned not only with what individuals cannot bear to know, but 
what hegemonic discourses of normalcy resist knowing. Queer theory, she suggests, 
“can think of resistance as not outside of the subject of knowledge or the knowledge 
of subjects, but rather as constitutive of knowledge and its subjects” (p. 154). She 
looks to particular techniques through which queer theory is engaged and what they 
might offer in terms of rethinking both pedagogy and knowledge itself.  Specifically, 
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Britzman considers the study of limits, ignorance, and reading practices, and in her 
consideration of each analyzes the ways in which hegemonic discourses produce 
certain knowledges and subjects as unintelligible.  
Suzanne Luhmann in, “Queering/Querying Pedagogy? Or, Pedagogy Is a 
Pretty Queer Thing” (1998), also took on the challenge of articulating a queer 
pedagogy.  Building from the growing discourse that Bryson, deCastell, and Britzman 
shaped, Luhmann asked tough questions: “Is a queer pedagogy about and for queer 
students or queer teachers?  Is a queer pedagogy a question of queer curriculum? Or, 
is it about teaching methods adequate for queer content?  Moreover, is a queer 
pedagogy to become the house pedagogy of queer studies or is it about the queering 
of pedagogical theory?” (p. 141).  The spirit of Luhmann’s questions suggest a 
necessary inquisition into who or what is queer in this discourse.  Following 
Britzman’s line into considering resistance towards particular knowledges, Luhmann 
advocates an “inquiry into the conditions that make learning possible or prevent 
learning” through an interrogation of the student/teacher relationship and “the 
conditions for understanding, or refusing, knowledge” (p. 148). 
 Part of where Luhmann is particularly helpful is in pointing to the linked 
political strategies of reclaimed language in both the cases of queer and pedagogy.  
Recalling that the term “pedagogue” conjures a pedantic and dogmatic schoolteacher, 
she draws a link to the historically derogatory usage of queer, “meant to shame 
people as strange and to position them as unintelligible with the discursive framework 
of heteronormative gender dichotomies and binary sexualities” (p. 142).  While both 
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terms are marked by repudiation, they both have been “refurbished to serve critical 
functions” (p. 142), though from different social locations.  While “queer” critically 
disrupts the production of normativities, with particular (though not exclusive) 
attention to sexualities and genders; “pedagogy” – when aligned with descriptors like 
radical, anti-racist, or feminist – denotes a position critical of mainstream education 
“as a site of unequal power relations” (p. 142).  Further, she suggests that the terms 
share the common fate of reduction, and in that reduction the risk of being rendered 
superfluous.  Both queer and pedagogy are susceptible to being usurped as 
convenient shorthand, suffering from “over-determination and under-definition” (p. 
142); queer standing in place of the ever growing list of identity categories that 
cumbersomely are evoked to name the “community” (lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgendered, intersexed, two-spirited, etc.), and pedagogy reduced to a referent for 
instructional methods, teaching style, and classroom conduct.   
 Pedagogy is more than an exploration of the “how-to” of teaching, but rather 
encompasses questions about how we come to know, and how knowledge is produced 
in interactions between multiple parties (student, teacher, and written text, for a 
traditional example). Luhmann argues “this orientation to pedagogy exceeds 
education’s traditional fixation on knowledge transmission, and its wish for the 
teacher as master of knowledge” (p. 148).  Radical or critical pedagogies, categories 
to which queer pedagogy is undoubtedly related, she notes are commonly concerned 
with interventions into the reproduction of the power dynamics with the intent of 
reshaping education towards the political empowerment and liberation of students.  
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Queer pedagogy, with its links to a theoretic frame suspicious of liberation narratives, 
does not disregard the aims of other critical pedagogies, however it does reorient the 
critical lens towards knowledge production itself.   
 If a direct response to the question of what is queer in queer pedagogy – the 
teacher, the student, the content, the curriculum, the theory – remains somewhat 
blurry, the afore mentioned authors (with whom I concur) reach consensus in moving 
towards considering queer pedagogy to be particularly concerned with interrogating 
the production of normalcy and pushing against the psychological resistance to 
particular disruptive knowledges.  As such, the tendency in discussing queer 
pedagogy has been to focus on processes, practices and positions that point towards 
those aims and de-emphasize the centrality of queer subjects or practitioners.  Thus, 
the “queer” in queer pedagogy functions more in its verb form, to indicate pedagogy 
concerned with queering, or disrupting the tyranny of normalcy.  
 Yet, if queer pedagogy has broader application than content specifically 
regarding sexual identities and practices, then perhaps it still owes a debt of loyalty to 
that curricular content.  That is to say, while queer pedagogy can be strategically 
useful in a vast array of discursive analyses and education projects, its association 
(however loose) with queer (and/or queered) subjects necessarily invites a particular 
analysis of heteropatriachal normativities wherever such pedagogy is employed.  
Thus queer pedagogy in an introductory social foundations of education course might 
be utilized in considering the production of race and class in public schooling, but the 
implications for gender and sexual normativities would also be implicated in any such 
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analysis.  Ultimately, a queer pedagogical approach would further interrogate the 
limitations of categories such as race, class, gender, and sexual identity as themselves 
products and producers of normativities – so the afore mentioned intersectionality 
would be explored, then the boundaries of the categories on which intersectionality 
depends would themselves be stretched and transgressed.  
It is important here, even as I look to explore queer pedagogy as spiritual 
practice, and in relation to other specific spiritual practices, that we not fall into the 
trap of reducing the concept to a list of particular strategies that can be easily 
packaged an implemented.  Just as spiritual practices are not all encompassing of 
one’s spirituality but rather means towards focusing ones attention towards particular 
frameworks of meaning-making out of Mystery, queer pedagogy is more than the 
strategies that might be employed in its pursuit. Queer pedagogy is not a method but a 
stance – and one that I engage prayerfully.   
Spiritual Practice  
Having developed a workable sense of what I mean when I use the term 
“queer pedagogy,” we turn our attention to a consideration of the concept “spiritual 
practice”. When I speak of queer pedagogy as spiritual practice, we can now have 
some understanding of what I mean by “spiritual”.  Spiritual, as an adjective, refers to 
that which is concerned with the transformative nature of proleptic hope, 
characterized by contextualized, storied body-selves, co-creating within the structure 
Story makes possible and imagining possibilities towards the inconceivable as the 
very structures of meaning are stretched to their limits.  What, then, is meant by 
140 
 
“practice” in this context?  Here I draw from MacIntyre’s use of the term in After 
Virtue (2007): 
 
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systemically extended (p. 187).  
 
 
 MacIntyre goes on to offer examples, explaining that in his usage, Tic-Tac-Toe is not 
a practice, nor is throwing a football with skill; but the games of football and chess 
are.  Similarly, bricklaying and planting turnips are not practices; but architecture and 
farming are.   
To understand the distinctions between that which is and is not a practice, we 
must first understand the terms in MacIntyre’s definition.  When he refers to goods 
internal to an activity, he is speaking of intrinsic reward.  So in the case of chess, 
there might be goods externally and contingently attached, such as in prestige, 
awards, or money in the case of a tournament; however, there are always alternative 
ways of achieving those goods – none are particular to chess itself.  In contrast, 
internal goods cannot be achieved “by any other means than by playing chess or 
some other game of that specific kind” (p.188).  These might include the 
“achievement of a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic 
imagination and competitive intensity” (p.188).  These goods are internal in two 
ways: first, as already noted, they can only be achieved through the particular 
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practice; and second, they can only be identified and recognized by the experience of 
participating in the practice. Thus, “those who lack the relevant experience are 
incompetent thereby as judges of internal goods” (p.189).  
Further, MacIntyre notes that the notion of “excellence” in his definition of 
practice must necessarily be contextualized.  He uses the case of portrait painting to 
illustrate his point.  While the successful portrait painter is able to obtain many 
external goods (wealth, status, fame, etc.), they are not to be confused with the goods 
internal to the practice (the interpretation of the subject through the representation of 
the body).  The standards by which one might be deemed “successful” in realizing 
these internal goods is shaped by the philosophical and cultural constructions that 
give meaning to the notion of “subject” and inform the possibilities for representing 
the body.  “A judgment upon these goods,” MacIntyre argues, “requires at the very 
least the kind of competence that is only to be acquired either as a painter or as 
someone willing to learn systematically what the portrait painter has to teach” (p. 
190).  A practice in this conception, then, also involves standards of excellence and 
adherence to internal structures of the practice.  As practices have histories, their 
internal structures and standards are not immune from critique; yet, MacIntyre 
suggests, “we cannot be initiated into a practice without accepting the best standards 
so far” (p. 190).  Thus, a meaningful critique of a practice requires grounding in the 
tradition that shapes the standards and structures of that practice.    
 In light of the two previous points, MacIntyre notes a final distinction between 
external and internal goods.  External goods are always the property and possession 
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of some individual, and the more someone has of them the less there is for others. 
External goods are thus objects of competition by their very nature, in which there 
must then be winners and losers.  Further, their measure can be judged by an outside 
observer, someone external to the practice itself.  Internal goods, subject to evaluation 
only by other practitioners, are realized as achievement for the whole community who 
participate in the practice.  While they are not necessarily free from competition for 
excellence, in that they can be produced as its outcome, they are not themselves 
characterized by competition.  Instead, internal goods have broader relevance and 
potential to enrich.   
 Then, applying MacIntyre’s conception of “practice” to spirituality allows for 
a richer analysis than the easy dismissal of what Roberts’ (2002) critiques as 
decontextulized ancient spiritual rituals.  Where it might make some uncomfortable is 
in the suggestion that there might be excellence in spiritual practices.  Are, for 
example, some forms of prayer more excellent than others?  While all attempts at 
prayer may be worthy of affirmation, I would argue that one would be hard pressed to 
support an argument that within any given tradition some forms are deemed better or 
more sophisticated than others. By MacIntyre’s definition, a practice, such as prayer, 
can only be evaluated by others in the practicing community, and then against its 
adherence to the internal structure and standards of excellence.  Here we see evidence 
of Quinian holism in MacIntyre’s thought, as the controversial practice is considered 
in relation to the aspects of the tradition not under dispute; however MacIntyre 
expands Quine to include not only thought, but also practice within the web 
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justifiable knowing.  Thus, if we were to consider Roberts’ specific critique of 
labyrinth walking as a form of prayer we would first consider the goods internal to 
Christian prayer, which would require a further definition of “prayer” itself.  For our 
purposes let us consider prayer as some intentional means of opening oneself to the 
possibility of a transformative, proleptic experience of God.  Then we would evaluate 
labyrinth walking both on its effectiveness in achieving the internal goods and its 
adherence to the internal standards for excellent prayer (as understood within the 
community of practitioners).  Of course there are challenges as to who is included in 
the community of practitioners, the issue of competing standards, and differences in 
theology regarding whether prayer is initiated by God or the one praying, but the 
richness of those conversations, when held loosely serve to enliven the practice itself.   
 But further, we might consider the limits of thinking about labyrinth walking 
as a practice in and of itself, for while it might be understood as having intrinsic 
rewards, does it really contain standards of excellence or maturity only understood by 
other labyrinth walkers?  Perhaps, but that argument seems shaky at best.  It seems 
labyrinth walking is more akin to bricklaying or planting turnips than architecture or 
farming.  In this analogy, prayer itself would be the practice.  Labyrinth walking is 
more like what Brett Webb-Mitchell (2007) might call a “gesture,” not quite the 
practice itself, but the repeated acts one performs in engaging the practice through 
which God may be encountered.  Gestures, then, serve a performative function.  They 
replicate previous gestures and in so doing engage in a discourse through which 
subjects are produced and bodies made either intelligible or transgressive.   
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 If then, I am to propose “spiritual practice” as a category, then it might include 
things like prayer, worship, activism, and other activities which meet both 
MacIntyre’s definition of “practice” and my use of “spiritual” (primarily concerned 
with the self-implicating nature of one’s relationship to Mystery).  My assertion in 
this larger work is that pedagogy, particularly my conception of queer pedagogy, 
belongs to that category, as well.  So, let us first consider whether or not queer 
pedagogy itself meets the standards MacIntyre establishes for a practice.  Queer 
pedagogy can be understood as having internal goods, in that the particular 
constellation of analytical skills and political/eschatological priorities upon which 
queer pedagogy depends can only be achieved through the exercise of queer 
pedagogies themselves, and thus they can only be recognized by the experience of 
participating in the practice.  Further, excellence in queer pedagogy, while a concept 
that would certainly be queered for its upholding of and evaluation in relationship to 
prescribed norms, could only be comprehended in relation to the philosophical and 
cultural constructions producing the possibilities by which the practitioner can be 
understood as engaging said pedagogy.  Since the success of queer pedagogical 
practice depends on playing out particular philosophical and cultural constructions 
only understood by other practitioners (or those at least willing to invest the energy to 
study the practice), excellence within the practice functions to expand the possibilities 
and enrich the entire practicing community rather than just the individual pedagogue.  
As for “spiritual”, queer pedagogies inherently disrupt the assertion of unified and 
stable subject, including the self.  The disruption of an understanding of the self as 
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knowable is certainly both self-implicating and indicative of a humbling encounter 
with the limits of knowledge, or stated another way, an encounter with sacred 
Mystery.  
Queer Pedagogy and Spiritual Practices 
 There exists, however, a much larger discourse on specifically spiritual 
practices beyond MacIntyre.  Privileging voices whose articulation of spirituality are 
grounded in theological convictions reasonably close to those I have articulated, let us 
consider some other ways of thinking about these practices.  To begin with, we return 
to Sheldrake, who I utilized to make the case that spirituality is both a relatively 
recent construct, and still useful in theorizing curriculum.  Sheldrake (1995) reminds 
us that there has been  
 
a major shift in western theology towards a more serious reflection on 
human experience in its cultural particularity and therefore 
pluriformity.  This in turn provoked a movement away from a static 
approach to the Christian life, embodied in an analytical and abstract 
spiritual theology, and towards a more dynamic and inclusive concept, 
namely ‘spirituality’ (p. 57). 
 
 
This spirituality, he argues, seeks integration of all aspects of human life and 
experience, rather than a corded off exploration of the interior life.  Thus, issues of 
“life-style” are centrally important within Christian spirituality discourses.  British 
theologian Rowan Williams highlights the themes of interconnectedness over an 
isolated notion of the interior life suggesting that spirituality “must now touch every 
area of human experience, the public and the social, the painful, negative, even 
pathological byways of the mind, the moral and relational world” (2000, p. 59).  
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Thus, Sheldrake contends, that removing a wedge between the spiritual dimension of 
human existence and the materiality, while resulting in making the conversation 
significantly more complicated, results in a greater attempt to integrate human and 
religious values than an “exclusive interest in the component parts of ‘spiritual’ 
growth such as stages of prayer” (p.59).  The implication for the focus of my work is 
that the practices of trends in contemporary Christian spirituality are increasingly 
concerned with the interior in relation to the exterior, or even more interestingly, the 
blurring of the dichotomy between the interior and exterior.   
 As I have argued earlier, while the general concept of spirituality is the 
development of the human capacity for self-transcendence in relation to great 
Mystery, the practices of spirituality are, in Sheldrake’s words, “specific and have 
particular religious or doctrinal referents” (p.60).  It is this relationship to doctrinal 
claims that situate practices within a Quinian web, making possible any possibility of 
validation of authenticity.  “Every religious tradition,” he continues, “has tests for the 
authenticity of spiritual experience based not only on human considerations but also 
the revelation and …beliefs of the tradition” (p. 60).  That is not to say that those not 
claiming a religious tradition do not have the capacity for self-transcendence, or do 
not exist within relation to great Mystery, but rather that even the articulations of 
experiences of those persons and the practices either inspired by those experiences or 
in search of them have external referents in a larger cultural discourse.   
Having explicated both my historically situated understanding of spirituality 
and some core theological assertions through which I make meaning of my 
147 
 
experiences and which my own practices, either in response to or in search of similar 
experiences, I focus my discussion of queer pedagogy as spiritual practice in relation 
to three practices more commonly spoken of in Christian discourse: hospitality, 
embodiment, and testimony. As I enter an exploration of these practices, I do so in 
relation to my previous explication of queer pedagogy, our discussion of cultural and 
spiritual practices, and my teaching the course at the Wake Forest Divinity School as 
a specific site for engaging these practices. The choice of these three emerges from 
my reflecting on my journals as I taught that course.  Brief excerpts from those 
journals are included in the text.  The three more traditionally conceived practices 
offer frames for interpreting my own pedagogy in the particular context of the course, 
and I engage them as an invitation into further theorizing my larger pedagogical 
vision.  While each of these three engagements may be considered practices in their 
own right (though maybe not in the MacIntyrian sense), my use of them in this 
context constitutes them more as gestures, strategies or modes through which the 
spiritual practice of queer pedagogy is enacted.  Further, each of these three not only 
function within the larger discourse on Christian spiritual practices, they are met with 
parallel discourses in other theorizing that shape my consideration of them.  While the 
lines may be messy and the language a bit slippery, these practices/gestures/strategies 
function in this case in support of an understanding of the larger practice of queer 
pedagogy.   
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Embodiment 
Perhaps the most basic of these gestures is what Barbara Brown Taylor (2009) 
calls “the practice of wearing skin” (p. 35).  The practice of intentionally 
acknowledging and honoring our embodiment, while seemingly simple, can be 
radically transgressive.  Ruffolo (2007, p. 255), explicitly engaging queer theories in 
relationship to teaching, asks interesting questions about the pedagogical possibilities 
of embodying queer theories, naming that “it is somewhat unclear as to how queer 
can be embodied as a radical tool” (p. 257), particularly in his consideration, for 
straight teachers.  Working from the notion that bodies and cultures are dialogically 
produced, he explains that by the embodiment of queer he is referring to “a radical 
dialogical process of engaging queer ideologies though bodies and culture” (p. 272).  
In suggesting a way through the vagueness he identifies, Ruffolo argues that a 
radically queer pedagogical positionality is not dependent on the categories of an 
identity politic.  “The embodiment of queer (a queer politic) does not necessarily 
displace or embrace queer as a verb or noun.  The embodiment of queer, however, 
can be a descriptive position committed to radical (queer) processes. Queer therefore 
can be considered the intersection of queer as a verb and queer as an adjective: giving 
an account of queer highlights the radical process of reconsidering identity politics 
(verb) so as to describe and articulate the self as an ongoing negotiation working 
through the politics of identity (adjective)” (p. 257).  This embodiment of queer is 
integral to my understanding of queer pedagogy as spiritual practice. Therefore, in 
order to further our understanding of embodiment in relation to our larger 
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conversation, let us continue by looking to those who approach embodiment (both as 
concept and practice) primarily through the lens of spirituality.  
Cynthia Winton-Henry and Phil Porter, collaborative artists and theologians, 
are the developers of “InterPlay”, which they describe as “an active and creative way 
to unlock the wisdom of the body,” (2010). Over the last twenty-five years, the two 
have birthed and shepherded an international network of people gathering in groups 
to engage what they call “Body Wisdom Practices”. They define a Body Wisdom 
Practice as “a physical, repeatable action, that might create a desired change, balance 
a certain reality of our lives, or help us ‘maintain’” (2009, p. 39). While their use of 
“practice” is more akin to my use of “gesture” than the MacIntyrian notion, I retain 
their language in explaining the argument. They assert that repeated practices over 
time can help shift our behavior.  “The ‘practice’ part is particularly important,” they 
suggest;  “Although sometimes we have insight about what we want, we may need to 
make some sort of fundamental shift in action to move towards our desire” (p. 40).  
They conceptualize some Body Wisdom Practices as tools to utilize towards creating 
such changes. Alternatively (and maybe simultaneously), they suggest that Body 
Wisdom Practices help “balance a certain reality in our lives” (p. 40).  Examples of 
these balance-oriented practices range from remaining attentive to one’s breath in 
encountering a difficult co-worker to setting aside time from childcare tasks to dance 
or walk in the woods.  Finally, maintenance practices such as brushing our teeth or 
sitting meditation, function to keep the practitioner in some continued state of being.   
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In considering Body Wisdom Practices as spiritual practice, Winton-Henry 
and Porter advocate and embrace the physicality of spirituality, resisting the historic 
bifurcation of body and spirit.  All practices, they argue, are physical, “even if their 
purpose is to create quiet or stillness in the body.  And body and mind are also not 
split from each other, practices that involve the way we think are also physical 
activities” (p. 40). Recognizing that all people likely have existing body practices – 
bathing, eating, stillness – they suggest the development of a wider range of 
intentional Body Wisdom Practices that might work towards creating desired change 
over time.  Desire, rather than obligation, becomes the central motivation in their 
understanding of practices, and referencing a belief in the centrality of joy and 
playfulness, they stress simple practices that lead to change “with a sense of 
lightness,” rather than an emphasis on willfulness and over-earnestness.  Their 
conception of Body Wisdom Practices functions in accordance with Sheldrake’s 
notion that spiritual practices extend beyond the self and towards the transcendent.  
While Body Wisdom Practices, can be taken on for one’s own good, Winton-Henry 
and Porter suggest they also can function for the good of others, or “the planet or 
even all of creation (God)” (p. 40).  Within InterPlay, the idea of Body Wisdom 
Practices undergirds improvisational forms of movement, music making, and 
storytelling that are the primary tools of the community.  The premise of InterPlay is 
that as participants play, particular elements of these creative processes “become part 
of our vocabulary and we gain access to a different kind of experience” (p. 40). In 
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essence, what Winton-Henry and Porter provide is a framework for thinking about 
attentiveness to embodiment as spiritual practice.  
Springgay and Freedman (2007) offer insight to similar themes from the angle 
of curriculum theory, noting that “curriculum scholarship often falls prey to an 
understanding of the body through binary opposites,” and going on to suggest that 
while Cartesian dualisms have been disrupted by “a return to holistic practices, these 
interventions have not fully addressed the potential of the body in the construction of 
knowledge” (p. xix).  They argue that the body is a 
site of complex intersections between knowledge, 
subjectivity, and experience, and call for a larger 
discussion about the “unspoken practices in 
education that silence, conceal, and limit bodies” 
(p. xix).  They propose a bodied curriculum where 
the body is understood as meaning rather than 
simply a container in which meaning is stored.  
They draw from Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “flesh” 
as a means of talking about the body as neither 
material substance (as biological discourses 
produce it) or as containers where the mind (and I 
would add soul) is stored and thus separated from 
the world.  Flesh represents the integration of mind 
and body enmeshed within experience.  Flesh is conceptualized as “in-between, 
Journal Excerpt: 
There seems to be a central 
tension emerging in the class 
around reconciling the 
embrace of a queer, 
poststructuralist postionality 
and questions about the 
existence of the soul.  So much 
of our theological heritage is 
tied up in this notion of 
salvation that keeps the soul 
alive and distinct beyond the 
bodily experience that I find 
myself bumping up against it 
in my own learning process, 
not to mention as I engage my 
students.  It’s not really an 
active belief of mine anymore, 
but it still rears its head from 
time to time.  How can such 
an incarnational tradition, 
one that rejected Gnosticism 
and its devaluing of the body 
centuries ago, be so invested 
in this dualism?
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where beings (bodies) constitute themselves not as objects, but as meaning, and as 
embodied existence” (p. xx).  Thus, as knowledge is produced through bodily 
encounters, inter-embodiment is how we come to know ourselves and the world 
around us: “our subjectivity, is performed, constructed and created in relation with 
other beings” (p. xxii). 
 Curriculum theorist Peter McLaren (1999) speaks of the “enfleshment of 
meaning” referring to the ways in which ritualized knowledge is made sense of 
through the body. He uses “enfleshment” to mean the “dialectical relationship 
between the material organization of interiority and the cultural modes of materiality 
we inhabit subjectively” (p. 274).  Thus, the body is the site of learned narratives that 
are “spatio-temporally constructed at the intersection of desire and meaning” (p. 274).  
Ultimately, McLaren’s interest in the body is in recognizing it as the grounds for all 
intersubjective relationships.  “We cannot separate the body from the social 
formation,” he argues, “since the material density of all forms of subjectivity is 
achieved through the ‘micropractices’ of social power that are socially inscribed into 
our flesh” (p. 275). 
Springgay and Freedman call further attention to understanding of the 
significance of inter-embodiment as they consider it relation to difference.  Arguing 
that difference is performed and produced at the very moment of a bodied encounter, 
they claim the crucial need for curriculum studies to explore the ways that bodies 
become invested with differences and to attend to the “relational, social, and ethical 
implications of being-with other bodies differently and to the different knowledges 
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such bodily encounters produce” (p.xxiv). Invested in an exploration of reading 
strategies, through which knowledge as difference is produced, mediated, regulated, 
their articulation of bodied curriculum calls for a the disruption of normative 
assumptions and a risky openness to fluidity and uncertainty.    
When read alongside one another other, Winton-Henry and Porter’s notion of 
Body Wisdom Practices, which privileges a spirituality in which “selfhood” is shaped 
and re-shaped through repeated bodily gestures or performances; and both McLaren’s 
enfleshment and Springgay and Freedman’s bodied curriculum, which privilege a 
pedagogy through which knowledge is produced through bodily encounters; their 
potential for queering a notion of an essentially stable and singular identity rings 
loudly.  Each is invested in the disruption of binary constructions of self-hood and 
identity, and each is oriented towards an embrace of uncertainty, or something like 
what I have referred to as Mystery.  Even in the decidedly secular work of Springgay 
and Freedman, there is a reverence towards that uncertainty, which they 
simultaneously name as risky and call for an openness towards.  There is an implied 
faith in its transformative power; what I read as a queerly eschatological 
destabilization.   
 While other considerations of honoring the body as spiritual practice may be 
attentive to the sort of rituals that Winton-Henry and Porter mention, and may even 
seek to disrupt dualistic thinking, they tend to function in ways similar to how 
Springgay and Freedman characterize “holistic” (here, more in line with Miller’s 
usage than Murphey’s) curriculum studies, in that they are attentive to the body as a 
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container of the spirit but do not necessarily emphasize the function of the body in 
producing knowledge of the transcendent.  Though Stephanie Pausell’s (1997) work 
may deserve a similar critique, she still offers salient points for our conversation, 
especially in recognizing the centrality of the body in a particularly Christian 
spirituality: 
 
Embodiment is central to the Christian faith.  The Christian emphasis 
on the incarnation of God’s presence in Jesus and the Christian 
understanding of community, which describes the church as the body 
of Christ, both put embodiment at the center of Christian meaning.  
Jesus’ command that we love our neighbor as we love ourselves makes 
it clear that our faith has everything to do with how we live as 
embodied people. And when we gather to worship, we do things 
together that bring this command to life: in the meal of communion, 
we eat and drink, gathered together by Christ’s own wounded body; in 
baptism, it is our bodies that are bathed in cleansing water; in the 
passing of the peace, we touch one another in love and hope (p. 16).  
 
 
Here Pausell grounds practices of honoring the body in the particular rituals of 
Christian worship, with external referents to particular theological claims.  As 
spiritual practices extend beyond worship, this Christian emphasis on embodiment 
can have serious implications for the grounding of bodied pedagogy in spiritual 
practice. Similarly, Barbara Brown Taylor’s “embodied souls” (2009, p. 42) falls 
short of fully disrupting dualistic thinking, but nonetheless speaks to the sort of 
transformative pedagogy implied in what Springgay and Freedman call inter-
embodiment as she suggests:  
 
Wearing skin is not a solitary practice but one that brings me into 
communion with all these other embodied souls.  It is what we have 
most in common with one another.  In Christian teaching, followers of 
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Jesus are called to honor the bodies of our neighbors as we honor our 
own.  In his expanded teaching by example, this includes leper bodies, 
possessed bodies, widow and orphan bodies, as well as foreign bodies 
and hostile bodies – none of which he shied away from.  Read from 
the perspective of the body, his ministry was about encountering those 
whose flesh was discounted by the world in which they lived (p. 42).  
  
 
Given all of this, when I claim honoring the body as a way of speaking about 
queer pedagogy as spiritual practice, I mean honoring the body within the function of 
knowledge production, with particular attention to the ways in which bodies shape 
our sense of identity and mark and our identifications.  Sullivan explores the role of 
the body in relation to queer theorizing in her consideration of subjectivity, arguing 
for a departure from a Cartesian dualism, which asserts that identity is located in 
consciousness and “the body is simply a material receptacle that houses the mind or 
spirit” (p. 41).  This kind of dualistic thinking undergirds liberationist assumptions 
“that ideology colonises the mind of the individual, and that the goal of politics is…to 
free the mind, and hence the self from the repressive constraints of dominant culture” 
(p.41).  In contrast, poststructuralist theorists argue that because we both embody and 
are constituted by the discourses of our culture, we cannot discard or escape them.   
Drawing from both Butler’s and Merleau-Ponty’s considerations of the body 
as one’s “being-in-the-world” and thus the means through which identity is 
performatively generated, Sullivan (p.41) explains, “It is in virtue of having/being a 
body that is discursively produced in and through its relation to culture, that I am an 
‘I’” (p.42).  The effect of this notion of the body-subject is that we understand 
ourselves and all that we encounter through grids of intelligibility which are built 
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from knowledge we embody.  Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s metaphor of a blind 
man’s relationship to a walking stick, Sullivan suggests that as we do with our bodies, 
through the stick the blind man, experiences habitual perceptions “so attenuated as to 
skip the stage of conscious interpretation and intent.  Indeed, interpretation is the 
wrong word here: we are simply perceiving” (2001, p. 272). In short, because our 
knowledge is inseparably grounded in our bodies, the body is the central framework 
through which we generate identity and perceive our experience of the world.  
Foucault (1978) further argues that systems of power/knowledge form our 
relationship to our embodied being through discursive practices.  The body-self is 
constituted through performances (gestures, movements, etc.) codified in historically 
and culturally specific ways and regulated to ensure their adherence to hegemonic 
values.  Diprose (1994) goes on to suggest one’s identity or body-self is only 
understood, or achieves awareness of itself, in relation to the other.  Specifically she 
claims one’s subjectivity, “is built on the invasion of the self by the gestures of 
others, who, by referring to other others, are already social beings” (p.120).  One’s 
sense of oneself then, the very possibility of experiencing the self as anything, is 
shaped by a repetition of other performances and only exists within a context of 
shared social systems of meaning that offer a framework through which the self can 
be read.   As embodied beings, we may then be understood as a function of the 
regulatory strategies used to encourage adherence to culturally hegemonic values.  In 
other words, one’s body-spirit – one’s “self” if you prefer – is made intelligible by its 
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Journal Excerpt: 
I am a fan of the collective, noisy 
sigh.  Sometimes my body wants a 
good loud noise, a big out 
pouring of sound in order to clear 
space and keep going.   
particular failings or adherences to performances of normative identities in 
compliance with normative practices.  
In the course I taught at Wake Forest, the practice of honoring the body 
emerged as an enactment of queer pedagogies both through particular classroom 
rituals in which we attended to the needs of the body traditionally conceived simply 
(through allowing movement, eating, 
encouraging collective sighing when we 
encountered a difficult or tense moment in 
class), but further it played out in the very 
content of the course.   
An interpretation of Christian tradition that emphasized incarnation as a 
centrally defining characteristic led us to engage secular queer theorists with an eye 
towards the role of the body not simply as the housing of consciousness, but as 
completely integrated in the production of identities and knowledges.  In other words, 
specific theological referents shaped our engagement with discourses that functioned 
to destabilize assumptions about the nature of self, and ultimately rippled into 
questioning the nature of creation and all kinds of ontological questions about the 
nature and existence of souls.  Honoring the body as an aspect of the spiritual practice 
of queer pedagogy requires both an attentiveness to the actual body-spirits in the 
rooms, and a destabilizing exploitation of theoretical and (in this case) theological 
fissures in the doctrinal positions posing as immutable and ahistorical notions. The 
effect is to engage the specific practice of drawing attention to the ways in which 
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discursive power is exercised in the regulation of bodies, and the roles social 
institutions play as functions of that regulation.  While not all of these articulations of 
either queering embodiment or the embodiment of queer would necessarily stand up 
to MacIntyre’s definition of practice (though some certainly may), collectively they 
point to an intentionality in thought and gesture that can be taken up within a 
construction of queer pedagogy that itself could be understood as having goods 
internal to and partially definitive of it as an activity at which one might excel.   
Hospitality 
With a sometimes less than critical and often problematic lens, hospitality has 
emerged as a common trope in gay and lesbian theologies.  Based largely on the 
assumption that gay men and lesbians value relationships uniquely since it is whom 
and how they love that positions them on society’s margins, hospitality has been 
repeatedly claimed as the particular spiritual gift of the community.  In Soul Beneath 
the Skin, David Nimmons (2002) portrays gay men as a peaceful, loving community 
that broadens the definition of family; as an army of volunteers that stood by 
countless bedsides as strangers and friends were dying of AIDS and their own, 
biological families refuse to be present; as a band of lovers who blur the distinctions 
between lover, partner, and friend; and as a community which has created an 
atmosphere of hospitality that opens lives, homes, and institutions inviting people to 
more fully live into the complexity and chaotic beauty of themselves.  
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This sentiment is further echoed by theologian and activist Robert Goss 
(2002), who describes how a loving, same-sex relationship positions gay men for 
radical acts of hospitality: 
 
Generally, same-sex couples experience the need to share the fruit of 
their love with others.  Their love finds the need to include 
others…The more that we [Goss and his partner] experienced the love 
of one another, the more we were freed to serve others in need.  We 
took into our household ministry the throwaway people of our society, 
the developmentally disabled, alienated gay men and lesbians, and 
people living with the painful realities of HIV illness.  We created a 
community of love for the marginalized and the disenfranchised (p. 
126-127). 
    
 
In Our Tribe: Queer Folks, God, Jesus, and the Bible, Nancy Wilson (2000) claims 
“promiscuous hospitality” as a gay and lesbian (which is what she seems to mean by 
the term “queer” in her title) gift to Christianity.  She reconsiders stereotypes of gays 
and lesbians, presenting them as a platform on which new theologies can be built.  
“One stereotype of gay men,” she considers, “is that they are fabulous cooks and 
hosts of great parties.  Perhaps this connection of hospitality and gays is as simple as 
the notion of a ‘queer sensibility’: the love of gay men for elegance, for hospitality as 
an art form” (p. 232).  
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Similarly, Wilson lifts the stereotypical tradition of lesbian pot-luck dinners as 
an example of the less formal and “easy flow of work, preparation, food and home, 
sex and friends…with everyone pitching in and not a lot of ownership of the 
‘product.’ Also, it [a lesbian potluck meal] may be 
characterized by permeable boundaries that include 
parents and children and other family members, as 
well as bisexuals and men” (p. 233).  She suggests 
that these markers of “queer” sub-culture, 
springing out of a common sense of alienation and 
rejection, have become the fertile ground for the 
growth of communal values: “Many lesbians and 
gay men consciously create environments of 
hospitality in their homes or organizations.  They 
do this as a gift, a way of life.  And I don’t mean 
that straight people don’t do this, but there is 
something, perhaps, about being ‘unhinged’ from 
the conventional family constructs that opens up 
the opportunities, the desire to both deconstruct 
and reconstruct this aspect of our lives” (p. 234).   
 While I find the assumptions about “community” problematic and the 
idealized characterizations of whatever is meant by “community” as varying from 
quaint to laughable, these texts do point to a particular discursive construction that 
 
Journal Excerpt: 
We were ousted from our 
classroom by tenured 
professor who played a trump 
card to claim the space he 
wanted.  We’ve ended up in a 
conference room high and 
above the chapel, which is 
only lit by ghostly street lamps 
shining through the windows 
as we enter.  One student 
noted that it felt like being 
initiated into some secret 
society to ascend those stairs 
to our new gathering space.   
These students of 
mine, some have been run out 
of religious spaces over and 
over.  Some are painfully 
hungry to stake a claim to 
some home base in their 
theological education.  I 
remember that feeling.  As we 
climb those stairs together, I 
try and figure out how to hold 
onto the message that they are 
welcome here – that I am 
welcome here – that I came 
into this job by invitation.    
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reflects an aesthetic or poetic that is certainly powerful.  While far from queer (in the 
ways I am using the term in relation to theory and pedagogy), this trope of the 
hospitable outsider, the marginalized subject who welcomes the stranger, has 
resonances with more mainstream understandings of hospitality as Christian spiritual 
practice, and frankly makes me smile.  Wilson’s insistence on claiming and 
reconfiguring the same stereotype imposed on Southern Belles, Stepford Wives, and 
women in general as a higher moral calling is intriguing.  Perhaps it also evokes the 
metropolitan trope of visiting “developing” cultures, who have little materially but 
extend radical hospitality.   Something in this sense of the “excluded” having 
accessed a spiritual call to challenge practices of exclusion seems to resonate with 
Wilson. I wonder if the patronizing and problematic assumptions behind these tropes 
can be transcended.  While I cannot work my way through the problems with the 
production of collective identities in these images, there is still something in them that 
speaks to me about a hope for how I as an educator might hold space for another to 
feel welcome.  And yet, as we shall see, that notion is in and of itself problematic. 
 But before we leave an exploration of hospitality in gay and lesbian Christian 
thought, we would be remiss not to look at Kathy Rudy’s (1997) creative reimagining 
of the trope as she argues for hospitality as the core value to guide sexual encounters.  
“When I recommend hospitality,” she explains,  
 
I do not mean that strangers need to be welcomed through sex 
itself…our lives in Christ need to be opened to nurturing and caring 
for others…Unitivity and hospitality, it seems to me, are ways of 
talking about human life in a frame that is bigger than the individual 
subject…We know ourselves in relationship to and as a part of the 
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whole.  In a Christian context, the moral markers of unitivity and 
hospitality remind us that any sense of individuality ought to take a 
secondary role to our membership in the Body of Christ (pp. 126-128). 
 
 
Here we see Rudy play with some interesting moves 
considering our previous discussion of embodiment.  
Expanding on the metaphor of the church, or 
communion of Christians, as the resurrected body of 
Christ, for Rudy the individual body-spirit becomes 
secondary.  The self, as a subject, exists to a lesser 
degree than participation in a collective embodiment.  
Thus, sex acts as a means of embodying, through one 
individual’s hospitable encounter with another, a 
shared participation in and honoring of the larger body 
of Christ.  It is a complex notion, and perhaps raises 
more questions than Rudy is willing to answer, but it 
does represent a rather queer appropriation of 
hospitality as it begins to question the nature of the 
individual subject within this theological 
understanding of the body metaphor.   
The practice of extending hospitality, of 
welcoming the other, can similarly function as a way 
of thinking about queer pedagogy, but not without 
Journal Excerpt: 
Tonight, I am a live 
performance DJ.  I’m sifting 
through my sources material 
and will walk into the seminar
with a loose plan, probably 
more structured tonight than 
usual, because there is a need 
to trust that structure is there, 
that the container can hold, in 
an initial class meeting.  We’ll 
find a rhythm and share the 
responsibility of holding the 
space more as we go.  We will 
queer the assumptions about 
knower and known, teacher 
and student, week by week.   
     I dwell in the borders of 
this academic structure.  I am 
a disciplinary queer, teaching 
in a Divinity School with a 
(almost) PhD from a state 
university – not even in a 
religion program.  It all seems 
very polyamorous, the way I’ll 
affiliate with so many 
departments, my questioning 
fidelity to a single discipline. 
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some further critical reflection.  The practice of welcoming the other somewhat 
problematically constitutes the other as just that, an “other”, and in so doing engages 
the host in a normalizing discourse.  Derrida and Deutscher (2001) argue that the 
centrality of identitarian logic that the notion of community is commonly built on is 
inherently inhospitable, and perhaps even hostile, in response to the other.  A firm 
sense of identity, he argues, can only be formed by excluding that understood as 
different and vigilant guarding against its intrusion.  Because of what he perceived as 
this intrinsic connection between community and hostility, Derrida turned his 
attention away from community and towards hospitality, which he thought might be a 
more productive concept.   Derrida hones in on the internal tensions in the 
etymological meaning of hospitality.  While on the one hand the term means the 
benevolent welcome of the stranger, on the other hand it speaks to the power of the 
one issuing the welcome over the realm into which the stranger is invited, and by 
association over the stranger herself or himself.  Thus, hospitality is a thing that 
cannot be achieved.  It is an impossible, but necessary, action that Caputo describes 
as, “an enigmatic ‘experience’ in which I set out for the stranger, the other, for the 
unknown where I cannot go” (1997, p. 112). Or as Sullivan describes it, hospitality 
consists “of pushing against the limits of what one knows, moving into a beyond that 
one cannot anticipate or control” (2003, p. 149).  Further, Sullivan reminds us that 
hospitality is not something that “an already constituted subject decides to do or not 
do…one’s being-in-the-world [body-spirit] is always marked, molded, formed and 
transformed in and through encounters with others and with a world – encounters that 
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are beyond one’s volition and are central to one’s sense of self” (p. 149).  Thus, since 
identity is not essential, it could be understood as already marked by the necessity of 
an other, a point of difference by which one can understand oneself.  Further, the 
markers of difference, fluid and shifting in a web of social relations, make a sense of 
identity simultaneously necessary and impossible.  For Derrida, it is this paradoxical 
tension that undercuts the immobilization of being, and thus the possibility of 
community.   
Despite these tensions, the impossibility of fully welcoming the other, because 
by the very act of welcoming one constitutes the other as outside whatever they are 
being welcomed to, the queer pedagogical task is to claim productive tension in that 
attempt. The tension is not unlike the tension Luhmann identifies in queer pedagogy 
itself, leading her to suggest that “queer pedagogy must learn to be self-reflective of 
its own limitations” (1998, p. 142).  Like hospitality, Luhmann argues that ultimately 
a queer, post-identity, pedagogy becomes unthinkable – that at best queer pedagogy 
encourages an ethical practice in studying the risks of normalization and the 
“im/possibilities of (subversive) teaching and learning” (p. 154).  Without the politics 
of representation on which liberationist, anti-homophobic strategies depended to fall 
back on, queer pedagogies function to critique normativities, even the ones they 
simultaneously (if unintentionally) function to produce.  And yet, like in the practice 
of hospitality, we persist.   Our very reflecting on the ways our practices produce and 
replicate the kinds of normative assumptions (here the educator as having the power 
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to welcome and thus mastery over the realm of the education setting), enacts a queer 
pedagogical stance as it suggest the sort of study of limits to which Britzman refers.   
In her consideration of the practice of hospitality among early Christians, 
Pineda (1997) points out that in New Testament writings, the word xenos, is used not 
only to mean “stranger”, but also “guest” and “host”.  “This one word,” she contends, 
“signals the essential mutuality that is at the heart of hospitality.  No one is strange 
here except in relation to someone else; we make one another guests and hosts by 
how we treat one another” (p. 33).  The early church, she argues, emerging in cultures 
with rich traditions and customs around hospitality practices, “grew up turning hosts 
into guests and guests into hosts” as traveling apostles visited communities gathered 
in homes and simultaneously experienced and extended hospitality.  Xenos is a queer 
word, denoting a fluid and shifting set of identifications that only find their meaning 
in a relational context.  The fluidity in this notion of xenos, of hosting and being 
hosted at the same time, of noting the institutional structures and transgressing them, 
points to a way of enacting hospitality as both a queer pedagogy and spiritual 
practice.  
Testimony 
Given my embrace of Story as a primary model for God, I would be remiss 
were I not to consider the practice of queer pedagogy in relation to testimony.  Gary 
Wills (1999, p. 159) argues that Augustine of Hippo’s The Confessions, which may 
be considered a forerunner to the modern subject so destabilized by Foucault sixteen 
centuries later, might better be titled The Testimony.  Dorothy Bass (2004) reminds us 
166 
 
that before his Christian conversion, Augustine earned his living teaching the art of 
persuasive speech to Roman citizens.  She reminds us of his experience of watching 
fourth century children learn to speak, “Words, Augustine observed, are ‘precious 
cups of meaning’ that allow human beings to enter into community.  He also knew 
from experience, however, that words can become weapons when they emerge from 
the mouths of those who seek to dominate rather than to love and serve” (p. xii). The 
power of words, of storytelling (and Story-telling) both in the production of the 
subject and the eschatological politics of hoping for a better world mark this Christian 
tradition of testimony.   
 Thomas Long (2004) speaks of testimony as  “talking ourselves into being 
Christian” (p. 3), an unapologetic nod to the role of storytelling in the production of 
identity or the claiming of identifications.  He names a hunger for “authentic God 
talk,” in which Christians speak of God in contexts beyond the church.  “Talking 
about God outside of church is a potentially uncomfortable topic because it places 
many Christians in a bind.  On the one hand, we know that our faith touches 
everything about life.  It affects our relationships, our politics, the way we spend our 
money and spend our time…On the other hand, everybody knows that God and 
religion, like sex and money, are touchy matters, and speaking about faith in public 
always runs the risk of offense or even social rejection” (p. 4).  Perhaps for some of 
us that reticence is born out of an awareness of the issues around the cultural power of 
Christian discourses, or even more, fear of association with a particular vein of 
particularly politically powerful Christianity that runs counter to much of how we 
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interpret and experience our faith.   I certainly have encountered that very 
phenomenon while repeatedly revising this dissertation, navigating the discomfort of 
claiming identification within a tradition that so often has been problematic, while 
still trying to establish a credible voice with audiences beyond that tradition.   
For my purposes, I speak of testimony as telling stories, as the active and 
conscious participation in Story, with the articulated hope of personal and cultural 
transformation.  It is a practice that carries with it a complex set of challenges and is 
always in a tenuous dance with epistemologies and politics of representation.  The 
process of naming and constructing oneself through narrative is inevitably plagued 
with humanist identity categories and generally includes an editing process that cords 
off parts of the self that fail to adhere to the categories of self-definition.  Here, 
“talking ourselves into being Christian” parallels the coming out process central to 
gay liberation politics.  Foucault’s hermeneutics of desire through the technologies of 
self-examination, confession, and self-decipherment, undoubtedly play into the 
testimonial act.  However, rather than being at “the heart of the procedures of 
individualization” (1980, p.59), testimony is less invested in the libratory claims of 
the confessional act and more invested in story as a site of engagement.  Whereas 
Foucault’s analysis of confession highlights the disjunction between self-knowledge 
and the interpretation of that knowledge by others so as to classify, evaluate, and 
identify the confessor within a matrix of normative values – processes I do not deny 
as being at play in testimony – testimony privileges the transformative function of 
storytelling as a creative act of community identification.  It self-consciously and 
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unapologetically submits itself to be considered in relation to the community story 
and values that submission as itself a transformative act.  Both telling stories and 
listening to them is dangerous work, and yet if I were to look for a common thread 
through all of the jobs that have made up the twists and turns of my career, I would 
name myself primarily a storyteller and storykeeper.  Testimony is a central 
component of my spirituality.  
In considering the prevalence of testimony within many historically Black 
Church worship traditions, Thomas Hoyt (1997) defines the practice as people 
speaking “about what they have experienced and seen, offering it to the community 
for the edification of all” (p. 92).  Hoyt argues that the Black Church’s practice of 
testimony functions to make space for voices often silenced in other cultural contexts.  
He notes that the evocation of testimony borrows from the “world of courtrooms and 
trials” (p. 92), and in its more formalized practice (as in the worship tradition he 
claims) functions in a context in which the community expects to hear the truth 
spoken.  Further, “Witnesses – those making the testimony – must speak the truth as 
they have seen, heard, and experienced it. The practice of testimony requires that 
there be witnesses to testify and others to receive it and evaluate their testimony.  It is 
a deeply shared practice” (p. 92).  As he explains the function of testimony within a 
“free church” liturgy (a designation of worshipping modes that are less formal and 
often emphasize the more expressive and emotive), he suggest that “a believer 
describes what God has done in her life, in words both biblical and personal, and the 
hands of her friends clap in affirmation.  Her individual speech thus becomes part of 
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an affirmation that is shared” (p. 94).  Thus, testimonies function within liberation 
theologies as sties of resistance and solidarity.   
The common free church refrain, “Can I get a witness?” reminds us that 
witnessing takes on more than one form in the testimonial act.  There is the witness 
who testifies, but there is also the community gathered in witness of the testimony 
itself, some of whom might go on to repeat the story to yet another witness, and so 
on.  For Tom Henderson (2009), building off the work of Winton-Henry and Porter, 
this act of witnessing takes on a particular meaning: “first, noticing my own physical 
experience as I watch and listen and, second, affirming the person I have witnessed 
by telling them my own physical experience in just a few words or images” (p. 1).  
This sort of embodied witnessing points to the relational aspect of storytelling (for 
him, taking on multiple forms of dance, music, and speech), and harkens back to 
Murphey’s use of the Quinian web as a sense of seeking validity.  For Henderson, 
witnessing is as much about attending to ones sense of how the information – the 
testimony, if you will – is being received as a bodily being-in-the-world as it is to 
offering the storyteller a sense of being seen or heard.  It suggests a possibility for 
simultaneously noting either one’s own resonance with or opposition to the 
testimony, while still remaining attentive to the experience of the testifier.   
Surely, the concept of testimony is not without problems (as I have noted 
elsewhere in my discussions of the tyranny of community and the limitation of 
liberation theologies).  The unexamined assertion of personal experience as “truth” 
has deserved the critical responses it has evoked.  And yet, to respond to those 
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responses with a stifling of stories and a closure to knowledge produced in the telling 
of personal narrative would smack of an arrogance equally problematic.  Rather than 
eradicating their transformative power, problematizing narratives and their production 
of subjectivities opens them to being sites of multiple engagements, moments of 
crystallization in which individuals engage with one another in the production of 
more knowledge.  We cannot escape discourse, and so we tell, listen to, and re-tell 
stories, knowing all along that doing so creates multiple truths and has the potential to 
enact accidental violences.   
On the most obvious level, testimony has the potential to queer knowledge as 
the witnessing of another’s personal narrative disrupts one’s assumptions about the 
possibilities of what can be, or pushes up against what Britzman talks about as what 
one can “stand knowing” (1995).  The more complicated nuances of testimony, which 
point to how it might function queerly and how it might be queered, show up in the 
post-colonial discourses around the subaltern, and particularly the debates the 
testimonio genre has produced.  Testimonio, in this context, refers to a narrative form 
emerging in-between Latin American storytellers and predominately North American 
and European academics/consumers.  The form became central to the subaltern 
studies movement and has drawn sharp criticism on a variety of fronts.  I, Rigoberta 
Menchu, first published in 1982, sparked the perhaps most well known debates about 
testimonio, its appropriations, and the construction and function of “truth” after 
Menchu herself was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992 (Zimmerman, 2001).   
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Anthropologist Elizabeth Burgos (1982) transcribed and edited interviews 
with Menchu, and then published them as a book, launching both herself and Menchu 
into the international spotlight during a time of on-going conflict in Guatemala. The 
work has sparked multiple and complex conversations.  Stoll (1999), raised concerns 
about the factual basis of some of Menchu’s claims, and those critiques were then 
taken up by others in attempts to discredit Menchu’s political critiques (Beverly, 
2004, p. X). Testimonio as a genre thus raised questions about how it should be read 
and taught – whether it belonged in literature, history, or social science.  Further, 
critiques of anthropology, most notably Spivak in her essay “Can the Subaltern 
Speak?” (1988) concerning the production of the subaltern as such necessarily 
excludes them from being able to be heard, raised significant questions about the 
viability of forms of knowledge production such as testimonio.   
Beverly (2004), an adamant advocate of testimonio, takes a literary approach 
to the genre, and yet, he is clear that such an approach does not exclude the political 
implications and calls for transformation the texts evoke.  His approach is not unlike 
my approach to the Gospel narratives, that could be argued themselves function in a 
similar vein to testimonio.  In a collection of essays originally published over a 
fifteen-year span, Beverly demonstrates developments in his understandings of 
testimonio resulting from the controversies surrounding it.  He marks a shift from the 
liberationist tones of his early work with the genre to his encounters with postmodern 
theoretical discourses.  Beverly comes to suggest that “what testimonio requires of 
the academy is not that we ‘know’ it adequately, but something like a critique of 
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academic knowledge as such.  That critique, which for us would amount to a kind of 
criticism/self-criticism, would point in the direction of relativizing the authority of 
academic knowledge – that is, our authority – but not the rejection or abandonment of 
that knowledge” (p. 7).  Stated a different way, he suggests that what is at stake in 
testimonio, “is not so much truth from or about the other as the truth of the 
other…meaning not only that the other exists…but also the other’s sense of what is 
true and what is false”  (p. 7).   
While Beverly’s suggestion problematically locates testimonio as necessarily 
outside of the academy, glossing over the historic relationship between the story-
teller/subject and the editor/interpreter, and arguably re-inscribes the same practices 
of power that produce the subaltern as such, he also speaks to the power of narratives 
to disrupt the institutionally ordained ways of knowing.  I would argue, that while the 
production and dissemination of testimonio as research has undoubtedly been full of 
significant problems, it has also resulted in a subsequent body of critical work that 
has proven to be immensely productive.  In my way of thinking, the limits of 
knowability, the problems with constructions of truth, the politics of representation 
and listening, all draw us further into Story, which constantly functions to 
simultaneously produce and disrupt meaning.   
Arnaldo Cruz-Malave’s Queer Latino testimonio, Keith Haring and Juanito 
Xtravaganza: Hard Tails (2007) reflects the sort of complexity of which I am 
speaking.  The book presents the story of Juan Rivera (aka Juanito Xtavaganza), the 
lover of artist Keith Haring through the years preceding his 1990 death from AIDS.  
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Cruz-Malave makes the conscious decision to remain an active and visible part of the 
text, not rendering his editorial maneuvers invisible, but rather allowing their 
visibility to disrupt the readers assumptions around the narrative’s cohesion.  The 
result is a theoretically sophisticated portrait of New York in the seventies and 
eighties, exploring the effects of AIDS, crack, and gentrification on the lives of 
queers of color.  The messy politics of representation loom large as Cruz-Malave 
struggles to both bear witness to and relay Xtravaganza’s story without enacting 
epistemic violence.  Gopinath (2009), reminds us that “we know all too well from the 
various critiques of testimonio and conventional ethnography that have emerged in 
the last twenty years, the dangers or the project of ‘giving voice’ and speaking for the 
socially marginalized other.”  Cruz-Malave’s struggle with this awareness led to a 
ten-year paralysis between recording the interviews and his tackling the book project.  
What emerges is a hybrid text, in which the edited interview is contextualized within 
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Journal Entry: 
When I took on this role of 
teaching at the Divinity School 
at Wake Forest, I did so already 
known by most of the faculty as 
a former student.  I was known 
by many of the students as one 
of the founders of the queer 
student organization within the 
school.  I was known to other 
students because of my 
involvement in Baptist 
organizations.  I entered the 
classroom with stories of me 
from other times and other 
contexts preceding me.   
  As I encounter students 
who had worked out strategies 
for navigating their positions 
around sexualities, both their 
own and other people’s, I don’t 
hesitate to challenge or disrupt 
their thinking, but I am also 
aware of my desire to read their 
stories through lenses that 
support my own navigations.  
Some of the students frustrate 
my attempts to make them 
intelligible, rejecting gay and 
lesbian identity categories, but 
also rejecting queer as an 
acceptable alternative.  I feel 
exposed when I encounter my 
old identity politic scripts 
showing up in seeking to 
stabilize queer as a noun.  
Other students seem to hold in 
tension a constructivist 
understanding of sexual identity 
and a theology of election in 
ways I cannot fathom.  They 
maintain the notion of a soul 
enscripted with a faith waiting 
to be realized. 
a reflective analysis of both the context of 
Xtravaganza’s story and the challenges of engaging in 
this kind of research.  While claiming its place within 
the genre of testimono, the book deconstructs its 
methodology as it engages it, looping back on itself 
and occasionally repeating itself verbatim.   
Cruz-Malave’s intention is as much to consider 
the production of the text as it is to tell the story.  His 
acts of interpretation and reconstruction are reflected 
in his ongoing theorizing of listening as an ethical and 
political act.  The author implicates himself as the 
interview transcripts reveal the tension in his read of 
Haring as exploiting Xtravaganza and Xtravaganza’s 
adamant rejection of the notion that Haring 
appropriated black and Latino cultural spaces that he 
accessed through his lovers as a means of fueling his 
art for consumption by an art world that minimized 
those very spaces: “A lotta people would say 
that…’Cause the aborigines had used the same images 
and Keith had just swiped them! But it wasn’t a matter 
of swiping—Keith knew how to continue the 
conversation. And he knew how to continue the line 
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with the street artists” (p. 44). Xtravaganza’s 
disruption of Cruz-Malave’s desire, and perhaps the 
desire of the reader, to cling to a particular 
interpretation of Haring’s relationship to the 
subcultures of queers of color functions to expose 
the longing for easy intelligibility and to invite 
questioning about our demands for adherence to our 
readings of another person’s story.  It is this 
reflexivity on Cruz-Malave’s part that leads 
Gopinath to say of the work that it “can be read as an 
extended meditation on the possibilities and limits of 
collaboration across hierarchies of power and 
privilege: between Cruz-Malave and Rivera, and 
Haring and Rivera, but also between the reader and 
the text itself.  As readers we are compelled to 
interrogate our own positionality as we are drawn into the circuits of exchange and 
‘trade,’ in all senses of the word” (p. 1). 
  Cruz-Malave offers insight into the problematics of witnessing another’s story 
in what he refers to as “a reticent genre” (p. 97).  He self-consciously struggles with 
his paralyzing shame and concern that his fascination with Juan Xtravaganza’s story 
is driven by a need to “secretly feed a prurient interest…for Latino loves under 
duress” (p. 96), or “providing someone a walk on the wild side so that, me included, 
It’s like the 
identity/subjectivity 
conversations we’re having 
around gender, sexuality, and 
race, dare not disrupt 
embedded theology. 
Interesting to encounter what 
we can stand considering – 
and that point is different for 
everyone in the room.  Hit it 
early with some, don’t know 
that we’ll hit it at all with 
others. 
   Making room for our 
stories and the stories we 
read, while holding their 
telling as sites of performance 
and loci for engagement 
rather than trump cards to 
shut down disagreement and 
dissent or objects for 
consumption, is the 
complicated and fruitful work 
of our learning community.  In 
the end, I hope our stories of 
our storytelling and story 
holding, without demand for 
nakedness but with room for 
vulnerability, serve as 
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could finally feel, could com-probar, could both confirm and taste the joyous sigh of 
relief, that jolt that may be experienced at reliving ‘lesser’ lives at a distance, safely 
sconced at home, in one’s comfortable armchair, with one’s ubiquitous cup of coffee 
by one’s side” (p. 97). But in the end, Cruz-Malave’s queer testimonio offers a model 
for embracing both the necessity of telling and listening to stories despite the 
accompanying problems; both queering the practices of storytelling, re-telling, and 
listening, and demonstrating the potential of testimonies to queer what is assumed to 
be known or knowable. “I had stopped,” he bemoans: 
  
For ten years I had been paralyzed with shame – overcome by the 
possibility that a word, a word of mine might damage, betray.  But the 
art in Juan’s voice – its hesitation, elisions, detours – kept prodding 
me, urging me on to strain, to reconnect.  And then one day, I just got 
up – as Juan would say, deferring interpretation – and fortified by the 
thought that such minimal deviations were not only a command but a 
hope, I decided to pick up the phone and answer his call (p.119).   
   
 
Testimony is messy – we are implicated in the politics of representation of 
both ourselves and others – but those politics are as inescapable as discourse itself.  
We are aware of the limitations of what we do, and still we do it.  We present 
ourselves as texts, and take up one another in that manner, engaging a plethora of 
reading strategies in order to make meaning of our stories, to seek common ground 
and ponder difference.  In engaging testimony as an enactment of queer pedagogy as 
spiritual practice, the point of acknowledging difference is not to know it, or 
borrowing from Cruz-Malave, “to expose it until it yields its secret…not even to 
venerate the mystery of the other’s inscrutable, ever-receding, sacred face…It is more 
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simply – and more difficultly – to engage with that difference” (p. 119).  We testify, 
and we bear witness, so that we may engage.  The mystery is not so much in 
encountering the other, but in the possibility of being transformed by that encounter.   
Conclusion  
  Embodiment, hospitality, and testimony hardly offer a comprehensive 
exploration of the ways queer pedagogy as spiritual practice might be enacted.  They 
do, however, offer language and traditions through which my own practice might find 
meaning.  When understood as an interrogation of the production of the normal, as an 
exploration of the boundaries of knowledge and ignorance, then queer pedagogy can 
also be understood as concerned with the transformational potential of engaging 
Mystery.  
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CODA 
 
In November of 2009, I attended the American Education Studies Association 
conference in Pittsburgh, PA.  Wanting to milk all I could from the experience, I 
studied my program and marked every session having anything to do with queer 
pedagogy or religion and spirituality.  As I moved from session to session I began 
making connections with what turned out to be two different circles of colleagues.  In 
most all of the queer pedagogy sessions, I found the same folks.  Similarly, there was 
a cadre of scholars moving from one religion session to another.  What was striking to 
me is that I saw none of the queer pedagogy folks in the religion sessions, nor any of 
the religion folks in the queer pedagogy sessions.  Even more, I was struck by the 
several times I heard religion, and particularly Christianity, portrayed monolithically 
and derisively among those working in queer pedagogy.  The very un-queer 
production of the Christian subject in those conversations was surprising.  Less 
surprising, but equally frustrating, was the complete silence regarding queer theories 
and queer subjects in the religion sessions.   
Ironically, as I engaged colleagues in hallways and over coffee, I found trends 
amongst both groups towards challenging certainty. Similar critiques of the ways 
institutions approached the processes of education as being about solidifying 
knowledge of oneself and the world were being articulated by these scholars who 
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seemed to have so little interaction.  When I spoke of faith and spirituality among the 
queer pedagogy folks I was met with blank looks.  When I spoke of queer pedagogy 
among the religion folks I was met with an absence of even a basic understanding of 
what I was referring to.  While my experience of living in the in-between at that 
conference was hardly new for me, it served as a reminder of why I do the kind of 
work that I do.   
Simply put, I find myself living with a foot in each of two of the most 
powerful institutions of knowledge production in my culture: the church and the 
academy.  Because of the ways I am situated (and have situated myself), I am most 
often in conversation with those in each institution who are somewhat conflicted, 
deeply invested in the institution they call home and critical of it at the same time.  As 
one whose work and life has been so shaped by both queer pedagogy and spiritual 
practices, I am somewhat evangelical about the potential for a culturally 
transformative, collaborative engagement at the places where those discourses 
intersect.   
Given my critique of the discourse around spirituality in education, and my 
further assertion that there is still something worth holding onto in the conversation, 
what are the implications for a consideration of queer pedagogy as spiritual practice?  
I contend that if we consider queer pedagogy as spiritual practice, then we can still 
claim some transformational quality in its intent, not in the mode of the liberation 
models historically fueling critical pedagogies, but more in an implicit transformation 
occurring in humbling encounters with the edge of knowability, a movement from the 
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fear of limits of knowledge towards an embrace of mystery.  At the same time, queer 
pedagogy has the potential to invigorate the conversations around both spirituality in 
education and spiritual practices in general, offering those conversations new life and 
potentially detaching them from their dependency on the essentialist and foundational 
thought of modern liberalism.  This, in a nutshell, is my work: to reconceptualize 
queer pedagogy as encounters with Mystery, and to reconsider spirituality as practices 
drawing our attention to the limits of our knowledge claims.   
In bringing these two discourses into conversation with one another, and 
reflecting on my enactment of both, I further articulate my identifications within (or 
pushing against) both the institutions built up around preserving each of them. It is a 
snapshot, a “just for now” kind of positionality, which is all it could possibly be, but 
it is a portrait in which I see myself and recognize something worth claiming.  But 
even more importantly, I suggest that the defining aim of grappling with the limits of 
knowledge and knowability make these two discourses unlikely, but powerful, dance 
partners.  For those invested in discourses around spirituality – whether in 
foundations of education, theological education, or church settings – queer pedagogy 
offers a framework for articulating a critical engagement with the embrace of Mystery 
required for their work to remain relevant in postmodernity.  Similarly, by critically 
engaging spirituality rather than dismissing it altogether, queer pedagogues open 
themselves to a rich discourse with tremendous cultural capital.   
In demonstrating my perception of common ground in these discourses, I have 
not only worked to articulate my own scholarly identifications (which, admittedly, 
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has been a driving force in this project), but also have attempted to open the door to a 
collaborative politic – a “queer” understanding of the advocates of spirituality and the 
advocates of queer theory operating from a common pedagogical impulse in 
examining how what it is known is called into being, and meeting the limits of that 
knowledge with a humility that does not silence or shutdown, but rather invigorates 
and invites contemplation.  I long for a network of pastors and scholars, teachers and 
theologians, who come together across lines of institutionality not so much to 
organize for political reform (though I would certainly welcome that) but to learn 
from one another about the multiple ways in which mystery/Mystery informs our 
knowing and the navigations of our work.   
 And so, I return to the beginning, since attentiveness to these multiple 
discourses is precisely the kind of work that informed the projects I included in the 
appendices, the initial work that shaped the direction this dissertation has taken.  I 
began this project with a discussion of epistemologies and methodologies that 
resurfaced throughout the text utilizing multiple metaphors.  In the end, each of the 
metaphors I have referenced has its limitations. Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) 
rhizome can be critiqued for its tendency to mask imbedded exercises of power in its 
attempts to decentralize hierarchies.  The web or net that Quine (1953) and Murphey 
(1996) employ can be critiqued for its dependency on discernable edges to any given 
interpretive community and failure to adequately grapple with collisions of 
intersecting or multiple communities.  The dj/remix, extrapolated from the ideas 
posited by Davis (2008) and Miller (2008), can be critiqued as advocating 
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juxtaposition for the sake of juxtaposition, and in borrowing snippets from multiple 
discourses detaching them from the larger referents that give them meaning.  I have 
struggled with the limitations of each of these, and recognize that other approaches to 
the same questions I raised in this research might privilege different metaphors and 
thus produce different knowledges. 
I argued for deep contextualization in this research, and given that I grounded 
an argument for the usefulness of spirituality as a concept in pedagogical discourse in 
its unapologetic claims towards self-implication, it was a necessary strategy.  The fact 
that as a researcher I am particularly and noticeably present in the work is a function 
of the nature of the work itself.   Because in my critique of spirituality in education 
rested on it being levied as a means of referencing personal experience and 
theological conviction in a way that shelters either from critical engagement, if I was 
to argue any utility remains in the concept I had to take on those critiques and model 
a different approach. It is challenging to write critically about spirituality.  Drawing 
from Sheldrake’s (2007) assertion of the self-implicating nature of the work requires 
both a deep contextualization and a reflexive stance.  To engage that without slipping 
into fetishizing the autobiographical impulse requires vigilance.  
The result was an articulation of the particular theological referents shaping 
my spiritual practices and a valuing of personal experience that simultaneous remains 
open to challenging the limits of ones own self-understanding.  While personal 
narrative informs my research, the aim of the work has not been primarily to analyze 
or theorize my story, but rather to explore intersecting discourses around sexuality, 
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spirituality, and pedagogy.  I entered into this project insisting that spirituality can be 
useful and has a place in critical discourses.  I am satisfied that I have made a 
compelling case.  Similarly, I have demonstrated that claiming a faith tradition and 
acknowledging the transformative and productive nature of that claim is not 
necessarily incompatible with poststructuralist and queer epistemologies. 
I set out to write a readable text that dealt with complex ideas, and to write a 
book I would like to read.  I think I have done that.  I have not sacrificed depth in the 
name of accessibility, but I have further prepared myself to speak to multiple 
audiences.  I am invested in the academy, but I am also really interested in teaching 
undergraduates and speaking in churches.   Thus, I recognize my research is intended 
for multiple audiences, and so I conclude with a word expressing my hope and 
longing for each: To my fellow pastors and leaders of progressive faith communities, 
I encourage you to reject the simplicity of identity politics as a substitute for real 
engagement with complicated issues.  To my colleagues concerned with spirituality in 
education: we must challenge our dependence on modernist articulations of Platonist 
assumptions if we are to be taken seriously in a postmodern age.  To the queer 
pedagogues who inspire and challenge me: our failures to challenge the oppositions 
between intellectualism and faith, science and religion, are inconsistent with our 
larger project, and rob us of opportunities for powerful collaborations towards 
creating the change we value.   
 
God said, ‘You are concerned about the bush, for which you did not 
labor and which you did not grow; it came into being in a night and 
perished in a night. And should I not be concerned about Nineveh, in 
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which there are more than a hundred and twenty thousand persons who 
do not know their right hand from their left?’ (Jonah 4:10-11). 
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APPENDIX A 
 
A Loose Garment of Identifications 
 
 
  I confess: I was baptized as an infant.  I was 
not born a Baptist.  I was not raised a Baptist.  Still, 
I am a Baptist.  I know this because my church told 
me so when I joined.  I joined a Baptist 
congregation that affirmed my infant Baptism.  
Being Baptist and all, it was the congregation’s 
decision to make – though I am left with a “Baptist 
identity” that some would contest.  I went to 
Divinity School identifying as a United Methodist 
refugee hanging out in a Baptist camp.  I was really 
into the exile narratives.  Dean Leonard (author of 
the preface of this volume) joked that if you 
scratched me I still bled Wesley.  He was probably 
right, particularly if you scratched me while talking 
about grace.  I confess: there are parts of what I 
learned as a United Methodist kid that I want to 
keep.   
     I grew up in Winston-
Salem, NC, on the campus 
of The Children’s Home.  
My father had grown up 
there as a resident and my 
mother, like me, as a 
“staff kid.”  The church 
was literally the center of 
our community.  Our 
work, our play, our lives 
radiated out from it. I 
grew up in a church that 
was made up of young 
people with hard stories.  
The kids in my 
neighborhood knew the 
world was complicated – 
full of challenges and 
injustices.  In a church 
made up mostly of 
children, we learned the 
daily practice of 
resurrection.  
     In the middle of my 
southern hometown, I 
grew up side by side with 
rural and urban kids of 
different race.  I grew up 
with a sense that our faith 
called us into action, it 
called us into working for 
a better world.  It was a 
community – and a church 
– built on love and hope. 
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 I confess: I am an ordained Baptist Minister.  
Yes, I am an ordained Baptist Minister that was 
baptized as an infant.  Truthfully, it really was not 
until the process leading up to my ordination that I 
came to seriously identify as Baptist.  I was 
ordained by a congregation that knew and loved me 
well.  They identified my gifts for ministry, and 
invited me to minister with their youth and young 
adults.  They stood in line to place their hands on 
me in an act of blessing while I wept with joy, 
transformed by grace.  Being Baptist and all, it was 
the congregation’s decision to make – though it left 
me in an interesting place as I later tried to interpret 
believer’s Baptism to young people discerning a 
call.  I confess: I have never been so sure that I was 
Baptist as I was the first time another was leaning 
back in my arms, submersed in the baptismal 
waters.   
 I confess: I share my home, my bed, and my 
life with a man named Ron.  The fact that I dearly 
love another man and have covenanted to spend my 
life with him was well known by the Baptist 
     When I was in middle 
school the church at the 
Home was dissolved and 
became a chaplain’s 
ministry. My family moved 
to a church across town.  I 
was heavily involved in 
the youth group and 
served as a youth 
representative on several 
councils and committees.  
I loved church, and took 
my commitments 
seriously, but I asked a lot 
of questions.  By the time I 
was graduating from high 
school I found myself 
bumping up against a 
church culture that 
suggested faith primarily 
meant accepting what you 
were told. 
     I left for college both 
committed to my Christian 
faith and increasingly 
frustrated with church. 
This was the early 1990’s, 
and with Cold War gone 
the culture wars took 
center stage.  The horrors 
of the early years of AIDS 
thrust “homosexuality” 
into the limelight. I 
remember attending a 
church conference with 
my father where they 
talked for hours about the 
exclusion of homosexuals 
from ordination – the 
threat and abomination 
they represented.  Later 
that day I told my father 
that God may be real, but 
certainly couldn’t be 
found in church. 
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congregation I joined, the same congregation that 
later ordained and called me just months after they 
blessed our union when we made a more formal and 
public declaration of our covenant on our tenth 
anniversary.  When I initially came back to church I 
did so as a Baptist, because it was a Baptist 
congregation that would have me – it was their 
decision to make.  These congregational decisions I 
mention were not made in isolation or on a whim.  
They were decisions that were preceded by 
prayerful discernment.  My congregation chose 
their practices in accordance with biblical study, 
attentiveness to tradition, and a sense of where God 
was calling them.  I came to learn and love the 
prophetic Baptist tradition that claimed me.  While 
many of my younger Baptist peers were wondering 
whether or not “being Baptist” was worth holding 
onto, I was falling in love with a way of doing 
Christianity that seemed well situated to respond to 
a changing world.  I confess: I get excited when I 
talk about Baptists.   
     While in college I 
became heavily involved 
in campus justice 
movements.  I was 
involved in work around 
sexual violence, racial 
reconciliation, gender 
equality, and the abolition 
of the death penalty.  I 
knew my faith and my 
family story had 
something to do with my 
commitments to justice 
work, but I had not yet 
learned how to articulate 
the connection.  I found 
church boring and 
consumed with protecting 
the status quo, so I 
distanced myself from it.     
     As I began dating Ron, 
I came face to face with 
the aggressive 
condemnations of 
Christians bent on saving 
me from eternal 
damnation.  Rarely did I 
see those folks so 
interested in the gender of 
who I was dating show up 
in the places where we 
were speaking out about 
injustices on our campus 
or in the larger world.  I 
wore a cross around my 
neck, but kept it hidden 
under my shirt.  I knew 
that I saw the face of 
Christ in the broken and 
often angry folks I 
encountered as an activist, 
but I still couldn’t name 
what that had to do with 
church.  
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 And yet, I have never been quite so gay as when 
I have been identified as a Baptist minister.  The 
juxtaposition of the two draws attention to the ways I 
am marginalized.  Though I was fortunate to serve a 
congregation that had room for me to be known mostly 
for my work with young people, I knew that for many 
in our pews my standing up front mattered differently 
because it meant they belonged, too.  I knew that the 
blessings the church bestowed on me were politically 
loaded, even if we did not want them to be.  I knew 
that, at least to some, when I walked out into the world, 
I was known as “that gay Baptist minister.”  Because I 
identified with a Baptist church, and because I 
identified with a loving man, I was a border-dweller – a 
hybrid – both a part of and separate from all at the same 
time.  Even in my inclusion, I was understood as one to 
be included.  I was a walking paradox.   
 Just saying, “I’m a Baptist minister, and this 
is my partner Ron,” still makes me laugh.  I was 
invited (and still am) to sit on panels, speak to other 
church groups, guest lecture in classes – to stand up 
in front of the gathered body and confess: I am a 
     I followed church 
news, and all around me 
it seemed that pastors 
were being brought up 
on charges or churches 
were being “disfellow-
shipped” for blessing 
same-gendered 
relationships or 
celebrating the gifts of 
gay or lesbian identified 
Christians for ministry.  
Though I was thankful 
that there were places I 
knew were working for 
change, I stayed away.  
It was all just too 
exhausting. 
     Years later, after 
several bouts with 
depression and lots of 
failed strategies to numb 
the ache that I carried 
with me day and night, I 
accepted that it was time 
to go back.  I longed for 
church – for a faith 
community that came 
together in worship and 
love.  I began to bump 
into church folks in 
activist circles.  I am 
sure they had always 
been there, but suddenly 
I had eyes to see.   
     The first time I met 
with the woman who 
would become my pastor 
and friend (and later 
supervisor), I told her 
that I was scared that if 
I came back to church, it 
would lead me to going 
to seminary. Two years 
later, I enrolled.    
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gay Baptist minister.  I colluded (and sometimes 
still collude) with well-meaning folks trying to 
understand.  I confessed to my ridiculous paradox, 
and then tried to make sense of it, answering 
questions about scriptural interpretation, offering a 
range of ideas about sexuality, and telling my story 
of how I came to “know” who I am.  I let myself 
become one of the good gays, the gays that are “just 
like us, but different,” because it was the only space 
offered, and though I had not set out to find that 
status, in many ways it was pretty easy for folks to 
read me in that way.  I made myself easily 
intelligible, an “acceptable other.”  I was being 
created in the image of…I don’t know what…but I 
am not sure it was God.  I was being created and re-
created, being constituted and re-constituted, by this 
public discourse about homosexuality and 
Christianity, and I was implicated as a co-creator.  I 
confess: I am getting tired of explaining myself in 
ways that are more about making other folks 
comfortable than doing the Gospel work of 
reconciliation and resurrection.  
     I began my formal 
theological education bent 
on coming to understand 
God.  I figured that if I 
studied hard enough I 
could think my way there.  
I learned a lot that was 
really useful – but 
ultimately came to 
recognize that there were 
limits to the whole 
thinking project.  At some 
point you just reach the 
edge of mystery and stand 
in awe.  I began to find 
new ways to talk about my 
experience of God, and 
eventually came into the 
beginnings of practicing 
contemplatively oriented 
prayer.  It would take a 
few years for those 
practices to root 
themselves – I was pretty 
skeptical.  However, those 
years in school 
represented a major shift 
in the focus of my 
attentiveness. I also found 
ways of praying in which 
my body and my spirit no 
longer felt so divided. 
     I developed a strong 
identification with the 
Lazarus story in John 11.  
I loved Jesus calling to 
Lazarus to “Come out!” 
(11:43). I had known the 
darkness, and I was 
emerging from my tomb, 
following the voice of 
Christ.
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 There is an over-againstness to that conversation that no longer works for 
me, a way of understanding and being understood that is dependent on the stability 
of our identities worn anxiously.  
I am getting tired of trying to figure out what it means to be an insider and outsider 
at the same time. I am getting tired of being the litmus test by which some other 
Baptist is determined to be a good liberal, a good moderate, or a good conservative.  
I am getting tired of being the “other” by which your identity is constituted.  It am 
tired, but not angry – really, please hear me when I say that.  I am just feeling done 
with the pattern of this conversation.   
I am ready for what is emerging – new ways to talk and think about being 
Christian, and about being Baptist.  I am ready to pay attention to a discourse through 
which God is creating and re-creating us in God’s image, through conversations that 
speak us into new ways of being. 
Towards Identifications 
I am writing this knowing that if I wrote it a year from now it would be an 
entirely different essay, as much as I know that if I’d written it a year ago and read it 
now I would want to revise it.  One of the gifts and challenges of postmodernity is an 
awareness that knowledge is always situated in a particular time and place, mediated 
by the language and symbols we can access at that moment, and inseparable from our 
embodied experiences of the world.  It is an awareness that is daunting, 
simultaneously toppling our foundations and inviting us to be fully present to what is 
right here and right now.   
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 The toppling of those foundations calls into question the limits of any claims I 
can make about my own “identity.” As for the idea that deep underneath there is a 
core self just waiting to be liberated?  My toppled foundation #452. That’s been a 
hard one for me to let go of, but the effect of trying has been a deeper encounter with 
mystery.  In accepting my unknowing, even of myself, I experience humility. I 
encounter grace. I am constantly being formed by the conversations in which I 
participate.  I can only know myself in relation to whatever strategies I use to make 
meaning of my experiences and of the body that experiences them.  I am less and less 
invested in my identity, more and more interested in my identifications.  
 The noun identity emphasizes the notion of a singular, stable, core-self that we 
both should and are able to unveil.  In contrast, identifications is the noun form of a 
verb –   the very structure of the word (an active verb held stable for a moment by the 
addition of the -ion suffix) suggests fluidity, acknowledging ever shifting matrices of 
engagements and influences.  In its plural form, identifications makes room for one to 
stand in multiple places simultaneously.  It acknowledges the experience of finding 
those multiple places sometimes congruent and sometime conflicting.  Whereas 
identity is built on a foundation of core principles assumed to be universal across time 
and space; identifications shifts our attention towards practices, always in 
conversation with tradition, but finding meaning in particular contexts.   So, I claim 
Christianity as my primary identification.  My faith offers an amazing system of 
language and symbols through which I read my embodied experiences of the world, 
but I am still becoming. I am a work in process. I am a sacred creation (and a 
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discursive production) spoken into being through a language of Love – and that 
process is God.  In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the 
Word was God (John 1:1).   
Shifting from an obsessive attachment to the quest to uncover my “true” 
identity towards wearing a loose garment of identifications has opened me to paying 
attention to God working in my life through all that I encounter – the lines between 
the sacred and mundane are falling away.  Those binaries have just quit working for 
me – most binaries have.  Understanding myself over-against some “other” always 
requires my closing myself off (at least to some degree) to that other.  It requires a 
deepening sense of alienation, even from myself.  Wearing this loose garment of 
identifications has also allowed me to let go of the “enough” questions: Am I 
Christian enough? Am I Baptist enough? Am I man enough? 
Identifications are less about core essences, more about free associations (in a 
Baptist polity kind of way).  I identify with certain words and gestures and the ideas 
they represent because they have shaped a sense of subjectivity that, while always 
incomplete, is an attempt to speak about how I am reading what is going on with my 
body-self.  Talking about my identifications pushes me to think about what I am 
primarily in terms of what I do.  The practices take center stage.  And yet, just as I am 
constantly reading and interpreting other people’s practices and gestures, they are also 
reading and interpreting mine. Despite the intention of my performance, of how I 
string together those practices, I have little control over how I am understood.  My 
practices can play with words, symbols and gestures, juxtapose them onto one another 
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in creative and interesting ways, reshape them and place them in new contexts, offer 
them up to those around me; but I cannot escape the systems of meaning through 
which they are read, nor can I control the route they take through those systems.  So, I 
tread lightly, working out my salvation with fear and trembling (Philippians 2:12). 
  While identities are fixed and require clear borders (which then must be 
defended and protected), identifications are fluid and multiple.  We identify with 
Christ, we take on that posture, and so we follow on a journey towards Jerusalem, 
taking on that practice. Full of hope and fear, but trusting in the Mystery, we journey 
with whomever else shows up on the same road; engaging in conversation and story-
telling; tending to one another’s bodies/spirits; praying, walking, and resting together. 
We travel together for a while, then shifts in pace or the need for rest bring us new 
travel partners. We keep traveling, following that which is life-giving, leaving the 
dead to bury their dead.  We hold our identifications loosely, so there is room for the 
movement of the Spirit.  We are emerging, and the journey defines us.     
Sexuality and Sexual Practice 
 My deep longing is for the church to engage a conversation about sexuality 
that is not caught up in the gender of my partner choice, but rather in the practices we 
claim by which our bodies encounter the sacred in one another.  I long for a 
conversation about sexuality that is not so concerned about who fits into what 
category and how or why they ended up there, but takes seriously the implications of 
our incarnational tradition for the holy mystery of sex.  I want to talk about pleasure, 
about deep and intimate connection, about the permeable boundaries of our body-
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selves.  But, I do not want to have a conversation that makes me Exhibit A, as if my 
thoughts and experiences of these miracles of sexual practice are somehow freakish 
and exotic.  I do not want to continue to walk into rooms with my partner and know 
that there are folks wondering “Who does what to whom?” Or worse yet, I do not 
want to continue dealing with folks’ assumptions that they know the answer to that 
awful question by how we stand, speak, or dress.  
 When we let go of identities in favor of identifications, then we have the 
possibility to connect in new clusters and formations, to engage serious conversations 
about sexual practice as spiritual practice, to teach our young people what it means to 
embody love and encounter God in the sacredness of a partner’s touch.  Why must we 
assume that my sexual practice has more in common with other men who partner with 
men than with other people of faith who approach sex as a form of prayer?  Why 
must we assume that the sexes of our bodies, or the qualities of our gender 
performance, are the most important aspects of how we extend hospitality to a lover?  
Aren’t these core spiritual values that deserve to be shaped and informed by our faith?  
So, why do we hand them over to the discourses that serve only to alienate us from 
ourselves, one another, and God?    
 For the most part Christians in recent years have bought into reducing a 
conversation about sexuality to a debate about “sexual orientation.”  As the term is 
used in these debates, sexual orientation is based in a notion of immutable 
differences.  It is a strategy that derives from a scientific/medical understanding of 
homosexuality merged with a history of efforts seeking equal rights under the law.  
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The thinking goes something like this: if my sexual identity is congenital and 
unchanging, then it is “natural” and “God-given,” therefore you must accept me and 
my relationships.  It is a strategy that was adopted from the liberation movements of 
other marginalized groups and has offered its share of successes, but it is also a 
strategy with significant problems.  First off, it sets up the category of “sexual 
orientation” as a clear-cut binary.  Either you are a straight, or you’re gay.  If you 
claim the possibility of choice in whom you partner with you undercut the central 
reasoning of the argument, and therefore fall outside the categories of analysis.  It 
also assumes that gender is stable, another clear-cut binary.  Folks are understood to 
be either men or women, based on whether they are male or female, and anything else 
(ranging from those who make “abnormal” choices in clothing and accessories, to 
those born with ambiguous genitalia) is deemed unnatural.  Further, the strategy of 
immutable difference sets up a notion of identity that in its controlling of boundaries, 
demands that loyalties be chosen between the sometimes conflicting politics of 
sexuality, gender, race, and class.  The effect is that the reigns of the conversation 
around same gender desire too often remain in the hands of wealthier, white, gay, 
men – while same gender loving women, people of color, working class folks, and 
non-westerners are relegated to other conversations about justice.  It sets up a system 
by which we pretend that racism, sexism, classism, homophobia, and imperialism are 
not all products of the same strategies to regulate access to institutional power.   
 Personally, I also find the logic of the immutable differences claims to be 
somewhat victimizing.  It assumes that if I could change I would…after all, who 
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would choose such a life?  Well, I would.  I love my life.  I love the gifts I have come 
to know because I share my life with the man I love.  I am thankful that my 
experiences with falling outside of dominant norms (so often violently regulated by 
the church) have opened me to a greater awareness of the other privileges that I carry 
in our culture as a North American, middle-class, white, male – also “identities” that I 
would argue are not natural or simply given, but rather are socially constructed, 
discursively produced, and far flimsier than they appear to be.  Still, those identities 
are read onto me, and I read them onto myself.  They shape my embodied experiences 
of the world, and thus they shape what I know and how I know it.  
 Ironically, because within the larger church I am read first and foremost as a 
gay man, I find it difficult to gain access to many faith-based conversations about 
other justice issues.  At least here in the South, though I suspect it is a broader trend, 
we somehow have managed to buy into this idea that churches can either take on 
issues of gender and sexuality or issues of race and class, but rarely both (I pray that 
the emergent church will take up the hard work to find another path).  Despite my 
childhood experiences, a career as a public school teacher, and a long history of work 
around other justice issues in the public sphere, when church folk come together 
beyond the congregational level to talk about justice and reconciliation I am often 
asked to either straighten up or stay away.  As long as I am working with secular 
activists, the connections between racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, 
imperialism, and rampant consumerism seem pretty obvious – and the assumption 
that they function separately and without overlapping targets seems pretty 
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problematic.  Still, in both ecumenical gatherings and those recent collaborations of 
Baptists of different stripes and flavors, rather than being understood as having a 
unique and possibly valuable perspective to offer on Christianity, power, and politics, 
folks like me are most often deemed a threat to unity (a unity that ironically seems 
dependent on our exclusion).  
 Here is my point, the thing I am feeling passionate about and finding life-
affirming these days: the emergent posture in regards to sexuality and justice, the 
truly prophetic stance at this moment, claims that life-affirming sexual practice based 
in loving kindness is a powerful, sacred, and transforming gift from God.  It is good 
and holy.  When this is our starting place, then the conversations about “What made 
you gay?” no longer have relevance.  The gender, race, and class of my partner 
become secondary to the ways in which we honor God through our embodied 
resurrection practices of sacred sex. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither 
slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus 
(Galatians 3:28). 
I say all of that, I name my deep longing for a different conversation, and yet I 
also believe the church still plays a huge role in working for a just and safe world for 
folks who call into question our assumptions about sexuality and gender.  As much as 
I long for a discussion about sexuality that moves from identities towards 
identification, from orientations towards practices, I know that we are constituted by a 
larger cultural discourse.  I would love to see the church take the lead in reframing the 
conversation and moving beyond apologetics that keep us locked neatly in place, but 
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as we do that let us not forget the daily physical, emotional, and spiritual violence that 
far too many of our bothers and sisters face at the hands of others claiming 
Christianity as their foundation.  I am ready for a new conversation, but I must move 
towards that without ignoring that the worst of the old conversation is still destroying 
the lives of people I love.  
A Call to Greater Justice 
I spend my time these days studying and teaching at a public university.  I 
work at the intersection of Curriculum and Cultural Studies, and teach undergraduate 
courses in both Education and Women’s and Gender Studies.  I have neither given up 
my ordination nor my commitment to ministry, but I have come to understand that 
amazing opportunities for engaging and rethinking my spiritual life have come with a 
willingness to walk beyond the boundaries of the churchyard.  Whether I am talking 
about the role of spirituality in the education process, or introducing the complexities 
of poststructuralism and queer theories, I carry my identifications with my faith 
communities with me.  Sometimes those identifications are named more explicitly 
than others, depending on the time and place, but it is widely known among my 
students and colleagues that not only is my ordination as Baptist minister part of my 
background, it is also part of my present.   
I can land in conversations about the relationship between the church and state 
on Tuesday, teach about the racialized and classed nature of the push for legalized 
same-sex marriage on Thursday, and then on Saturday find myself functioning as an 
agent of both the state and the church in performing a wedding and signing a license 
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for a cross-gendered couple.  Those practices and conversations leak into one another 
(which, by the way, makes the signing of those licenses more and more difficult). 
While I am always careful about the boundaries of my role as a state employee, I 
make little attempt to pretend that my multiple identifications are clearly distinct or 
lacking in meaningful tensions.  The invitation for me is to live fully within those 
tensions, to pay attention to how God is speaking through the stretches, and then to 
relax and trust. 
The ideas I have sketched out here have implications not only for sexuality, 
but also for how we think about privilege in relation to race, class, nationality and all 
other categories of identity that we take for granted. When we absolutize our 
identities, we set up rigid walls around communities that function as much to divide 
as to include.  We buy into the subtle hostilities in processes of self-definition that 
needs easily discernable others, abnormals by which we can understand our 
normalcy. That subtle hostility, when paired with anxiety and nurtured by fear, can 
erupt into hatred and violence. The church has a responsibility to confess and 
challenge our roles in producing and regulating those systems of categorization and 
their inherent outcomes.   
In the end, I am unsure as to whether or not there is anything really emergent 
about what I have said at all.  What is new about paying attention to God working in 
our lives?  What is new about Christ’s radical hospitality?  If what I am saying is read 
as disruptive, I pray that it is a result of my joining ranks with countless others over 
the past two thousand years who have sought to live their lives in the way of Jesus.  I 
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pray that I am but one of the countless people of faith from all traditions who opened 
themselves to the movement of Sacred Mystery in their lives.  I trust that God is in it 
all.        
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APPENDIX B 
 
An Open Letter to the Bishop 
 
 
This is a Southern story.  I am sure of this like I am sure that my heart pumps 
blood through my veins.  I know it like I know that just now my lungs are filling with 
air.  A sense of Southerness so permeates my consciousness that, at least to me, it 
largely goes unnoticed.  To talk of my experience as Southern is to highlight the 
backdrop, to decenter the presumed subject in favor of all that surrounds him.  And 
yet, to fail to recognize the Southerness of that same experience is to misunderstand 
the overwhelming power of that context which produced it.  The South is a lead 
character in all of my stories, regulating and defining the lives of the rest of us 
players. 
On February 25, 2006 my partner and I sat down for a Saturday morning 
breakfast at a diner in Charlotte, North Carolina.  We were tired, and in need of a still 
moment in the midst of a hard week.  We were in Charlotte to bury his mother, and 
breakfast would be our only chance to be alone before picking up his brother from the 
airport and heading back to the funeral home for final arrangements.  We ate quietly, 
reading the newspaper, comfortable in the security of being known so well as to feel 
no obligation for conversation.  Ron broke the silence asking, “What was your 
Sunday School teacher’s name?”  
“Which teacher?” 
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“You know…the Sunday School teacher.” 
“Jimmie Grubbs.  Why?” 
“I think you should read this.” 
Jimmie Grubbs had been arrested and faced a series of sex abuse charges.  I 
went outside, threw up, caught my breath, and decided since this had waited for 
twenty years it could wait two more days.  We buried Ron’s mother on Sunday.  
Monday morning I called the FBI.  I was one of more than a dozen who would 
eventually come forward, and at thirty-three the oldest of the North Carolina victims 
– at the time of the investigation most of the others were still in high school.    
Six weeks earlier I left my job as Minister with Youth and Young Adults at 
Pullen Memorial Baptist Church in Raleigh.  There were only a handful of clergy 
who publicly identified as something other than straight and still managed to serve a 
congregation in my home state, and I had been one of them.  Of that small group less 
than half of us publicly identified before our ordinations, and as far as I know, I was 
the first male to do so outside of the mostly gay and lesbian Metropolitan Community 
Churches.  I loved my work, but I was exhausted.  Working with a church youth 
ministry kept the memories and effects of my sexual abuse constantly stirred up, so I 
left and headed back to school.  A month and a half later, and more than fifteen years 
since I had last heard anything of his whereabouts, Jimmie Grubbs interrupted my 
breakfast and was thrust back into my life. 
It is not as if I had not worked on my issues around the abuse, nor had I been 
able to avoid questions about how the abuse continued to shape my sexuality.  Those 
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had been significant themes in both my academic and spiritual lives. I had spent the 
summer between my second and third years of Divinity School studying sexual ethics 
and homosexualities in Christianity at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, 
courses not offered at my school in North Carolina.  That was 2002, the summer after 
news of a string of abuses and cover-ups in Boston (and then elsewhere) rocked the 
Roman Catholic Church.1  The sexual abuse of boys by church leaders stepped into 
the national spotlight.  Everywhere I went out there I found myself in conversations 
about sexual violence, secrecy, and either the scapegoating of gay priests or the 
sexually arresting institution of celibacy.   
I was also in Berkeley to figure out if it was where I wanted to continue my 
studies.  It is as close as I would ever come to living out the exile theme so dominant 
in the narratives of queer Southerners, that notion that in order to be fully ourselves 
we must leave the South and spend our lives nostalgically pining for it (Smith, 2001; 
Brassel, 2001; Segrest, 2001).2  That summer I learned that I was able to hold my 
own in conversation with even my most radical classmates, both intellectually and 
politically.  But even more, I renewed my investment in the South, knowing that I 
wanted more than anything to be a part of those same conversations back home.  
Neither my queerness nor my abuse could be divorced from their Southern context.  I 
could run with the Bay Area queers, and I could question the Roman Catholic 
Church’s actions in New England, but I was still a Southern sissy abused by a Sunday 
School teacher in a protestant church.  I had important conversations that summer, but 
in the end my trip to Berkeley just pointed me back to North Carolina. 
213 
 
Dews (2001) speaks to the strange tension of the insider/outsider experience 
for us queer Southerners who chose to remain in the South, a position “creating a 
double or triple vision of the world, a position from which one may both participate in 
southern culture and yet remain apart from it” (p. 236). For years I had worked 
towards reconciling my relationships with the South, with Christianity, with 
professional identities as both teacher and youth minister, with queer theorists and 
gay communities, with my partner and my family, with masculinities and “manhood”; 
but in the months between Jimmie Grubbs’ arrest and his sentencing, the task 
changed. I was invited to live into the complexity of multiple identifications as I lost 
the capacity to internally regulate their boundaries. In the chaos and turmoil the 
investigation and court proceedings brought into my life, the clearly demarcated 
categories of my “identities” that I longed to claim as crystallized and stable bled into 
and reshaped one another.  The juice from my snap beans blended with the red-eye 
gravy from my country ham, which tasted of the vinegar I poured on my collards.  As 
they ran together, my identities lost their cohesion.  In effect, I was queered.   
The destabilization of my self-definition was not an intentional exercise in 
post-structural theories, rather it was a lived experience that post-structural theories 
helped me describe.  I could no longer manage with a wink and a laugh to identify 
myself as the ironic sum of a list of easy categories.  “Southern, Christian, white, gay, 
man” pointed towards something, but was based in an “additive model of identity” 
(Sullivan, 2003, p. 71) that no longer added up.3 The life I was living required a 
radical reconfiguring of all of those identities that made up my sense of self, and 
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brought to the surface the limitations of my claiming them each as discrete from the 
other.  I struggled to speak about my shifting subjectivity.  I longed for an entry point 
into a discussion of what it meant to carry in just one body all of these often 
conflicting discourses that shaped me.  I found that the text begging to be reread and 
theorized was my autobiography, the text of my own story.4 
If our subjectivity is preceded and determined by the language that speaks us 
into being, then mine was constituted with a drawl.  I grew up with the notion that 
Sunday morning is for worship and Sunday afternoon is for visiting.  I learned the art 
of storytelling, as both a practice of hospitality and a pedagogical strategy, on the 
front porch of my great-grandfather’s farmhouse.  Whether I am preparing a sermon 
or a scholarly paper, my words are always inflected with the cadence of the old folks 
whose stories told me who I am and where I belong. Southerners are a storied people, 
and in our storytelling we seek a common understanding of the South that shaped us. 
Jim Grimsley notes that despite our considerable diversity in life experience, as 
Southerners, “…when we talk about ourselves, we reach for…common material, the 
grotesque South, the soul-food South, the South that never forgot the Civil War, that 
never forgave slavery.  We reach for a South that has simmered in its own traditions, 
that has a past.  We remember a South that made us suffer in one way or another, and 
we hold onto that” (p. 231). For better or worse, I cannot engage in the act of writing 
without asserting my Southerness.  I make meaning from and through stories, and no 
amount of coaching could keep me from writing them with an accent. 
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I grew up in Winston-Salem, NC, hometown of Krispy Kreme and R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco.  It was a town that could glaze you in sweetness, while slowly 
stealing away your ability to breathe – but the South is changing, and in a move 
towards redemption the town’s largest employer is now the Baptist hospital 
(www.wsbusinessinc.com, 2007).  Both sides of my family have called North 
Carolina home for more than two hundred years.  I am a cradle Christian, baptized 
into the United Methodist Church before I spoke my first word.  As for many of us in 
the South, religion was such an omnipresent force in my rearing it is as if Christianity 
was absorbed through the pores of my skin; as Faulkner said, “It’s not so much 
whether I believe or disbelieve—it’s just there” (in Ketchin, 1994, p. xii).  I have 
lived my whole life in what Flannery O’Connor described as a South in which people 
“still conceive of humanity in theological terms”; a South that while “hardly Christ-
centered, is most certainly Christ-haunted” (in Ketchin, 1994, p. xi).  I grew up in a 
place where the church loomed large and faith was our native tongue.  In the cultural 
discourses that constituted my subjectivity, Christian and Southern were so conflated 
one bespoke the other.5  
 The letter that follows represents a moment of organic theorizing.  It was an 
act of letting go of attempts to reconcile disparate identities in favor of holding gently 
a complex web of identifications.  At the end of the odyssey launched in that diner in 
Charlotte, the need to address the church of my youth seemed self-evident, so I wrote 
a letter to the father of a childhood friend – a man who at the time of the abuse was 
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the District Superintendent for the Methodists in and around my hometown, and at the 
time I sent this letter was the Bishop for the Western North Carolina Conference: 
 
December 2, 2007 
First Sunday of Advent 
 
Dear Bishop McCleskey,  
 
I hope this finds you well.  It has been ages since we last met.  Please 
send my regards to Matt.  I hope he is doing well.  I am writing you 
because I want you to know that during that time your son and I were 
friends, my world was in chaos.  
 
I am one of Jimmie Grubbs boys, one of the twelve that have come 
forward thus far.  He was my Sunday School teacher at Maple Springs 
United Methodist Church.  Don’t worry; I’m not going to sue.   
 
That was me, “adult victim number six,” who was there when he was 
sentenced on October 17th. They told me I’d read a prepared statement, 
but then never gave me a chance. Instead, they put me on the stand, 
asked me what we’d done in those secret rooms.  Then they cross-
examined me, and called me a liar; but in the end, the judge deemed 
me credible.  I had the strange experience of having a stranger wearing 
a robe, sitting on a platform high above me, tell me that what I already 
knew was my history was indeed my history.  My story has been 
sanctioned by the state.  That matters to me more than I wish it did – 
after all this time to hear, as if hearing it for the first time, what I had 
heard in my head for two decades: what happened actually happened.   
 
After all that, there is just this one thing I want to make sure you 
understand: I do not hold the church accountable for what Jimmie 
Grubbs did, but I do hold the church accountable for propping up a 
culture that made it so easy.   
 
When Jimmie Grubbs was my Sunday School teacher we called him 
Coach.  I can remember the first time I met him – the day he sat down 
on the floor beside me in my confirmation class.  What I want you to 
know is that Coach was a mastermind at picking his boys, but I guess I 
was a pretty easy target.  
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It didn’t take a genius to figure out that I was the frequent target of 
homophobic taunts.   
It didn’t take a genius to figure out that I was prone to crushes on adult 
men.   
It didn’t take a genius to suspect that I had secrets I was longing to tell.   
 
But this was Sunday School in a conservatively moderate United 
Methodist church, in a conservatively moderate Southern town.  It was 
1985.  AIDS had just come into the news.  All I knew of men who 
loved men was that they died, and most folks I knew thought they 
deserved it.  All I knew was that I wanted to be among them, living or 
dying.   
 
Coach was a mastermind at picking his boys, but I guess I was an easy 
target.  It took him a while to build up to it, but one day driving me in 
that white convertible, he said, “You know, it’s really okay if you are 
gay.  God just made some of us that way.  We don’t have a choice.” 
 
“It’s okay,” he said.  “You’re safe with me, but other’s won’t 
understand…” 
 
And my life changed.  I was named.  There is tremendous power in 
naming…to be named is to be claimed.  It is a blessing – or a curse. 
God just made some of us that way.  We don’t have a choice. 
We don’t have a choice. 
I had no choice.  
I was gay.   
This is what it meant to be gay. 
 
So what I want you to understand, Bishop, is that I was framed.  It was 
a set up.  Where else was I supposed to go?  The church left my 
parents ill equipped for the likes of me, told them I was an 
abomination.  The only adult who would name what was going on 
inside me, claimed it for himself.  Jimmie Grubbs wielded them in his 
own crafty ways, but the tools he used were forged in the church’s 
fires.  
 
Next time you are invited to take a stand for folks like me, who once 
were the children longing to love outside the lines, remember that 
when no one else stood up, Coach stepped in.  And it nearly destroyed 
me.   
 
Bishop, I left the United Methodists fifteen years ago, right after I 
spoke up the first time about Jimmie Grubbs.  I was nineteen.  I went 
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to a pastor, and he took me to a District Superintendent.  There should 
be a letter on file, but it was lost by the time I showed up with sheriff 
and the FBI a decade and a half later.  That letter, so dutifully lost, was 
incomplete – I was too scared to tell all of what happened, and no one 
asked for more information than I gave.  I was too scared I would be 
implicated and run out of church, never mind that I was just a boy 
when I knew him.   
 
Two weeks after breaking the silence I went to the Annual Meeting of 
the Western North Carolina Conference (at the same place where I 
once performed sex acts with Jimmie Grubbs) and witnessed a three-
hour argument about what exactly makes for a “self-avowed, 
practicing homosexual,” the kind of homosexual denied ordination in 
the United Methodist Church.  Later that day, on a drive through the 
mountains, I told my father that God may be real, but God surely can’t 
be found in the church.   
 
We drove on in silence.  
 
I became an activist.  I remember thinking it would be a status symbol 
to someday have my name on a file with the FBI. I just figured it 
would say “dissident,” not “victim.”  Turns out they didn’t use my 
name anyway, just victim number 1617605.  What does that number 
mean?  I wonder who 1617604 and 1617606 are.  I imagine our secrets 
snuggly pressed against one another, high on a shelf in some 
warehouse of stories.  
 
It seems funny now, most of the folks who knew me thought my 
frustration with the church was just about my being excluded as a gay 
man – they only knew the half of it.  In reaching out to me, those big-
hearted, Southern, gay Christians told me, “God just made some of us 
that way.  We didn’t choose this.” It was a familiar refrain.  
 
They played point/counterpoint with the seven clobber passages: 
“No, this one isn’t about homosexuals, it’s really about temple 
prostitutes,”  
“This one is really about abuse of slave boys,” 
“There’s nothing in here about consenting adult lovers.”   
They argued that the truth about what the Bible says about 
homosexuality could be found in understanding the historical context 
in which it was written, and that historical context doesn’t include 
people like us.   
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But if the meaning is in the truth, and the truth is in the history, and I 
am not in the history, how am I to find anything in scripture at all? 
And so, I lost my scriptural heritage in a struggle to come back to the 
church.  It was reduced to the history of its origins and in the process 
was rendered irrelevant.  As a gay Christian without a choice, without 
a sacred story, I was lost.  
 
After eight years of wandering, I came back to church. I had this deep 
longing that would not let me rest.  Around that time, I heard a woman 
say, “Who cares if it’s a choice, it’s my choice to make.  Love is a 
sacred gift, and that’s enough for me.”  That was all I needed to hear.  
The deep longing overwhelmed me.  I cried every time I took 
communion that first year, just to be back home, to claim my 
belonging in the living body of Christ, resurrected in the life of the 
community.   
 
I picked up my Bible once again.  I fell in love with Lazarus, Jesus’ 
close friend, who in the eleventh chapter of John dies and spends four 
days rotting in a tomb, only to hear Jesus’ voice calling for him. 
 
But Jesus does not roll away the stone himself.  Jesus does not go into 
the tomb and wake Lazarus up.  He does not aid his friend in making 
the short journey out of the tomb (which must not have seemed so 
short to a dead guy whose hands and feet were bound).   Jesus simply 
cries with a loud voice “Lazarus, come out!” (John 11:42).  
 
Jesus calls on Lazarus to take the initiative to come out of his tomb.    
Jesus calls on his friend to practice resurrection, but the practice of 
resurrection requires his participation.  Christ can hold the space, give 
voice to the hope, but coming out of the tomb requires standing up and 
walking.   
  
Lazarus makes his way out of the tomb.  He stumbles out into the 
crowd gathered there, following the voice of his friend and teacher. 
But Jesus stands aside.  Instead of taking direct action in aiding his 
friend, Jesus turns to the crowd and directs them to do the unbinding. 
For me, this is perhaps the most significant (and overlooked) part of 
the story.  This is the part that keeps me coming back. 
  
In fact, the last words of the Lazarus story are “unbind him, set him 
free” (John 11:44). Jesus’ command to those gathered is a powerful 
directive to the community of believers. Jesus calls Lazarus into 
resurrection, but then he calls the community to overcome their 
propensity for spectating and get involved.  Resurrection is a 
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communal event…it is a team sport!  Unbind him, set him free!  This 
is Jesus’ word to those privileged enough to bear witness to one 
emerging from the tomb. It is the work of the community, to unbind, to 
set free.   
  
So this Jesus in the Lazarus story, he doesn’t do a whole lot, himself.  
This is not the Jesus who finds us good parking places at the mall.  
This is not a Hollywood Jesus.  This is a Jesus who stands on the 
horizon beckoning towards wholeness.  This is a Jesus calling to 
practice resurrection.   
 
This is why I am still a Christian, or at least why I don’t flinch if you 
need to call me that.  This story is still my story, and I know it is told 
in lots of other ways in lots of other traditions, but this is the one I 
learned in Sunday School.  The church gave me lots of stories.  This is 
the one I’m holding on to.   
 
It’s not always easy being a queer Christian, even in a gay affirming 
church.  I read from low and outside.  I claim my choices as holy and 
sacred.   
 
What I want you to understand is that this is not over.  My father is 
going to General Conference, where he will “vote for his son” – he 
said that too me, honest.  Dad would never claim to be an activist, and 
he does not thrive on controversy.  There are a lot of issues facing the 
church that are more central to his faith and getting far less attention, 
particularly the love and care of children in need.  But he is no longer 
able to sit silently knowing that I had to leave the Methodist church in 
order to find a home – a home where I could be ordained, a home 
where I minister with youth.  
 
Please do me a favor, Bishop, listen to those folks trying to get your 
attention, the ones making the case for the inclusion of gay, lesbian, bi, 
trans folk in the church.  But know that they are tired, and will settle 
for the slow progress they can get.  Not all of us can settle anymore.   
 
For some, the cost has been too great.   
 
Sincerely,  
Rev. Brian Ammons 
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Jimmie Grubbs was sentenced to twenty years in federal prison.  When the 
sentence was announced a wave of fist-pumping, back-patting, and hushed cheers of 
“Yes!” rippled through those gathered in the courtroom.  Sitting between my partner 
and my father, I was still and silent.  Glad as I was that he would no longer have 
access to boys, I would not participate in the revelry.  There were no winners.  
Nothing was restored.  As we left the room, sheriffs, lawyers and FBI agents shook 
my hand or hugged my neck.  We walked briskly past a swarm of cameras as we left 
the building, not pausing to comment.   
Going into the court that morning, my intent was to tell the story of my life in 
the two decades since knowing Jimmie Grubbs – the way his choices had continued 
to effect my daily existence.  And I wanted to forgive him, at least in as much as 
“forgiveness” means letting go.  I did not get that chance.  The language and 
proceedings of the justice system constituted me as an easily discernable victim, a 
present-day version of my twelve-year-old self.  I participated willingly because I 
wanted to stand in solidarity with the younger boys.  Even still, whatever subjectivity 
I could claim shifted while I was on the stand.  While being asked to describe in detail 
the rooms in which I performed my earliest sex acts, I looked at Jimmie Grubbs and 
knew that despite all that surrounded me in that moment, he did not have the power to 
reduce me to a child.  In that moment I was the man I long to be, a grown man 
holding another grown man accountable not with anger or malice, but with 
compassion.   
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In the months that followed, my letter to the Bishop was born in response to 
that moment of grace. As a Southerner, I had learned that stability was valued above 
all, that direct confrontation was crass, that silences served a purpose, and that it was 
better to just smile and walk away.  I learned those things not in the formal teachings 
of the churches of my youth, but rather in the practices of well-intended churchfolk.  
But the faith that taught me to believe in resurrection was bigger and than the 
Southern institutions that tried to contain it.  As a queer, I had learned to go ahead and 
let things be complex, to cease pretending that there were clear distinctions between 
any notion of us and them, and that whatever meaning we read onto our bodies and 
experiences was shifting and fluid.   
I never received a response to my letter.  I did not really expect that I would, 
though I have chosen to believe that it was read and hope its contents planted a seed.  
Perhaps more importantly, I know that the Southern church culture that refused to talk 
about ugly things is the same church culture that taught me a faith built on grace and 
forgiveness.  It is a queer juxtaposition, and in coming face to face with the 
impossibility of it, I was undone.  All I can say is that it is my deep belief that in my 
unbecoming – in the queering of Brian – God was present.  
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1 Mark Jordan’s Telling Truths in Church (2003) has been particularly helpful in 
shaping my thinking about navigating conversations about both sexual identities and 
sexual abuse in a church context.  His has been a rare and important voice in naming 
the intersections of multiple issues of human sexuality and the church’s silence 
regarding them.   
 
2 The theme of leaving in order to find freedom is often repeated in queer Southern 
narratives – Smith: “One of the stories I tell about myself begins something like this: 
In 1982, I moved to San Francisco to become gay, and there I found out that I was 
southern”; Brasell: “…she moved from the South to New York City and ‘became a 
full-fledged gay activist”; and Segrest: “I told myself in private conversations that I 
had to get away from home to be myself” (p. 204). Aside from these three cited 
essays from Out in the South (Dews & Law, 2001), the trope is repeated in major 
works of Southern fiction as exemplified in Allen Gurganus’ Plays Well with Others 
(1997). Grimsley (2001) offers a variation on this theme as he explores the experience 
of Southern queers who face a self-imposed, internal exile within the South’s major 
cities (Atlanta, New Orleans, Miami, etc.).  This version of the exile resonates more 
closely with my own experience of finding a home in the relatively progressive city 
of Raleigh – which, though smaller by far than Atlanta and Miami, holds its small-
town Southerness in splendid tension with its cosmopolitan aspirations.   
 
3 Sullivan refers to the “additive model of identity and oppression” (p. 71) in her 
discussion of race and queer theories.  She quotes Anzaldua in her critique of the 
model: “Identity is not a bunch of little cubby holes stuffed respectively with intellect, 
sex, race, class, vocation, gender.  Identity flows between, over, aspects of a person.  
Identity is a…process” (in Sullivan, 2003, p.71).  
 
4 I have found the work of other queer Southerners helpful in this regard.  In “Queerly 
Fundamental” (2007), Whitlock speaks of theorizing her own story in these terms: “I 
engage autobiographical narrative, and thereby lived experiences, as text, as ways-of-
knowing, ways-of-being-in-the-world.  Emergent themes thread together, but not 
neatly in a pattern” (p.70)   
 
5 As a Southern queer, the church plays a particularly distinct role, even for those 
who, in Grimsley’s words, “never attended any service or sang any hymn.”   He goes 
on to explain that the church is inescapable in the South, “…and has set about it’s 
task of telling people how to live…Most of all we have the church that tells us sex is 
nasty, never to be discussed except in its nastiness.  For gay people, this is the hardest 
part of all: because we can only identify ourselves as ourselves through what we 
desire, and we learn from the first moment of life in the South, that desire is a deadly 
evil thing” (p. 232). 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Sexualities and the Church 
 
 
Course Proposal for the Wake Forest University Divinity School 
Submitted by Brian Ammons, 2/09/09 
 
MIN 790: Sexualities and the Church: A Que(e)ry 
 
Brief Description: Ministers in a variety of settings are increasingly expressing a need 
for thoughtful preparation to engage both the religious and the larger cultural 
discourses around same-sex desire, coupling, and sexual practices.  This course will 
bring some of the frameworks referred to as "queer theories" into dialogue with the 
traditional theological disciplines, and will examine the implications of this work for 
the larger conversation about sexuality and gender in the church. 
 
Learning Objectives:  Students will be able to articulate an understanding of queer 
theories and their implications for Christianity. Further, students will employ 
strategies grounded in these theories as they consider themes and practices relevant to 
Christian ministry.  
 
Course Meetings: The fifteen contact hours will ideally be divided into eight two-
hour sessions (except the first meeting, which will be only one hour), with substantial 
time in-between.  The course material is complex and may require a significant shift 
in thinking for many, so time to read, reflect, and process will be crucial to the 
learning process.  I have considered other less-traditional structures, but am 
convinced that much would be lost by longer meetings or meetings held in rapid 
succession.  The most sustainable rhythm would be weekly meetings for half a 
semester (my preference is for earlier in the semester), but either bi-weekly meetings 
for the whole semester or twice-weekly meetings for a month would be workable.  
 
Course Overview: We will begin with a broad critical analysis of the range of 
Christian positions commonly taken in relation to homosexuality, GLBT, or Queer 
“inclusion” in the life of the church (including condemnation, conversion, access to 
baptism, church leadership, blessing of unions, and ordination).  Particular attention 
will be paid to emerging work calling for a new way of approaching these 
conversations. From there, we will engage in a brief introduction to queer theories 
(focused primarily on the significant influences of Foucault and Butler), and how 
these theories might shape our consideration of sexualities and the church.  The rest 
of our study will build on this basis and deepen both our understanding of these 
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frameworks and our fluency in utilizing them.  Our “que(e)ry” will lead us to 
interrogating a variety of topics, including:  
• Normativities and the production of the “sexual subject” 
• “Liberation” and “community” in the church and GLBT organizing 
• Scripture and reading strategies 
• Ethics (and its limitations) 
• Marriage and procreation 
• Sex as spiritual practice 
 
Assessment: Students will be evaluated through short papers, a final project, and class 
engagement.  
• Short Papers: In preparation for class meetings, students will be expected to 
complete one-page, single spaced papers about one of the assigned readings. 
Papers will briefly respond to the following four questions: What was the 
author’s primary argument? What worked well in making the argument? What 
did not work well or needed more development in the argument? How does 
this reading connect with your experience (personal or ministerial), or other 
studies? 
• Final Project: Students will have the opportunity to propose and complete a 
final project designed to match their needs and interests.  Options include (but 
are not limited to): a traditional academic paper (exegesis, analysis of a 
denominational stance/process, theological question, etc.); an ongoing journal 
throughout the course reflecting engagement with readings, class meetings, 
and outside discussions; a liturgy for a ritual relevant to course themes; a 
sermon manuscript or video; or a short film or art project. Projects will be due 
two weeks after the last class meeting.  An optional gathering to share/reflect 
on final projects will be considered. 
• Class Engagement: Preparation, attendance, and participation in discussions 
are critical to the success of the class.  
 
Texts: 
Articles and/or chapters will be drawn from these or similar sources: 
Althaus Reid, M. (2002) Indecent Theology 
Ellison, M. & Thorson-Smith, S. (2003) Body and Soul 
Goss, R. (2001) Queering Christ 
Spargo, T. (2000) Foucault and Queer Theory 
Other readings will be on reserve, many from the journal Theology and Sexuality 
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Syllabus: Sexualities and the Church: A Que(e)ry (MIN 790) 
Instructor: Brian D. Ammons 
Contact: bdammons@uncg.edu 
Available by appointment on Mondays  
 
Ministers in a variety of settings are increasingly expressing a need for 
thoughtful preparation to engage both the religious and the larger cultural discourses 
around same-sex desire, coupling, and sexual practices.  This course will bring some 
of the frameworks referred to as "queer theories" into dialogue with the traditional 
theological disciplines, and will examine the implications of this work for the larger 
conversation about sexuality and gender in the church.  Here we will question both 
the theological, ecclesial, and spiritual practices that produce/assume gendered and 
sexualized normativities, and the practices that then disrupt/transgress those same 
normativities.  We will engage the sacred mystery and the secular oddity 
simultaneously, reflecting on how one informs the other.  Our presupposition is that 
the discourses on sexuality and the church might be best illuminated by attentiveness 
to the persons and practices that push against their boundaries or cut against their 
grains, and so our questions emerge from those tenuous spaces.    
Ours is a large task, and our time is short.  If we do our job well, we will 
likely walk away with more questions than answers, but also with some new tools and 
a bit of practice in applying them.  We are ministers in an era of extensive 
conversation about sexuality, often framed as debates around “Christianity and 
Homosexuality” or “The Inclusion/Exclusion of Homosexuals”.  These debates take 
on various forms and pop up in both ecclesial and secular contexts.  Our work is to 
consider the nature of these discourses, the knowledge they produce, and the ways 
they function culturally.  During our time together we may not work out where you 
stand on any given proposition in your own denominational body, and we may not 
become expert givers of pastoral care for GLBT persons, but we will be better able to 
critically engage questions of grave importance to the people and communities we are 
called to serve.  
We will begin with a broad critical analysis of the range of Christian positions 
commonly taken in relation to homosexuality, GLBT, or Queer “inclusion” in the life 
of the church (including condemnation; conversion; access to baptism, church 
leadership, blessing of unions, and ordination).  Particular attention will be paid to 
emerging work calling for new ways of approaching these conversations. From there, 
we will engage in a brief introduction to queer theories (focused primarily on the 
significant influences of Foucault and Butler), and how these theories might shape 
our consideration of sexualities and the church.  The rest of our study will build on 
this basis and deepen both our understanding of these frameworks and our fluency in 
utilizing them.  Our “que(e)ry” will lead us to interrogating a variety of topics, 
including: biblical hermeneutics, racialized and gendered bodies, “liberation” and 
“community”, marriage, and sex.  
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Course Meetings: We will meet from 6:00-8:00 each Monday from the beginning of 
the semester until Fall Break.  Class participants may decide to hold an optional final 
gathering in which students will have an opportunity to share a meal and offer 
learnings from their final projects. 
 
Assessment: Students will be evaluated through short papers, a final project, and 
class engagement.  
 
• Short Papers: In preparation for class meetings, students will be expected to 
complete one-page, single spaced papers about one of the assigned readings. 
Papers will briefly respond to the following four questions:  
o What was the author’s primary argument?  
o What worked well in making the argument?  
o What did not work well or needed more development in the argument?  
o How does this reading connect with your experience (personal or 
ministerial), or other studies? 
Papers will be evaluated and accepted based on adherence to the assignment 
and quality of execution.  Each accepted paper (at the “A” or “B” level) is 
valued at 10 points. There are six possible papers, you will be graded on four 
– thus you either have two weeks off or two unaccepted papers may be 
dropped.  40 points (10 each). 
 
• Final Project: Students will have the opportunity to propose and complete a 
final project designed to match their needs and interests.  Options include (but 
are not limited to): a traditional academic paper (exegesis, analysis of a 
denominational stance/process, theological question, etc.); an ongoing journal 
throughout the course reflecting thoughtful engagement with readings, class 
meetings, and outside discussions; a liturgy for a ritual relevant to course 
themes; a sermon manuscript or video; or a short film or art project. Projects 
will be due two weeks after the last class meeting.  40 points. Due 11/2. 
 
• Class Engagement: Preparation, attendance, and participation in discussions 
are critical to the success of the class.  While students are not expected to be 
experts in the material, they are expected to engage in class discussion.  
Questions are valued and welcomed.  20 points. 
 
Texts: 
Wilchins, R. (2004). Queer theory, gender theory: An instant primer.  Alyson Books: 
Los Angeles. 
 
All other required readings will be made available on Blackboard. Optional resources 
for those interested in further reading will also be posted. 
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Schedule: (Readings are listed with the day they will be discussed) 
 
9/7: Normativities and the production of the “sexual subject” 
 Ammons, “Beyond Inclusion” 
 
9/14: Queer Theories/Gender Theories 
 Wilchins, Queer Theory/Gender Theory: An Instant Primer 
 
9/21: Scriptural Engagements  
 Goss, “Overthrowing Heterotextuality – A Biblical Stonewall” 
 
9/28: The Body as Queered Text (read at least one of the following) 
Douglas, “Black Body/White Soul: The Unsettling Intersection of Race, 
Sexuality, and Christianity”  
Mollenkott, “Crossing Gender Borders: Toward a New Paradigm”  
 
10/5: “Liberation” and “community”  
Althaus-Reid, “On Queer Theory and Liberation Theology: The Irruption of 
the Sexual Subject in Theology” 
 
10/12: Marriage and Relationships 
 Rudy, “Gay Communities and the Value of Family” 
 
10/19: Sex as Sacrament, Sabbath, and Hospitality (choose one of the following) 
 Goss, “Out of the Closet and Into the Streets”  
 Rudy, “Toward a Progressive Sexual Ethic” 
 
 
Other Course Policies: 
Students are expected to adhere to the Honor Code of the University.  Please refer to 
the Divinity School Bulletin and Student Handbook. 
Late Work:  Work is expected to be turned in at the class meeting on the day that it 
is due.  Should the need arise for you to negotiate an extension it is your 
responsibility to contact me before the due date.  Plan ahead, and keep a back-up 
copy of your work in case of computer problems.  
Exceptionalities: Please notify me of any special learning needs so that we may 
adapt to best enhance your learning experience. If you have a disability which may 
require an accommodation for taking this course, please contact the WFU Learning 
Assistance Center (758-5929) with the first week of the course.  In order to make 
accommodations for you, we must have a written statement from the WFU Learning 
Assistance Center. 
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Attendance: Regular class attendance is expected. If you know that you will be 
absent, please contact me ahead of time.  Unexcused absences will adversely affect 
your engagement grade.  Missing two or more class meetings will constitute 
automatic failure of the course. 
 
Course Grading: 
For all courses carrying graduate credit in the Divinity School, there are three passing 
grades—A (excellent), B (commendable), and C (satisfactory)—and one failing 
grade—F (failure). An A has the grade point value of 4.00 for each semester hour of 
credit involved, a B the value of 3.00 for each semester hour of credit involved, and C 
the value of 2.0 for each semester hour of credit involved. An F grade carries no 
credit. Pluses and minuses may be given at the discretion of the faculty member. 
 
 
Author Notes (includes optional readings): 
 
Althaus-Reid, Marcella: Argentinian Theologian and former Senior Lecturer in 
Christian Ethics, Practical Theology and Systematic Theology at the University of 
Edinburgh.  She began her studies of theology in Buenos Aires at one of the leading 
centers for liberation theology in the Americas.  She worked among economically 
deprived communities in both Argentina and Scotland. 
 
Ammons, Brian: is a Ph.D. candidate in Curriculum and Cultural Studies, and 
Women’s and Gender Studies, at the University of North Carolina – Greensboro.  His 
primary research is on Queer pedagogies as spiritual practice.  He is an ordained 
Baptist minister and 2003 graduate of The Divinity School at Wake Forest 
University.  He authored chapters coming out later this year in South to a Queer 
Place, and Baptist Stories of Emergence.  
 
Bailey, Marlon: recently earned a Ph.D. in the African Diaspora Studies Program 
with a designated emphasis in Women, Gender, and Sexuality in the African 
American Studies Department at the University of California, Berkeley.  His primary 
research focuses on Ballroom, a Black gay subculture in the US. 
 
Douglas, Kelly Brown: is Professor of Religion at Goucher College in Baltimore, 
MD.  She is a priest in the Episcopal Church, outspoken advocate around HIV/AIDS 
issues in the Black Church, and author of Sexuality and the Black Church and The 
Black Christ.  
 
Goss, Robert: teaches Religious Studies at Webster University.  He is an ordained 
pastor of the Metropolitan Community Church, where he transferred as clergy from 
the Roman Catholic Church where he had been an ordained Jesuit.  He earned a Th.D. 
from Harvard.   
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Kandaswamy, Priya: holds a Ph.D. in Ethnic Studies from the University of 
California, Berkeley.  Her dissertation research examined the intersections of race and 
gender in the U.S. welfare state’s efforts to regulate sexuality, control labor, and 
police the boundaries of citizenship.  
 
Monroe, Irene: is a Ford Fellow and doctoral candidate at Harvard Divinity School. 
She is a widely published columnist and well-known speaker/activist around the 
intersection of race, gender, and sexuality. She has been a regular contributor to In 
Newsweekly, The Advocate Magazine, and The Witness.  
 
Mollenkott, Virginia Ramey: is a feminist and queer theologian, grandmother, and 
Professor Emeritus of English at William Patterson University.  She is author of 
numerous books, including the pioneering “Is the Homosexual My Neighbor?” in 
1978 (with Letha Scanzoni) and the award-winning Omnigender: A Transreligious 
Approach in 2001.  
 
Patrella, Ivan: is an Argentinian theologian, currently Assistant Professor of 
Religious Studies at the University of Miami.  He is the author of numerous works 
including The Future of Liberation Theology (2004), and Liberation Theology: The 
New Generation (2005).  
 
Queen, Carol: has a Ph.D. from the Institute for the Advanced Study of Human 
Sexuality. She is the author or editor of many books, including The Leather Daddy 
and the Femme (1998), and PoMoSexuals (1997).  She is an activist/educator, 
minister in the Universal Life Church, and co-founder of the Center for Sex and 
Culture.    
 
Richardson, Mattie Udora: is a writer and activist who has been published in a 
variety of anthologies, including: Every Woman I’ve Ever Loved: Lesbian Writers on 
the Their Mothers, Does Your Mama Know: Black Lesbian Coming Out Stories, and 
Sisterfire: Black Womanist Fiction and Poetry.  
 
Rudy, Kathy: is Associate Professor of Women’s Studies at Duke University.  Her 
1997 publication of Sex and the Church: Gender, Homosexuality, and the 
Transformation of Christian Ethics, sparked a controversy that led to her leaving her 
joint post with the Duke Divinity School.  While more than ten years old, it remains 
an insightful and influential text.   
 
Wilchins, Rikki: is an activist and author whose work has focused on issues of 
gender as it impacts many Americans: straight and gay; male, female and 
transgender; white and of-color; youth and elder. Her work on combating 
discrimination and violence caused by gender stereotypes has provoked criticism by 
some in the transgender community, but has been widely accepted by others.  
